

# THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE



MAY, 1944

OVERSEAS EDITION



BOUGAINVILLE FIGHTER STRIP

# Events of a Month

The following chronological summary of events from March 10 to April 9, 1944, is furnished by special arrangements with *Current History*. Events in which Marines are known to have participated, or of special significance to them, are indicated in bold type.

## ON THE BATTLEFRONTS

- March 10—Soviet forces launch a new drive in the center of the 500-mile long battleline against the German stronghold of Uman.
- A combined British-American force lands on the island of Lissa, 25 miles south of the Yugoslav port of Spalato.
- General MacArthur announces that a second Allied air base within 150 miles of the Japanese base at Rabaul has been established within the past week at Talasea on the Willaumez Peninsula of New Britain.**
- March 11—Soviet troops cross to the west bank of the Dnieper to threaten Kherson. Street fighting continues for the third day in Tarnopol.
- Florence is raided for the first time by United States medium bombers, while heavy bombers attack Toulon and Padua.
- March 12—United States forces occupy Wotho Atoll in the Marshalls.
- American and Chinese forces are believed to have trapped a large Japanese force in the Hukawng Valley of Burma.**
- March 13—Russian troops capture Kherson, important Black Sea port, after a ten-day drive which netted them large amounts of captured German supplies and cost the Germans 63,000 men.
- American-led Yugoslav Partisans attack the Germans on the islands of Brac and Hvar off Spalato.
- American forces repulse a Japanese counterattack on the beachhead at Empress Augusta Bay and kill one-third of the attacking force.**
- In a drive toward Akyab, British and Indian troops capture Buthedaung, inland terminus of the Maungdaw Road in Burma.
- March 14—Soviet troops encircle several German divisions northeast of Nikolayev on the Bug River.
- Wewak, major Japanese base on New Guinea, is under heavy attack. New landings are made on New Britain below Talasea.**
- British forces open a new front against the Japanese in Burma, 110 miles southwest of the American-Chinese forces.
- March 15—The town of Cassino is subjected to the heaviest bombing and shelling ever concentrated on a single target.
- Navy bombers attack the Oroluk Atoll, 230 miles east of Truk.
- Secretary of War Stimson defends the progress of the war in Italy, declaring that "we already have achieved our first set of major objectives in the Italian campaign." He attributes the slow-down to difficult terrain, extremely bad weather and the "formidable forces" of the Germans.
- March 16—General MacArthur's headquarters announce an Allied landing on Manus Island. Four-motored bombers, apparently flying from the recently conquered Marshall Islands, attack Truk. General MacArthur, on the second anniversary of his arrival in Australia, renews his pledge to return to the Philippines.
- March 17—Lorengau airfield on the island of Manus is captured by Allied forces.
- March 18—The Allied airborne invasion of northern Burma on March 5 was the greatest of its kind in history, it is announced. Two strips were quickly built and supplies came in on a 47-second schedule.
- March 19—**Since the landing on Los Negros, 18 days ago, the Allies have seized all vital areas in the Admiralty Islands.**
- Japanese forces launch a major offensive toward India, across the Chindwin River.
- March 20—Allied flyers sink a Japanese convoy consisting of a 4,000-ton and a 6,000-ton transport with three escorting corvets, headed for Wewak, New Guinea.
- Chinese and American forces enter the Mogaung Valley in Burma.
- American battleships and planes attack Mili Atoll in the Marshalls.
- United States Marines land on Emirau Island, only 84 miles from the Japanese base at Kavieng.**
- March 21—The Allies announce the sinking of 22 more Japanese vessels in the Pacific.
- Indian troops recruited by Subhas Chandra Bose join the Japanese in their drive toward India.
- March 22—Japanese patrols cross the border into India from Burma.
- March 23—Heavy "round-the-clock" bombing of Germany continues as Allied forces attack Hamm, Achmer, Muenster, Brunswick and Frankfurt-on-the-Main. The British Air Ministry estimates that 326 Berlin factories were destroyed or damaged between November 18 and February 15.
- A second Japanese column crosses the Indian border.
- March 25—American forces in Burma take Shaduzup, cutting off the Japanese retreat line.
- General Ho Ying-chin, Chinese Minister of War, declares the reopening of the Burma Road is vital.
- March 26—Planes from the Aleutians hit Paramushirv, Onnekotan and Shimushu in the Kuriles.
- March 27—A third Japanese drive threatens Imphal from the north. In other sectors in Burma the Allied position improves.
- American flyers meet with some fighter opposition in another raid on Truk and inflict heavy casualties on the enemy force.
- March 29—Allied forces withdraw from advance strong points and German troops again command all the heights around Cassino.
- March 30—The War Department announces that, for the year 1943, the United States Army Air Forces destroyed 11,042 enemy planes at a cost of 2,885 planes.
- A strong United States naval force strikes at Palau, 550 miles from the Philippines. Simultaneously, a two-pronged air attack by American planes is made on the Truk atoll.**
- The announcement of 2,500 Japanese casualties in the drive on Imphal, India, indicates that the enemy drive is employing large forces.
- March 31—The Seventh United States Air Force raids Truk for the third time in 36 hours. At the same time Army and Navy planes bomb Woleai and Eauripik in the Carolines.
- Japanese forces enter the Manipur plain in India and the British abandon Tiddim, 100 miles from Imphal. General Auchinleck, Allied Commander in India declares there is no cause for alarm.
- Major General Orde C. Wingate, British jungle-fighter, is killed in a plane crash in Burma.
- April 1—It is estimated that 70 per cent to 75 per cent of the American troops transported overseas have been carried in American vessels as against 45 per cent in World War I.
- April 3—**American forces occupy 10 more atolls in the Marshalls.**
- Japanese forces cut the supply route to Imphal, India. It is believed that the drive into India is intended to divert United States pressure in other areas.
- April 4—In three attacks, Allied airmen destroy the entire Japanese air force at Hollandia, Dutch New Guinea.
- In India, Japanese forces set fire to the jungles east of Imphal, forcing the British to withdraw. The Chinese advance rapidly down the Mogaung Valley.
- Allied flyers strike at Bucharest, capital of Rumania.
- April 5—Japanese forces in India capture 15 miles of the Imphal-Kohima road.
- April 6—Allied aerial activity in the Southwest Pacific centers on the northwestern part of New Guinea.
- Indian troops in Burma break out of a trap to reinforce the threatened garrison of Imphal.
- April 7—**Enemy losses are tallied for the three-day attack, by Pacific fleet task forces, on Palau, Yap, Ulithi and Woleai. They include 28 ships sunk, 18 beached or damaged and 214 planes destroyed. American losses were 25 planes shot down and 18 men lost, while all ships escaped unscathed.**
- Ponape and Wake Island are again attacked.
- Japanese forces have advanced to within 35 miles of the Bengal-Assam railroad in India.
- April 8—On the Balkan front the Germans have been driven back to the borders of Czechoslovakia and northern Rumania.
- General MacArthur's headquarters announce the heaviest attack to date on Truk, where 51 tons of explosives were dropped.
- Military experts in Washington express concern over the Japanese ad-**

(Continued on inside back cover)



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## CONTENTS

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### COVER ILLUSTRATION:

This picture of the fighter strip at Torokina Point, Bougainville, was taken shortly after its capture. Marine planes are shown using the metal mat strip while graders are still at work.

THE THIRD MARINES AT BOUGAINVILLE. <i>By Officers of the Regiment</i> .....	2
A MARINE IS DIFFERENT. <i>By Colonel Charles A. Wynn, USMC</i> .....	13
MARINE CORPS ACES. <i>By Second Lieutenant Edna L. Smith, USMCWR</i> .....	15
THE EVOLUTION OF AN ATOLL .....	16
THE TAKING OF ENIWETOK. <i>By Captain Phillips D. Carleton, USMCR</i> .....	17
A JUNGLE AID. <i>My Major L. M. Mason, USMC</i> .....	21
AMERICAN MICRONESIA. <i>By Captain Clifford P. Morehouse, USMCR</i> .....	22
EL TORO. <i>By Major Arthur Menken, USMCR</i> .....	30
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? <i>By Captain Garrett Graham, USMCR</i> .....	35
MARINE CORPS SHOULDER INSIGNIA .....	37
EDITORIALS .....	38
CIVIL AFFAIRS. <i>By Captain H. C. Prud'homme, USMCR</i> .....	40
THIS WAS TARAWA. <i>By Colonel Clyde H. Metcalf, USMC</i> .....	43
CAMP ELLIOTT TRANSFERRED TO NAVY .....	46
AFTER THE TANK, WHAT? <i>By Colonel H. W. Miller, Army Ord-Res.</i> .....	47
INTERLUDE ON GUADALCANAL. <i>By W. S. Marchant</i> .....	49
BOYINGTON RECEIVES MEDAL OF HONOR .....	51
INTRA-BATTALION COMMUNICATIONS AFTER LANDING. <i>By Lieutenant Thomas M. Kerr, Jr., USMC</i> .....	53
DECORATIONS AND COMMENDATIONS .....	54
BOOK REVIEWS .....	58
MILITARY DIGEST .....	60

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*Opinions or assertions in the articles are the private ones of the writers, and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Navy Department or the naval service at large.*

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# THE THIRD MARINES AT

As dive bombers continue their attack, landing craft make for the shore.

**T**HE landing of United States Marines at Empress Augusta Bay on 1 November 1943 marked the beginning of the end for the Japanese in the Solomon Islands. This is the story of the part played in that operation by the Third Marines, one of the two assault regiments in the initial landing, from that date until the relief of the regiment at the end of December. During that period of nearly two months, the men of the Third had their baptism of fire, and fought their way through several important engagements with the enemy, initiating one of the most important campaigns in the South Pacific area.

The Third Marines, under command of Colonel George W. McHenry, USMC, were reinforced for the landing attack at Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville, B.S.I. by the 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines (Pack Howitzers); a Composite Battalion of the 19th Marines (Engineers); Company "C" of the Third Medical Battalion; detachments of Motor Transport, Amphibian Tractors and the Band; a Scout Platoon, and the Headquarters of the Second Raider Regiment (Provisional) and the Second Raider Battalion. A number of detachments of Division and Corps troops were attached for transportation and were a part of the shore party during the landing.

The transports arrived on station off Puruata Island during daybreak of 1 November. The debarkation of the troops

was executed under the cover of air support and during the fire of the naval gunfire preparation.

The landing schedule of the regiment provided for the simultaneous landing of the four landing teams on beaches from Cape Torokina to the Koromokina River, the 1st Battalion landing on Cape Torokina, the 2nd Raider Battalion to the west of the 1st Battalion, the 2nd Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Hector de Zayas, USMC) to the west of the Raiders, and the 3rd Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Ralph M. King, USMCR) between the Koromokina River and the 2nd Battalion. The 3rd Raider Battalion, attached to and under the control of another combat team, was to land on Puruata Island and destroy anti-boat defenses which might be emplaced there.

As the several boat groups approaching their beaches passed the western tip of Puruata Island, they were subjected to a heavy volume of fire from Japanese machine guns which had as yet escaped the Raiders. Fortunately, casualties were light, but LCP's which were employed as boat group commander's boats were, because of their distinctive appearance as compared with LCV's, easily identified as command boats and were well worked over while in range of the enemy guns.

The initial waves of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions reached their beaches without opposition other than from a light

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fire of rifles and machine guns from enemy observation posts. The 2nd Raider Battalion landed in the face of two bunker positions and a series of entrenchments occupied by a reinforced platoon but quickly overcame this resistance. The 1st Battalion ran into serious opposition. Cape Torokina was defended by a force of 270 officers and men who were determined to make a stand in the emplacements they had constructed and which included 25 heavy log and sand bunkers, one of which housed a 75mm. Mountain Gun. The well concealed bunkers were mutually supporting and the approaches to them covered by series of rifle pits and interlocking bands of machine gun fires.

As the boats of the 1st Battalion approached Cape Torokina they were again subjected to enemy machine gun fire, this time from positions on Torokina Island to their right: still casualties remained light. But now the 75mm. gun began to fire at the landing craft, and for a time the situation appeared to be most serious. However, though this gun fired over fifty rounds of high explosive shell, it succeeded in destroying or seriously damaging but six of our boats, and the landing continued unchecked. The gunfire did, however, blow up the boat formation, resulting in the landing

of the assault units in an order practically the reverse of that planned.

AS the boats grounded on the beach, the Japanese opened fire with their beach defense machine guns, but the density of fire was insufficient to stop the charge of the Marines across the beach and into the brush. In spite of the disorganization of units and the wounding early in the attack of the battalion commander,\* a unity of effort existed that soon destroyed the continuity of the defense fires and insured the successful completion of the landing.

In the meantime, shortly after H-hour, Japanese aircraft appeared, and the transports temporarily withdrew to sea. Although the enemy was soon repulsed by our air cover, a number of his planes succeeded in strafing our beaches, but inflicted few casualties since the troops in the shore parties had prepared slit trenches immediately after land-

\*Major L. W. Mason, who was in command of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, was wounded in the landing at Empress Augusta Bay. He was evacuated, but rejoined his unit several weeks later.


Major Mason was succeeded by Major John Paul Brody, and later by Major Charles J. Bailey, Jr., as CO of the 1st Battalion.

# EAT BOUGAINVILLE

## By Officers of the Regiment



LST's come in close to unload supplies and equipment.



Ammunition, food and supplies had to be carried over narrow trails like these, by hand. . . .

ing. The most serious consequence of this air attack and several more which followed during the day was the resulting delay in the unloading of the ships; however, before dark and well within the five hours of working time which had been set as a standard for the task, the transport division had been unloaded. In spite of a heavy surf which ran on two of the regiment's beaches to such a degree that they were subsequently closed to small boat traffic, the debarkation of equipment and supplies was completed without the loss of a single boat from other than enemy action.

The scheme of maneuver of the Division called for the landing on beaches within the Third Marines sector of engineer and antiaircraft artillery organizations from combat cargo ships which rendezvoused with the transport division during the approach to Bougainville. These landings were successful; antiaircraft defenses were established on the beaches before the debarkation of equipment and supplies was completed.

On Cape Torokina, as bunker after bunker fell to the assault of squads and platoons, control was gradually re-established over the landing team, the rifle battalion was reorganized and an advance begun which by evening terminated in the occupation of the proposed initial beachhead line.

**W**ITH the sending out of the first patrols, it became evident that with the exception of two avenues of approach to Cape Torokina, the landing teams were hemmed in by swamps and the most dense and rugged jungle that the men had ever seen. With each landing team on its final objective for the first day, it was only by

superhuman effort on the part of the communicators that even lateral command lines between teams could be laid before dark. Patrols from the 2nd Raiders and the 1st Battalion, pushing through swamp and tangles that held their advance to a few dozen yards an hour could not make contact. To plug the gaps and close the possible avenues of approach of Japanese reinforcements which were known to be north of Piva Village, Company "E" of the 3rd Marines and Company "L" of the 3rd Raider Battalion were shifted to the Cape Torokina sector and put in position to cover the flank and rear of the 1st Battalion, now nearly a thousand yards from its beach.

But the 2nd Raider Battalion had done its work well and, before the enemy could determine on a course of action, was securely established across the line of advance of whatever reinforcements the Japanese might have wanted to send to Cape Torokina. A counterattack against our position on Cape Torokina never materialized. Company "E," 3rd Marines, was returned to its Battalion on the 2nd of November when the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, was shifted to the Cape Torokina Sector to reinforce the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines.

The daylight hours of the 2nd and 3rd of November were devoted to the sending out of flank contact patrols and reconnaissance patrols to the front, in establishing the beach defenses, and in reinforcing and improving the defenses of the Cape Torokina sector. Torokina Island, from which a small but determined band of Japanese harassed the Cape Torokina beaches with machine guns for two days, was finally neutralized, marking the end of initial resistance to the landing.

At 1800, 3 November, control of the Cape Torokina sector passed to the 9th Marines, who on the 2nd and 3rd had had two battalions shifted to the area. The 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, went into Reserve under control of the 9th Marines at that time and remained on Cape Torokina until the 6th, when it reverted to the 3rd Marines and was moved to a regimental reserve position east of the Koromokina River.

In the meantime, the 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines, in a position on the left flank of the Division beachhead, with its flank on the sea, had been attached to the 3rd Marines, and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 3rd Marines, had begun an advance inland through the swamps. The general course of the 2nd Battalion was to be north, and to enable it to maintain contact with the Raiders on the right, Company "A" of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, was attached to the 2nd Battalion from the 6th to 11th of November.



. . . Or through the heavy mud by amphibious tractor.





Trucks often skidded off the narrow road and bogged down in the swampy shoulder.

The general course of the Third Battalion was generally north and then east, along the perimeter of the Division beachhead: the 3rd Battalion was assigned the task of locating the route of a lateral road from the left flank to the right.

ON the morning of the 7th of November, a Composite Battalion of the Japanese from Kavieng and Rabaul landed outside of the Division beachhead west of the Koromokina River and moved against the 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines. The initial landing was made by about 75 men; over 400 more were observed to land at intervals throughout the morning at various points along the beach. However, the enemy was distributed over so wide a front that his full strength could not be assembled quickly, and unless he were to delay so long as to lose the initiative, he had only the alternative of attacking with but a portion of his force.

The enemy chose to attack at once. Although his attack was most aggressive, the enemy's strength was insufficient to carry him through our position. When the advance of the enemy had been checked, the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, less Company "A" was ordered to pass through the left flank company of the 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines, and attack the enemy, now numbering 200 or more, in his position. By nightfall, the offensive power of the enemy had been destroyed although during the night the remnants of the landing force kept moving up in an attempt to restore the Japanese position. At dark, the 1st Battalion went into defense west of the Koromokina River. Two platoon patrols operated in the enemy's rear throughout the night and caused the Japanese considerable trouble.

Early on the 7th, the 1st Battalion, 21st Marines, had been shifted to the Third Marines' Sector and had been placed in Regimental Reserve. It was now planned to finish off the enemy with an attack by this unit on the



Mud and water filled the foxholes. This machine gun team repelled repeated Jap attacks at Piva Trail road block.

morning of the 8th. During the night, a coordinated infantry-tank-artillery-air attack against the Japanese position was arranged, and soon after daylight, following a fire preparation by several batteries of artillery, several antitank weapons, and the machine guns and mortars of the 1st Battalion, Third Marines, the 1st Battalion, 21st Marines, accompanied by light tanks, passed through the 1st Battalion, Third Marines, and advanced to a lagoon 1500 yards west of the Koromokina River. There, opposed only by a few shocked survivors of a force completely shattered by the fighting of the past twenty-four hours, it went into perimeter defense and sent out combat patrols to the north through the swamps and west to the Laruma River. The results of the patrols were negative, and it was evident that the Japanese effort against our left flank had been destroyed by the attacks of the 7th and the fire preparation of the 8th.

On the 9th, to insure that the Koromokina Lagoon-Laruma River area would be cleared of any possible concentrations of survivors, a dive bomber strike bombarded and strafed the beaches, jungles, and swamps from our lines to the Laruma River and for three hundred yards inland. Patrols later found the bodies of many Japanese who were caught by the strike as they returned to the area from the refuge they had taken in the back country.

The air strike of the 9th permanently ended all enemy activity on the west. At noon on that day the sector and the control of the 1st Battalion, 21st Marines, passed to the 37th Division of the Army. The 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines, reverted to the 9th Marines and was shifted to the Cape Torokina sector. The 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, returned to its position in Regimental Reserve.

With regard to the disposition of the units which had been attached to the 3rd Marines for the landing on 1 November, almost all organizations reverted to the control of their own regiments or to Division control soon after the completion of the debarkation of equipment and supplies. The Scout Platoon was the only organization to remain attached throughout the entire campaign: the Raider Regiment passed to Division control on landing; artillery batteries soon passed to artillery battalion and then to artillery regimental control, and by the 12th of November engineer troops constituting the regimental shore party had reverted to the 19th Marines and the regimental shore party had been disbanded. After the detachment of these re-



War dogs helped to spot Japanese snipers.

inforcing units, engineers, service and supply troops, motor transport and amphibian tractors were attached or placed in support of the regiment as the situation, from time to time, might require. The 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines, war in direct support of the regiment throughout the campaign and Company "C" of the 3rd Medical Battalion maintained its field hospital in the vicinity of the 3rd Marines' command post during the first month of the operation.

IT was believed that the purpose of the enemy landing had been twofold: first, to make a diversion on the west and create a favorable situation for an attack against our eastern flank by the Japanese 23rd Infantry which, less one battalion, was in readiness in the hills north of Piva; second, the attack of the 23rd Regiment having been successful, to make a junction with that force and establish and cover a beachhead east of the Lauma River for the landing of additional forces from New Britain and New Ireland.

The entire scheme was ruined by the quick destruction of the landing force, and when the 23rd Regiment moved to the attack to carry out its part of the plan, it found its way blocked by the Raider Regiment. So, as it was later found, the enemy withdrew again to the hills and began the construction of defensive positions east of the East Branch of the Piva River and the setting of road blocks and ambushes on the Numa Numa and East-West Trails, thereby preparing a base for further operations along other lines.


When the general locality of the enemy's main force had been established by our patrols, the rate of advance of the Third Marines, the speed with which the Lateral Road was being run in, and the number and range of combat and reconnaissance patrols was stepped up to the limit of endurance of men and machines. Neither jungle nor swamp interrupted the steady advance to the north and east to the vicinity of the junction of the Numa Numa Trail with the East-West trail where, if no time were wasted, it was anticipated that a main action could be fought with the enemy before he could complete his defensive installations.

ON the 11th of November, the 3rd Battalion, cutting in the Lateral Road, crossed the front of the 2nd Battalion. The 2nd Battalion then advanced a thousand yards north of the road and covered it and the interval between



Wounded had to be carried over deep jungle trails.





Chaplain George M. Kempker celebrates Mass on an altar made of logs and a tent roll. The Chaplain was awarded the Legion of Merit for his heroism in Bougainville.

the 37th Division and the left flank of the Third Marine Division, now covering the Numa Numa Trail. On the 12th, the 1st Battalion, Third Marines, began a movement through the jungle which on the 15th put them in a position south of the 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines, which was covering the Trail Junction of the Numa Numa and East-West Trails. On the 16th, the 3rd Battalion broke out of the jungle at the trail junction and connected its supply road from the west with the Numa Numa Trail which


had been joined with Amphibian Tractor Trails from the east. The supply of the regiment in further operations was assured. The Third Battalion took a position north of the 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines, and west of the Numa Numa Trail. The 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines, now passed to the control of the Third Marines.

The regiment was now in position to begin the extensive patrolling and development which finally located the

*(Continued on page 10)*



Regimental Chaplain Joseph A. Rabun conducts Protestant services so close to the front lines that the congregation sit amid barbed wire entanglements.




← Headquarters of Brigadier General Field Harris, USMC, on the front lines in the battle for Bougainville.



↑ These Marine engineers rush construction of a crude bridge over one of the countless streams in swampy Bougainville.

↓ Veterans of the battle of Cibi's ridge.



↑ Weary Marines return from an all-day patrol into enemy territory.



← The Marine on the far left (with phone) is waiting for the word to open fire with this 75mm. pack howitzer on the Japs at Bougainville.

→ This Marine Corps dive bomber was the first plane to land on the newly constructed airfield built near Empress Augusta Bay.





↑ Marines parade down the sands of Bougainville, awaiting embarkation aboard ship.


↑ These tanks, battered veterans of the invasion of Bougainville, are being repaired by Marines on Empress Augusta beach.



↑ Major General Allen Hal Turnage, who led the invasion of Bougainville, shoos away a fly at a luncheon conference with Lieutenant General Millard F. Harmon, USA (on left), and Major General Oscar W. Griswold, USA.

↑ Framed in the heavily wooded hills of Helzapoppin Ridge is Mount Bagana, active volcano on Bougainville.





This is First Lieutenant Steve J. Cibik who led a small group of Marines in the capture of a 400 foot high ridge near the Piva River and held it against four powerful counterattacks. The ridge was named in his honor and his platoon nicknamed themselves "Cibik's men."

(Continued from page 7)

enemy's exact position and brought about a decisive action with the Japanese main forces.

As a result of patrol activity on the 17th and 18th, an enemy road block was discovered on the Numa Numa Trail one thousand yards north of the 3rd Battalion's position, and a Japanese outpost was located on the East-West Trail in front of the 1st Battalion, 21st Marines, half way between the East and West branches of the Piva River.

To release the 3rd Battalion for an attack on the Numa Numa Road Block, the 3rd Raider Battalion, now attached to the Third Marines, moved into the line.

On the morning of the 19th, the Third Battalion, 3rd Marines, accompanied by light tanks, advanced in a contact imminent formation towards the enemy. The Japanese road block was by-passed and struck on its flank: the enemy, a reinforced company, after a short resistance, withdrew. The 3rd Battalion occupied the position and established a perimeter defense. On the morning of the 20th, the same Japanese company that had withdrawn the previous day, returned and attacked the 3rd Battalion in its rear but the outcome was never in doubt. As the survivors fled to the east, the 3rd Battalion followed. On the morning of the 21st, the 3rd Battalion encountered a Japanese defensive position of 150 foxholes to its front: without delay the Battalion attacked, carried the position and occupied a mass of high ground overlooking the main Japanese position which was now determined as being east of the East Branch of the Piva and astride the East-West Trail. In

addition, the position now held by the 3rd Battalion cut the Japanese line of communication between the Numa Numa Valley and the Jala district.

As for the East-West Trail outpost, the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, released from the left as the 37th Division extended its lines to the northeast on the 19th, approached behind the 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines, and on the morning of the 20th, passed through our lines and reduced the enemy position.

The 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, then continued on across the East Branch of the Piva in a reconnaissance in force which fixed the exact location of the Japanese defenses and resulted in the occupation of a commanding ridge from which artillery could be precisely adjusted on the enemy positions.

While the 2nd Battalion was still across the West Branch of the Piva, the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, which had been withdrawn from the right to a position in reserve on the 20th, now, on the morning of the 21st, advanced to the west bank of the East Branch of the Piva and, reinforced by machine gun squads from the Regimental Weapons Company and by Company "L," 3rd Raider Battalion, established a defensive line from the left flank of the 21st Marines sector to the right flank of the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, including the ridge which had been seized by the 2nd Battalion. The 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines, now reverted to the control of the 21st Marines and moved to the south.

On completion of its reconnaissance on the 21st, the 2nd Battalion returned through the 1st Battalion's lines to an assembly area in rear of the 1st Battalion and south of the East-West Trail, but not without a fight; the enemy, with a strength of two battalions, reinforced, did his best to prevent a disengagement.

While the 2nd Battalion's movement to its Assembly Area was in progress, the Japanese suddenly attempted a double envelopment of the 1st Battalion's newly occupied positions. Unfortunately for the enemy, his columns fol-



Despite all obstacles, the Marines won the day as typified by this leatherneck carrying a captured Jap flag.

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lowed the avenues of approach best suited for defense, and his effort was destroyed in front of the machine guns that had been sited against just such an attempt. While the action was in progress, a combat patrol from Company "A," 21st Marines, came up and joined in the fight. Thereafter, and until the 21st Marines advanced their lines abreast the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, this Combat Patrol remained in a position covering the right flank of the 1st Battalion.

ON the morning of the 22nd, the plan for the destruction of the enemy had been formulated. As the first step in executing it, the 2nd Raider Regiment, now coming under control of the 3rd Marines, advanced and relieved the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, in position. By the evening of that day the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, had been moved to an assembly area in rear of the 1st Battalion, abreast of the 2nd Battalion, but to the north of the East-West Trail.

The regiment was now in position for the attack. The enemy positions, consisting of rifle pits and small bunkers, and supported by artillery, had been found to be disposed as if to resist an attack from the south towards the hills. But the Plan of Attack contemplated an attack from west to east, enfilading the Japanese lines and paralleling the hill mass the enemy thought we would attempt to occupy.

The 24th was set as the date of the attack. The Scheme of Maneuver was that the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, following an artillery preparation, would advance abreast, pass through the lines of the 1st Battalion, and attack to the east for a distance of 800 yards beyond the East Branch of the Piva. The East-West Trail was to be the boundary between battalions.



**COLONEL GEORGE W. McHENRY, USMC**  
Colonel McHenry commanded the Third Marines in the Bougainville Campaign.

The day of the 23rd was spent in completing the reconnaissance of unit commanders; the artillery forward observers plotted in their targets and adjusted their batteries, and the 1st Battalion moved every available machine gun into the line, including several Nambu and Hotchkiss machine guns which had been captured from the enemy.

By dark, all was in readiness. Seven battalions of artillery, four of the 12th Marines and three of the 37th Division, were prepared to fire 5600 rounds of 75 and 105mm. high explosives in 20 minutes into an area 800 yards square. Batteries of 155mm. guns and howitzers were ready to fire on distant targets. The 1st Battalion had sited 44 machine guns and coordinated the fires of twelve 81mm. and nine 60mm. mortars for a fire preparation across the front that was to be covered by the attacking battalions.

On the morning of the 24th, right on time, the artillery opened fire with the heaviest concentration that had ever been delivered before an attack by Marines; the 2nd and 3rd Battalions advanced to the line of departure to the accompaniment of a continuous rattle and roar of machine guns, mortars, and artillery. As the battalions entered the Japanese lines, they were met with silence; the destruction of the enemy's positions within the beaten zone of the fire preparation had been complete. But, gradually, as the advance continued to its objective, the enemy rallied his survivors and committed those reserves who had escaped.

By the time the left battalion, the 3rd, had moved forward about 500 yards, the enemy was ready and launched a counterattack against our left flank. The 3rd Battalion met the attack in full stride and continued its advance in a hand-to-hand, tree-to-tree struggle that ended with the



**BRIGADIER GENERAL OSCAR H. CAULDWELL, USMC**  
General Cauldwell, who trained the Third Marines, has now been made director of training for the FMF.



On the captured airfield these seven Marine transport planes are being loaded with the wounded for evacuation to field hospitals.

complete destruction of the enemy's entire flanking force.

As the 2nd Battalion neared its objective, it too, closed with Japanese reinforcements coming forward to make a stand. The battalions remained on their initial objectives only long enough to reorganize and reestablish contact. Again they started forward, this time to a final objective 350 yards to the front. The Japanese here made a desperate effort, but as the leading elements of the Third Marines came up to a line 1150 yards in front of the original line of departure, all resistance came to an end. The Japanese 23rd Infantry, leaving 1107 dead on the field, was destroyed.

This battle, known as the Battle of the Piva Forks, marked the end of serious opposition to the occupation and development of the Empress Augusta Bay area as an American air base. The enemy, with the exception of small detachments and patrols, was driven east of the Torokina River, and the high ground which he had held and from which he not only controlled the site which was to become the Piva bomber field but also from which he could harass the entire beachhead was occupied by our forces.

THE 25th and 26th of November was spent in consolidating the new position and in advancing the Division's lines to the flanks of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions.

On the 27th, the sector was turned over to the 9th Marines, the Raiders were detached, and the regiment was shifted to the east, where it took up a position in defense,

from the sea on its right flank to Hill 500 on its left. The regiment had now completed a transit of the entire beachhead; from Cape Torokina and the mouth of the Piva to the Koromekina and then through the jungles and swamps back to the limits of the patrols of the first two days.

While the regiment was in the eastern sector, the 1st Battalion, 145th Infantry, which maintained an outpost on the west bank of the Torokina at its mouth, and the balance of the Scout Company of the 3rd Tank Battalion were attached. Company "C" of the 19th Marines, a combat engineer company, had been in support since before the actions on the Numa Numa Trail, building and maintaining hospital facilities and supply routes to the battle positions, accompanied the regiment into the sector. An antitank battery of the Special Weapons Battalion supported the beach defenses on the right flank.

In order to afford the rifle battalions an opportunity to rest and reorganize their troops who had been on the go for twenty-seven consecutive days, a Composite Battalion was organized from among the Regimental Weapons Company, the Scout Company, the several Headquarters Companies, and from available service troops, and assigned a position in the lines from November 28 to December 3, when, with the exception of the Scout Company, the units were returned to their normal duties. The Scout Company remained in the lines until the regiment was relieved of the sector.

The sector bordered on deep swamps, fingers of which cut across the supply routes. The problems here again centered around maintaining the men in position. Though numerous patrols traversed the swamps daily and searched the east banks of the Torokina River from time to time, no evidence could be discovered that the Japanese intended to do more than keep the Sector under observation. A number of sharp skirmishes were fought between small patrols which came upon each other in the cane-filled swamps. In time the enemy stopped sending his parties across the river and contented himself with attempts to maintain observation posts on the beach across the Torokina.

On the 22nd of December, the regiment was relieved in position by the 2nd Raider Regiment, reinforced with a parachute battalion, and went into corps reserve, where it remained until it embarked to return to its base.

#### REGIMENTAL STAFF

##### Third Marines at Bougainville

Colonel George W. McHenry, regimental commander.

Lieutenant Colonel George O. Van Orden, executive officer.

Major Grant Crane, R-4.

Major Sidney S. McMath, R-3.

Captain John E. McDonald, quartermaster.

1st Lt. John W. Foley, Jr., R-2.

2nd Lt. Clyde T. Brannon, R-1.



# A Marine IS Different

By Colonel Charles A. Wynn, USMC

THERE is something special about a United States Marine. It starts before the man is even sworn in. It starts when he is offered a choice and says:

"I'll take the Marine Corps; it's the best fighting force in the world."

I don't say the Corps is the best fighting force; I could easily be accused of prejudice. But I firmly believe it is, and because of the very fact that men who have only heard of the Marine Corps believe it to be, those who are in it are positive of it; and men who have served with the Marines are forever thereafter Marines, no matter what they do outside the service or in any other branch of it. "Once a Marine, always a Marine," is a definite, simple truth. How does this happen?

It is something deep down inside the soul of the Corps which I have often tried to analyze. It isn't because the Marines have served in every corner of the world; the Navy has done that. So has the Army. It isn't because the Marines have won many of the greatest battles; some of the greatest battles fought by our forces have not used a single Marine. But ask a man why he enlisted in the Corps and his answer is always the same:

"It's the best fighting force in the world."

And when he says it there is always something in his eyes which proves that he means every word of it. His eyes light up and his shoulders straighten and his pride is something he himself would find it difficult to explain.

Is it because his trails have led him, since that day in 1775 when the Corps was first formed, through so many lands of romance? Is it because "from the Halls of Montezuma to the Shores of Tripoli" he has really *lived*? What is the first thing the newcomer to the Marine Corps experiences? Discipline, with a capital D. His first contact with the Corps is invariably with a corporal, sergeant or other noncommissioned officer. Oh, he is sworn in by a recruiting officer, but the officer has no time for discipline, and the NCO is really the first introduction to the leathernecks. Before that the man has only read about the Corps, and has but the foggiest notion of what it stands for. Or he may have a relative in the service, or one or more may have served in the Corps before him. Whatever his motive, he is now a leatherneck. And even this nickname, dating back to a time when marines wore leather collars, has a special sound and meaning.

DOES the NCO receive the newcomer with a smile? He does not! He finds in the newcomer just another marine. But the newcomer finds something in the NCO; he finds the Corps. There is a grim, determined set to the shoulders of that first NCO. There is no smile on his face; a smile indicates friendliness, hail-fellow-well-met, and the NCO definitely is not that. Maybe he himself, six months

ago, was a newcomer. But in six months he has become as much a Marine as though he had served in the Corps for years on end. He has *absorbed* the spirit, the tradition, of the Marine Corps. It is all there, in his attitude, his appearance, the way he wears his uniform, the set of his cap, the authoritative tone of his voice, the firm tread of his feet. He takes obedience for granted, and because he does, his men, including the newcomer, *especially* the newcomer, obey him. In him the newcomer sees what he may become: a man with a background, the stripes of authority, knowledge of things military, of the far places of the earth, the tongues of men, the sureness of self-confidence, of faith in God and in his own destiny. In short he sees a *Marine*, and he would have perhaps even more difficulty in explaining his meaning than I have, and I have had thirty years in which to study thousands upon thousands of leathernecks—every last one of whom, in greater or less degree, has been a *Marine*.

Take the oldtimer. On his dress uniform (which the newcomer cannot wear because it is not issued in time of war) he wears his campaign ribbons, ribbons indicating various decorations, ribbons indicating where he has served his country, often in small wars which have scarcely attracted the attention of the newspapers. The newcomer doesn't know the meaning of half of them, or any of them, but in every squadroom, every headquarters, he will find a poster which explains them all. That ribbon, for instance, is for service in Panama; that one for service in Haiti. There are ribbons for service in World War I, Santo Domingo, Panama, the Spanish American War, the Nicaraguan Campaigns, Mexican Campaigns, Chinese Expeditionary, Yangtze Patrol. There are *two* ribbons for the Byrd expeditions to the Antarctic, for Marines got in on those, too. There are ribbons for Korea, the Cuban Pacification, the Philippine Pacification—even for the Civil War; and woe be unto the eager young Marine who, all unknowing, appears in a purchased uniform wearing a Civil War ribbon, or any other ribbon he is obviously too young to have earned! That's one of the first things he must learn: wear it if you rate it, otherwise be satisfied with what you have; it's honor enough just to *be* a Marine.

THE oldtimer is just about average when he wears three rows of ribbons, three ribbons to a row. He has been just enough places to make him interesting, to give him stories to tell, and if he is the average oldtimer he will tell them. And, contrary to sometimes popular belief, his tales are more likely to be under- than over-drawn. There are, of course, exceptions. There are famous oldtimers in the Marine Corps who have themselves done little, but have a gift for story-telling which holds the "boot" spellbound. A "boot" is any Marine, of any rank, who has less service than

the oldtimer, who is himself a "boot" to an *oldtimer*. An oldtimer will invariably begin a tale like this:

"When you've been a gyrene as long as I have. . . ."

Or,

"When you've been as many places as I have. . . ."

Then he will settle back and start talking. And while he may not have taken part in every campaign that the Marines have experienced since 1775, he has known Marines who *have*. And I wouldn't be surprised if that might be the answer. Until recently, when World War II skyrocketed the Marine Corps to unbelievable numbers, as if it were planned that the leathernecks themselves handle the Japanese situation, the Corps was a big family. Every officer knew every other officer, personally or by repute, every enlisted man knew or knew of, every officer and "just what made him tick." And the older officers knew all of the older noncoms, who knew themselves, in turn, to be the backbone of the Marine Corps. Those same NCO's still are the backbone of the Marine Corps; but only themselves and the older officers know it. They must work unhonored and unsung, holding the Corps together as always, preserving tradition, spreading their personal influence—which is the Corps. They are far outnumbered by younger, fresher noncoms; but those younger noncoms, even though they may never know it, derive directly from the oldtimers whose names they may never hear. That is tradition, the real reason why Marines are different. The oldtimers, the crack rifle-shots, the crack machine-gunners of yesterday, the grizzled veterans of "banana warfare" in Haiti, Santo Domingo, Mexico, Panama, Nicaragua, Venezuela and scores of other—literally—hot spots, have so set their mark on the Marine Corps that nothing can erase it, no agency can change it. The newcomers can only ride with the tide, and every last one of them is proud to do just that. The newcomer who has never visited any of the places which are second homes to the oldtimers, nevertheless partake of those places. They are his vicariously. The oldtimer presents them to him when he enters the Corps and he, the newcomer, instantly enjoys a feeling of ownership, of sharing. The Corps is big enough to be divided into many families, but it chooses to remain one big family.

And that is carried out in every unit of the Corps. The squad is a family. The section, platoon, company, battalion, regiment, brigade, division, corps, army—yes, the Corps has really become an army, in numbers—each unit is a family, firmly and sternly self-contained, and eager to defend itself against all comers, including other squads, sections, platoons, companies, etc. A squad within a section is fiercely competitive, but let another section challenge that section, and squad rivalry is merged into section rivalry; the three or four squads become one unit, one family, indivisible, regarding itself as unconquerable.

"I'm the best damn' man in the best squad in the best section in the best platoon in the best company. . . ."

WE need not go all the way with that; but the oldtime drill master can recite it at top speed, and convince the rookie that he is an integral member of each of those units in which the preceding one is contained, right up to and including the Corps itself, to such an extent that the rookie, almost from the beginning, regards the Corps as

his personal property, for whose honor he will fight anybody else to the death. It is little wonder, from a psychological standpoint, that when all the chips are down the leatherneck fights like a wildcat until something cracks, or somebody goes down—usually the other fellow's installations, then the other fellow, though he is not particular as to the order of precedence.

"March like you owned the parade ground! You don't own it really. *I* do! But for now, *pretend* that you own it!"

That's real invention of an oldtimer and it's amazing how such an obvious outward absurdity can straighten the shoulders of marching Marines, light up their eyes, with the result that all their superiors say, when the parade is over, the march in review at an end:

"Well done, leathernecks!"

Or,

"Pretty good show!"

Praise does not have to be lavish to please a Marine; he already *knows* he's good. And why does he know it? Because the past of the Corps proves that it has been hitherto filled with real Marines, and he has stepped into the shoes of some Marine who no longer needs them because he has retired, or gone out in glory on some beachhead that all the world has forgotten—except the Marine Corps, which remembers and honors its own. This fact has caused the repeated accusation that the Marines "blow their own horn too much." The Corps pays little heed to this. It merely tells accusers to go and do likewise, and thus be too busy to spare time to accuse, or puts it like this:

"When we no longer put up, we'll shut up!"

I don't mean by this that every Marine, or any Marine, goes around bragging about himself. He does nothing of the sort. The man who does is a bore in the Corps, as he is anywhere in civil life, or in other branches of the service. He allows his deeds to speak for him. The newspapers and magazines tell the story, sometimes exaggerated perhaps, sometimes underdrawn, so that the balance is usually as it should be.

The Marine specializes in so many things. The individual Marine may be only an expert rifleman, a sharpshooter, a marksman, or even unqualified, with the Springfield or the Garand; but he shares the Corps with the great rifle shots, the distinguished marksmen, who have won their medals and their trophies against the great rifle shots of the nation and the world—and therefore *he* is a distinguished marksman. He rubs shoulders with the elite of the rifle, sees and hears just how it has been, and can be done, resolves that sooner or later he too will be distinguished. And because he spends the rest of his "cruise" trying, constantly improving, absorbing the lore of rifle shooting, "snapping in" on his own spare time, he increases his efficiency to the point where the difference between himself and the distinguished marksman becomes invisible—at least to a German or Japanese. What difference does it make to them that the distinguished marksmen can drill them between the eyes, while the expert rifleman refuses to risk a miss, and drills them through the heart instead?

THE individual Marine may not be the best machine-gunner in the Corps, but he rubs elbows with the best, and plenty of their knowledge, experience and coolness,



rub off on him. The oldtimer himself, with the interests of the Corps always at heart, sees to this. The oldtimer who will not spare the time to "put the rookie wise," does not exist. Proud of his background, the oldtimer makes it continue as part of the Corps' tradition, by passing it on to as many as have ears with which to hear, eyes with which to see.

This holds true throughout the weapons of the Corps. It is true on the land, the sea, and in the air. Everywhere the Marine is utterly at home. Take a "boot" who has never seen salt water, and send him to sea aboard a "battle-wagon" and he will belong, because he has already rubbed elbows with oldtimers who "know all the answers," and have passed them on to him. He'll betray himself by being seasick, and he'll be ashamed of it—until he finds an excuse for his own squeamishness in old salts who, even after years of going to sea, still become seasick on occasion. By the time he finds the excuse, he finds he no longer becomes seasick; that he is indeed a "soldier of the sea." Rudyard Kipling called him "the bloomin' cosmopolouse, soldier and sailor, too!" Now he has added to that by becoming a flyer as well.

The Marine goes everywhere, does everything. It is taken for granted that nothing is impossible. He is simply ordered to do a given job. He goes and does it. Nobody tells him how. He works it out on the spot. He invariably succeeds. It never occurs to him that he may fail.

It sometimes happens that orders practically require a Marine to be in two places at once. Does he complain? Bitterly, sometimes, for "beating his chops" is one of the prerogatives of the leatherneck, but even while he grouses he is busy doing both jobs.

"I may not be able to be in two places at once," is the way he puts it, "but I'll come as close to it as any man they can find!"

I'm still not sure, after thirty years, just how this is done, but within a week after enlistment, the average Marine knows everything I have tried to tell in this little article. He acquires his knowledge, I do believe, by some process of osmosis that defies the scientist. I've even heard an eighteen-year-old private first class, begin a lecture to a platoon of recruits with,

"In all my long career in the Marine Corps. . . ."

And have been amazed to see the platoon, sometimes containing men twice as old as the instructor, "take it" without batting an eye. I don't encourage lying, but in his own mind that lecturer was not lying. When he said, "my long career in the Marine Corps," he simply meant the very thing I am trying to analyze: his career was as long as that of the oldest timer, because he shared, from the moment of enlistment, the entire tradition of the Corps with every oldtimer in it, including the honored dead and the gloriously living.

## Marine Corps Aces

By Second Lieutenant Edna L. Smith, USMCWR

IN recapitulating the status of Marine Corps aces since 10 March 1944, the date of the list published in the April GAZETTE, the high score remained 26 when this went to press. But with Major Foss again in the combat area, it is possible that he will break his own record. Meanwhile it has been announced that an Army Air Force pilot, Captain Richard I. Bong, has topped the record by shooting down 27 enemy planes in the southwest Pacific area.

Only nine new names have been added to the list and there has been little revision of current scores, probably due to two factors: a time lag in receipt of February and March war diaries and no large-scale advance beyond Rabaul. Lieutenant Colonel John F. Dobbin, hitherto credited by several sources with 12 planes, has himself written us that his score is 8; thus his place on the list has been changed. On the other hand, Captain Eugene A. Trowbridge, who has been carried as a six-plane ace on former lists, has actually accounted for 10 planes, according to a recent official score which reached Headquarters following a directive from the Commander in Chief to all ships, squadrons, and stations operating aircraft. The directive, dated 14 February 1944, ordered that individual and squadron accomplishments since 7 December 1941, be recapitulated and submitted to the Bureau of Aeronautics; a few reports have been received.

With each new phase of the Pacific campaign, scores rise and new aces are born. Guadalcanal, New Georgia, Vella LaVella, and Bougainville activities each produced its crop

of aces. Following the Bougainville invasion, there was a short hiatus, the calm before Rabaul; then, operations against that stronghold were started in December. The relentless and multiple poundings on Rabaul produced some of our most recent outstanding aces. Lieutenant Robert M. Hanson had only 5 planes from November 1943 till January 1944, when he shot down 20 between the 13th and 30th. On 13 January, he accounted for 5 and on both the 23rd and 30th of January, scored 4, all in strikes on Rabaul. The remaining seven were shot down on missions to Rabaul on the 20th, 22nd and 23rd of January.

Captain Donald N. Aldrich, with a current score of 20, which equals that of Captain Kenneth A. Walsh and puts Captain Aldrich in third place among living Marine Corps aces, scored 3 in August and 2 in September 1943. Not until 11 January 1944, did he change his score but in six missions, from 11 January to the 27th, he accounted for twelve planes and, before leaving the combat area, added three more in February.

Lieutenant Harold L. Spears, who moves from sixteenth place in April to ninth on the May list, had only 4 planes to his credit when raids on Rabaul commenced. From 18 January 1944, when he shot down 3, until the 25th, he accounted for eight planes; just before leaving the Southwest Pacific, he bagged another three. Six of Major Boyington's total, including his twenty-sixth plane, were shot down in Rabaul raids.

# The Evolution of An Atoll


## Marines Should Be Familiar With Their Nature and Characteristics

**S**TUDY seems to have proved true Darwin's theories about the formation of coral islands. At one time the barrier reef of the existing island was growing around the shores of a volcanic island; as the volcanic peak slowly sank, the coral reef continued to grow, till finally it alone projected above the surface of the water, a thin comb of coral rising over a tremendous base of dead coral stone. It is a peculiarity of the coral polyp that it can thrive best only when the surf beats upon it and bears into it the oxygen and minute food particles on which it lives. Thus the thin edge of the reef near the surface of the water is always on the outer slope.

This thin shell of coral around the sunken island would follow pretty faithfully the outlines of the former island; though it would be roughly circular, it would double and turn at former indentations in the coast or up former ravines that led down to the sea. Over a long period of years, the surf breaks off great sections of the coral and drives them inland across the shallower portions of the reef; all kinds of debris collect, pile up, and gradually form a low island; on the lagoon side of the new island the lesser fringing reef grows and is destroyed in the same manner when the wind shifts to drive against it; the island grows in length but not in height (it rarely rises more than five or ten feet above the surface of the sea); finally it is held and secured in place by the vegetation that grows upon it—in some places the tall trunks of coconut trees planted by the

earlier migrant tribes; in some places only bush and jungle that has been seeded there by birds or winds. The island reflects the shape of the barrier reef; where the reef is a smooth arc, the island is long, thin, and oval; where the reef bends or turns sharply, the island becomes triangular or bends on itself like an open safety pin. The triangular island of a chain is the one most likely to be fortified since it offers the best surface for runways that can face two of the prevailing directions of the winds; it also has the area for barracks and supply depots.

Two final things need to be said about the atoll: (1) The islands are usually found on the windward side of the atoll circle; that is, the side from which the trade winds commonly blow; on the side across from the trade winds there may be no islands behind the reef or only very small ones; on the upper side of the atoll—the side toward the winds, the islands will be chunky: irregularly shaped or triangular; on the downward side where the wind drives alongside the reefs, the islands will be long, thin, and smooth. (2) There will be one or more passages into the lagoon through breaks in the outer barrier reef, typically between two fairly large islands. Fresh water draining from the islands kills the coral, and waves rush through the passageway lifting out the sand and scouring down the narrow channel. On the windward side the passage is likely to be deep and clear; but on the leeward side there may be one or more intercepting reefs.



Cross-section of a typical South Seas atoll, Eniwetok, the taking of which is narrated in the article beginning on the opposite page, is made up of such formations.





Over Eniwetok on February 17, 1944.

# The Taking of Eniwetok

By Captain Phillips D. Carleton, USMCR

*This account of the Eniwetok Operation has been compiled from available documents and is as completely presented as security considerations permit.*

THE attack on the Eniwetok Atoll will probably become a classic of its sort. The operation was singularly successful because of the long planning that preceded it, the previous training of the attacking force—the Twenty-Second Marines, and the efficient use of lessons learned in previous operations. The planning provided an answer to any contingency, the training proved strikingly efficient, and knowledge of previous operations was the basis for very smooth and close coöperation between the fleet and the troops, and for an unconfused specialization of tasks.

The Twenty-Second Regiment was the principal striking force for the Marine Corps. It had been kept as a separate tactical group and trained especially for a task like this. It had the special advantage of previous rehearsals and the opportunity to watch a similar attack when it accompanied the Fourth Division to Kwajalein and remained in the Corps Reserve during the taking of the atoll. Like other regiments which later distinguished themselves, it had done a tour of duty in Samoa.

Formerly early in 1942, it had landed at Samoa and had been attached to the Third Brigade; its Third Battalion was promptly detached and sent to another island as a garrison force with a defense battalion. For the next few months the war was being fought a long way off. The Seventh and Eighth Marines went away "for duty beyond the seas" and fought at Guadalcanal; then the Third Marines came in, completed their early training, and sailed to prepare for the attack on Bougainville. The Ellice Islands were being fortified and airports erected for the Central Pacific campaign. It was not until November 1943, in the flurry of reliefs coming in to the Ellice Islands to set loose the defense bat-

talions there that the Twenty-Second was reassembled and sent on its way to a staging area for its first combat as a tactical group of the Fifth Amphibious Corps. Previous to the sailing of the Regiment, Brigadier General Thomas E. Watson with his staff had been detached from the Third Brigade, had flown to a central base and there laid plans for the organization that was to be used in attacking Eniwetok Atoll. For this purpose the Twenty-Second Marines were to be attached directly to the Fifth Amphibious Corps and certain Corps troops were to be used as their reinforcements: in particular, the Corps Reconnaissance Company and the Corps Tank Battalion. The tactical group also included the 106th Infantry Regiment, U. S. Army, with its reinforcements: a field artillery battalion. This group also included defensive elements of both services.

After its arrival in the staging area, the Twenty-Second Regiment tried out full scale rehearsals of landing operations and learned to work with its reinforcing elements. In January it sailed on the expedition to Kwajalein Atoll, but spent most of its time on ship in the Corps Reserve. Back in the staging area, the regiment went to school again to digest the lesson it had learned; its education had been strictly logical and was now nearly complete. In February it moved against Eniwetok Atoll.

Eniwetok Atoll is an isolated chain of islands lying northwest of the Marshalls, typical in its formation of all atolls though smaller than many: its lagoon is nearly circular, about twenty miles across, with the large islands of the atoll to the north and at the south. It presented the usual problems for the attacker: the reefs which make any atoll island tough to get at; and once the attacker has landed,

the entire lack of cover which keeps him exposed. Outside the islands that compose the ring of the atoll lies the barrier reef of tough growing coral; inside them are the fringing reefs, wide, broken, and crumbling, because the live coral has been cut off from the surf which brings it food. Toward the ocean the reef slopes down to tremendous depths; the lagoon is usually shallow, with dangerous blocks of coral near the surface of the water.

**E**NIWETOK ATOLL is roughly circular and can best be described by reference to a clock face. Almost at 12 o'clock is Engebi Island, on which is the airport which the Japanese constructed. At five o'clock is Eniwetok Island from which the atoll gets its name; just above it is the deep passageway into the lagoon. At 6 o'clock there is another passage, not so deep nor so clear as the first. The problem facing our troops was the capture of Engebi and Eniwetok at opposite ends of the lagoon. The small islands that ran up from 3 to 1 o'clock were only weakly defended, and the islands on the west side were too small to offer effective places of resistance. (See map, page 22.)

Earlier information about the atoll dated back to 1923, when the USS *Milwaukee* had gone up and down the Pacific plotting, exploring, and checking against the earlier German hydrographic maps. After Japan had taken over her mandate through the League of Nations, the islands were closed to the rest of the world. Beginning in December reconnaissance flights had produced a careful set of aerial photographs and accurate maps; by January the whole operation had been planned in the most painstaking detail. The Japanese had not begun to fortify the atoll heavily, but had been using it as a supply base or as a naval anchorage since they confidently expected that the eastern Marshalls would bear the brunt of the first attack. After the fall of Kwajalein they had had no time and very little opportunity to rectify their error. We faced no great danger to our ships from shore guns, we could keep the Japanese aircraft on the ground or destroy it there; but we knew from previous experience that the troops ashore could and would put up a fierce and long resistance from interlocking pits, trenches, and pillboxes.

Dog day was the 17th of February 1944. A sweep of carriers had been planned to approach the atoll with its screen of destroyers by two-thirty on that morning. The main task force protecting the transports included battleships, cruisers, a swarm of destroyers and high speed minesweepers. This fleet arrived off the atoll at dawn and cleared the east passage by bombardment from the big ships and by the minesweepers. Close on the heels of the minesweepers, a battleship entered the lagoon and steamed north to strike at Engebi; now with protection within the lagoon the transports could enter through the wide south-





- 1—Landing barges, guarded by destroyers, approach Eniwetok.
- 2—Marines machine-gun Japs 400 yards up the beach.
- 3—Blasted trees offer little concealment in the advance inland.
- 4—This marine leaps a dead Jap and continues forward.
- 5—Bathing after a bloody battle.
- 6—Amphibious tractors back up the marines they landed.
- 7—An Army tank menacingly rumbles toward the front lines where marines were pushing the Japanese off the island.



1944

ay





(Map by courtesy Life Magazine)

ern passage, herded in by the minesweepers to their unloading points, carefully charted long before.

During the day the Corps Reconnaissance Company landed on Aomon and Buziri and took them from the few defenders and began to work up the reef toward Engebi. Within easy distance of the vulnerable points of the island, destroyers and battleships could pick their targets, and air strikes could be made on the selected points on each of the northern islands. The important islands were those lying from about two o'clock north to one o'clock: Aomon and Buziri Islands, and, of course, Engebi Island itself.

At one o'clock of the next morning the Scout Company of the Tank Battalion pushed off in rubber boats to lock the trap. They were to secure the short chain of islands to the west of Engebi in order to prevent any escape from Engebi. They were supposed to land on the island nearest Engebi—Bogon Island, but surf beat them off and they came ashore at the other end of the chain and worked up along the reefs to their objective. (In this Pacific warfare, the scout companies of the tank battalions were playing a strange rôle, and doing very well. Originally, as plotted in the tables of organization, the scout company of a battalion was a small mechanized company mounted on motorcycles and jeeps who scouted the countryside and the advanced roads for signs of the enemy.) By 8 o'clock of that morning the islands on either side of Engebi were secured and the final landing plans were ready.

The main attack on Engebi began at 0843 with the landing of the first wave. Tanks came in on landing craft through channels that had been plotted the day before, while the island was being beaten down under naval artillery. The tanks formed and went straight through the island till they came to the north end and then wheeled and started clearing the perimeter. Landing behind them, the first wave pushed ahead rapidly, bypassing the stronger positions. The second wave cleaned out the isolated strong points that remained. The resistance was fierce but not prolonged. Pill-boxes along the shore came to life, men landing were pinned to the beach. The locked struggle began: cement and machine guns against troops on an open beach armed with rifles and demolitions. The long training paid off again; the lessons learned at New Georgia, Bougainville, Gloucester, Tarawa, Kwajalein, the researches of demolition

engineers, and experiments in the staging area told the men what to do, and again they somehow had the courage to do it. At 0955 the Third Battalion Landing Team came in as Reserve. By 1450, the island was secured. That evening rations and supplies were being unloaded, and in the morning the first of the defense units were disembarking.

At nightfall the Third Battalion of the Twenty-Second was pulled back afloat together with the battalion of light tanks, ready for the next strike. On the nineteenth the attack turned south; the Corps Reconnaissance Company took over one by one the islands lying north of the east passage, and the Scout Company of the Tank Battalion secured all the small islands lying to the west of the south passage. At 0918 the 106th Regimental teams with the Third Battalion of the Twenty-Second in reserve made their landing on the beaches of Eniwetok Island itself. The beaches were near the waist of the island and poorly defended but as the battalion turned north and south, they met lines of fortifications hastily erected across the width of the island. There was no way of flanking these successive lines of defense to which the Japanese retreated, and the dense jungle scrub prevented very accurate assisting naval fire. Moreover, the narrow beaches prevented all the necessary troops from getting ashore quickly with their artillery. By night time, after the Third Battalion of the Twenty-Second had been committed, we had a large area in the center of the island and were forced to set up a perimeter defense until the next day. Businesslike preparations were meanwhile going on to attack the last formidable island of the group, Parry, which lay just to the north of Eniwetok.

During the night of the twentieth the searchlights of the ships played along our perimeter of defense and star shells kept the whole enemy area illuminated to prevent night action by the Japanese or infiltration by snipers. The snipers got behind the lines, but apparently the blazing lights kept their shooting inaccurate and ineffectual, and when daylight came they were quickly cleaned out. At dawn, all the field artillery of the army was ashore, the troops made a slow advance, and by nightfall had occupied the whole south end of the island. The next day they completed the capture of the island; the Third Battalion of the Twenty-Second was reëmbarked. The Reconnaissance Company had meanwhile taken the only other island in the chain, a mere dot of land lying athwart the passage itself on the lagoon side. There was no place to which the Japanese could retreat.

While the fighting for Eniwetok was still going on, some transports sailed through the passage and reported to the Corps Commander. They carried the Marine Defense Battalion, which in February had set sail and come to Eniwetok, arriving in the bright morning just as our troops were about to make the last advance down Eniwetok. The Battalion was ordered to form a provisional infantry company to support the Twenty-Second in its attack on Parry the next morning.

Taking Parry was the task of the Twenty-Second Regiment. They went in on the next morning after a preliminary bombardment. The pack howitzers dropped concentrations of fire where they demanded it. From their landing on the



northern beaches they secured the northern end of the island; and then, with the tanks ahead of them, swept south at a methodical pace of about 250 yards an hour through dense jungle growth. After four days of fighting, eating, and sleeping with the great guns of the fleet booming and the sound of gunfire always in their ears, the men were tired and worn out, and probably their very fatigue gave a kind of precision to the teamwork of their fire groups. At 1900 the Regimental Commander reported that the island had been secured. By a Corps order of the 15th of November, the Regiment had been directed to train "with the objective of early readiness for amphibious operations against small islands and coral atolls." This had been the objective. One subordinate direction under the general order had been to include "jungle warfare, including patrolling and use of the compass." At the time this direction

had seemed in contradiction to the general order. After the experience on Parry the Regiment knew the reason. Engebi had lived up to the general reputation of what a Pacific coral island should be, with its ranks of coconut trees and its white sands. Parry had been covered over its modest length with as dense a jungle as any the Twenty-Second had seen in its stay in the rain country of Samoa.

On the following days of the month the Twenty-Second was reëmbarked, and the Marine Defense Battalion went ashore to mount its guns on Eniwetok. The Army Defense unit took over Parry, and the 106th guarded Engebi. The atoll was secure. The Twenty-Second sailed back to Kwajalein. It had been an efficient, well-timed operation with comparatively few casualties. A cemetery of American Marines on a little island at the East Passage is a grim reminder that these islands are ours.

# A Jungle Aid

By Major L. M. Mason, USMC

THIS article is written to pass on something different that was tried in my battalion and many times proved its worth. Each officer and enlisted man was issued a ten foot length of quarter inch line and instructed on how to whip the ends and stain it green. This was always carried in a neat coil on the belt or pack. The uses it can be put to are innumerable and new ones are always presenting themselves. Besides lashing equipment, improvising stretchers, lashing spars, crossing streams and scaling heights (to mention a few) we used these lines to great advantage in keeping contact in moving through the jungle at night without lights. In case you don't know it you cannot see your hand before your face in thick jungle at night—even in a full moon.

Moving noiselessly at night through the jungle was next to impossible. The men couldn't see each other and were forever losing contact and getting lost. To help keep contact and to bolster their morale, which is not at its highest pitch when one is walking seemingly all alone in the jungle blackness, the men would keep verbal contact. This verbal contact grew into quite a din especially in the still of the night. Our ten foot lines finally solved this problem. Each man passed one end of his line through the left suspender ring of his pack and tied the other end to the loose end of the line on the man ahead of him. This gave you a column of files, which is the easiest way to move through the jungle at night, all on one line. An individual could not get out of the column, he had ten feet of loose line to move on and more important had both hands free to carry his piece, fend off branches and keep his balance—that last point is not to be overlooked if you've ever tried to walk in the jungle in blackness. In case of a sudden fire fight the line would be cut with the knife nearly everyone carries or with the bayonet. The line is passed through the left ring instead of the right ring to assist in such an eventuality. A word of caution: if care is not taken you are apt to end up with one or two men way out in front

and the rest of the platoon (not recommended for units larger than a platoon) bunched up like a string of fish on the end of a line. This condition can be avoided if each individual will not allow a knot to pass either way through his ring. With ten foot of line leaway, a man can make his own way comfortably in the dark with full confidence of not being alone. He does not have to speak a single word. Should he stumble and fall he does not pull anyone else down because the whole line is free to slip through each ring. Should the leader set too fast a pace for any individual that man does not have to shout "Hold it up," or "Wait a minute." Instead he holds fast on the line and if everyone is trained not to allow a knot to pass through the ring the whole column is stopped without an order. The leader of the group must realize that the majority of these halts are merely for individuals to close up one or two paces and so do not necessitate a long halt. The leader should push on after a few seconds halt and if the necessary adjustment has not been made another tug on the line will quietly stop the column. This obviates calling out "Alright, go ahead" or "Move out" as is the usual custom and moves the column forward quietly. The march can be resumed without command after a halt to rest by the leader getting up and starting very slowly forward. If no one allows a knot to pass through his ring the column resumes the march without a verbal sound.

For night work alone the piece of line proves its worth but you'll be surprised at the multitude of other uses you'll find for it. It takes frequent inspections to assure that each man has his line. Individuals are prone to lose their line or to expend it and not get a replacement. Trying to employ the lines at night as described above with two or three people without their ten foot lines complicates things right from the start. If individuals can be indoctrinated with the importance of that ten foot line as a piece of equipment you will find yourself more than repaid for your effort.

# American Micronesia

## The Marshalls and Eastern Carolines

By Captain Clifford P. Morehouse, USMCR

THE American flag now flies over most of the Marshall Islands. As this is written, only four of the double chain of atolls are still held by the enemy, and perhaps these will be in our hands before this issue is in the hands of readers. If not, they will have been made thoroughly untenable for the Japs, cut off from reinforcements and supplies, and time and attrition will do the rest.

Much has been made in the daily press of the fact that the invasion of the Marshalls marks the first seizure of pre-war Japanese territory by forces of the United Nations. But it is doubtful if the American public have any realization of the far-reaching significance of this beginning of the conquest of the Central Pacific and the transfer of these islands to American sovereignty. For the Marshalls do not stand alone; they are the first outpost of that vast area of sea, studded with atolls and volcanic islands, known collectively as Micronesia. Beyond the Marshall Islands lie the Carolines, with their strategic strong points of Ponape, Truk, Yap, and the Palaus—now beginning to feel the power of our fleet as well as the destructive force of our land-based and carrier-based planes. Beyond the Carolines lie Guam and the other Marianas—Tinian, Saipan, and other islands that have been raided by American task forces and that will feel our air and sea power increasingly in the months to come. Beyond the Marianas lie the Kazan and Bonin Islands, which have been Japanese for eighty years, and which lie only 550 miles off the coast of the enemy's homeland. And beyond the Bonins lie the string of Izu Islands which lead right up to Tokyo's front door.

The seizure of the Marshalls is but the first step to the occupation of all of these islands, sooner or later, by the Marines and by the Army and Navy of this country and our allies. Their future, and the future of their inhabitants, will be in our hands. "It would be unthinkable," said Rear Admiral Alva D. Bernhard, in charge of the building of a great American base at newly-captured Kwajalein, "ever to haul down the Stars and Stripes from over these islands. We have shed American blood here to insure future American security in the Pacific. We have freed the native population, who have been living in a state of slavery. Of course, we must keep these Marshalls and allow no one to interfere with us."

Less bluntly, but with even more far-reaching significance, Ralph A. Bard, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, in an address to graduating officers of the Naval School of Military Government and Administration at Columbia University, declared that administration of occupied areas of the Pacific taken from Japan will be of primary strategic and diplomatic importance at the end of the war. Asserting that these islands are "of peculiarly great strategic significance for the long-run defense of the United States

and its national interests," the Assistant Secretary continued in these prophetic words:

"These island areas—some of them mere pinpoints on the vast Pacific—are in the spotlight of the news today because of the mighty blows our Pacific fleet is striking in that region. But they will also be in the spotlight at the end of this war, for their importance in naval strategy is better appreciated than a generation ago, when the Japanese were allowed to take them as mandates.

"This means in blunt terms that the administration of the occupied areas of the Pacific will be peculiarly subject to critical observation by various powers and by the American government and people. In terms of square miles of land area, or in terms of population, those areas are of secondary importance. But in strategic terms, and perhaps in terms of diplomacy, they will have for a period front rank. It will be well for you to remember this if you are ever tempted to underestimate your own responsibilities by measuring them from the size of a coral atoll."

In the Cairo agreement, announced in a White House press release December 1, 1943, with the joint authority of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and President Chiang Kai-shek, the whole world was informed that "the three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914. . . . Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence or greed."

To be sure, it may not be necessary to take all of them—even all of the major ones—by force, since often the same object can be accomplished by cutting off the enemy's supply lines and permitting them to "wither on the vine," or by neutralizing them by continued pounding from the air and by occupying bases near enough to render them useless to the enemy. Already there are indications that Truk, Japan's vaunted "Pearl Harbor," has been made valueless to the enemy as a fleet base, and the daring fleet raid on Palau, only 600 miles from the Philippines (and west, as well as south, of Tokyo) showed the Japs that even this retreat was not sufficiently secure as an operating base for their main fleet units.

### DIVISIONS OF MICRONESIA

MICRONESIA is the general term given to the Pacific Islands lying north of the Equator between Japan proper and Wake on the east and between Japan and the Philippines on the south. They are one of three general groups of Pacific islands, the others being known as Polynesia and Melanesia.



Most of the Micronesia islands were mandated to Japan in 1919 following the first World War. Exceptions were the Gilbert Islands lying athwart the Equator, which have long belonged to the British; and Guam, situated in the Marianas, which has been an American possession since 1898. Yap, in the Carolines, received great attention after World War I because it is an important cable junction point, both for the American cable from San Francisco to China and other cables to the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies. President Wilson made a strong plea for ceding Yap to the United States or making it an American mandate, but the Japanese outbluffed us and Yap was included in the Japanese mandate.

Although the terms of the mandate required that the islands be kept open to supervision by the League of Nations, Japan consistently flouted this requirement and treated the islands from the outset as exclusive possessions. Reports were made to the League, but foreigners were not allowed access to the islands, and few white men ever visited them and lived to tell the tale. An American Marine, Colonel Earl Ellis, died mysteriously on Palau in 1935. The Japs reported that his death was due to a fever brought on by excessive drinking. Colonel Ellis was a Marine of high standing and his record is such as to make such a charge not only incredible but absurd. The rumor that he was poisoned is probably closer to the truth.

Two Naval officers who slipped ashore on Ponape died of an "accident." A British major shipwrecked on Yap was continuously accompanied by smiling Japanese police until he could be sent away three days later. It is suspected that Amelia Earhart, who disappeared on a Pacific flight, may have met with some sinister mishap in the Marshalls area, where the Japs directed the search for her.

One of the few white men who visited the islands and lived to tell the tale is Willard Price, who made a trip through the mandated islands in 1935 and managed to see a good many vital spots. His recent book, *Japan's Islands of Mystery*,\* is a fascinating as well as authoritative record of his findings.

During the 25 years of their occupancy the Japanese have been busily engaged in the exploitation of Micronesia for their own purposes. It is now well known that they converted many of the atolls into strong naval and air bases. They also introduced a single export crop, sugar cane, into the mandated islands, forcing the natives to produce this crop and thus obliging them to import a large part of their own food, making them increasingly dependent upon Japan. Foreigners were expelled and the natives generally were forced to serve the needs of the Japanese. All instruction in the schools was given in the Japanese language and all industries were placed in Japanese hands. At the same time relatively high health standards were introduced along Japanese lines.

Mr. Price observes that "The net result of a policy of banishing disease and teaching industry but at the same time depriving the people of the fruits of either health or



Jap installations on Mille go up in smoke.

industry is an accelerated decline of the native population. Some 400,000 Micronesians were progressively reduced by the Spaniards to a few tens of thousands but recovered somewhat during German rule. When the Japanese took the islands the population was growing. However, it soon reached a standstill at 50,000, where it remained until 1939. Then, according to the *Japan Year Book*, it dropped from 50,868 in 1938 to 40,406 in 1939. No explanation is given of this sudden decrease. We can venture none, and must wait until the islands are again accessible before we can learn whether there was active deportation of 'undesirables,' or whether the 1939 figure was the result of a census whereas the former figures were estimates, allowed to remain at approximately the same level during years when the population was actually dying out with increasing speed.

"Just as some plants cannot live in the same soil with certain others, so the Micronesians could hardly exist in the face of the Japanese torrent that increased the Japanese population of the islands from about 300 in 1914 to 73,028 in 1939!"

A government of the Japanese mandate is carried on a colonial administration known as "Nanyo." Its administrative center is reported to be at Koror Island in the Palaus, with subordinate centers at Truk, Jaluit, and other key points in the central Pacific.

#### MARSHALL ISLANDS

THE Marshalls are the first of the islands of Micronesia to be taken by the Americans. When our troops landed on Kwajalein on February 1, 1944, the first pre-war Japanese stronghold fell into our hands. Subsequently the rest of the Marshalls have been occupied by American troops, with the exception of Jaluit, Mille (Mili), Malobelap, and Wotje. While these islands have contained strong enemy fortifications, they are virtually worthless to the Japanese with the rest of the islands in American hands.

The Marshalls consist of two chains of atolls running roughly parallel for about 700 miles from the northwest to the southeast and about 100 miles apart. The western chain is called the Ralik or sunset chain and the eastern, the Radik

\**Japan's Islands of Mystery*, by Willard Price. New York: John Day Co., 1944, \$3.00. I am indebted to this book for much of the information in this article, and the quotations attributed to Mr. Price are from this source. The book is invaluable to anyone who wants to know about the terrain, natural defenses, people, customs, flora and fauna of the islands of Micronesia.



This map, copyrighted by the National Geographic Society and reprinted by permission of the National Geographic Society.

or sunrise chain. Kwajalein, where our initial landing was made, is in the Ralik group, as is Eniwetok—the most distant island to the northwest. The Japanese had their administrative center on Jaluit, also in the Ralik group.

There are 32 atolls in all, varying greatly in size. The atolls rarely exceed 200 yards in width and the highest point in the group is not more than 33 feet above the sea. During severe storms the lower islands are frequently entirely covered by waves and the population must climb into the coconut palms for protection. The islands are level and many of them are large enough to make good air strips, while the calm water of the lagoons are ideal harbors for surface ships, submarines, and seaplanes.

Kwajalein, the largest atoll in the Marshalls, has a deep water lagoon some 60 miles long and from 10 to 20 miles wide. The stiff opposition met by the Marines on Roi and Namur islands in this atoll show how strongly they can be protected. Under American auspices Kwajalein can be and doubtless is being developed into a powerful base capable of extending the operations of our fleet many hundreds of miles into the Pacific.

The natives of the Marshalls are a simple and friendly

people. When the Japanese took over the islands the native population was about 10,000 but the Americans found their numbers greatly depleted. Each atoll is governed by a local king who, under Japanese administration, was responsible to the Japanese police. Under native rule the king owns all property and is assisted in his administration by village headmen or "Alaps." The Japanese had conscripted all possible native labor and worked them from 12 to 18 hours a day, paying them about 25 yen (\$1.25) per month. If the workers were a little slow the Japanese beat them with a stick or otherwise abused them.

The copra trade, which was the principal occupation of the natives, was discontinued about the middle of 1942 and the natives were reduced to an existence level. The handicraft items that they formerly made were also discontinued, as there was no market for them. All commercial fishing was done by Japanese fishermen, so this source of food supply was also cut off from them.

The Americans found the way prepared for them by the favorable memories that the Marshallese had for the American missionaries who carried on their work until they were expelled when the Japanese took over the islands.





main island groups are Kusaie, Ponape, Truk, and Yap. All of these are lofty, with Ponape rising as high as 3,000 feet. As always in Oceania, the high islands are the ones of chief importance and these four particularly have great strategic value.


Proceeding westward from the Marshalls the first important island group is Kusaie. This lies almost on a line between Jaluit in the Marshalls and Ponape in the central Carolines. It is approximately 400 miles west of Jaluit and 290 miles east of Ponape.

Kusaie, says Willard Price, is the tropical paradise of one's dreams. The harbor is about half a mile wide and as beautiful as an Italian lake. However, it is not a good fleet base because of the narrow entrance and shallow waters. Heavy rain and fog, moreover, are hindrances to activities of aircraft. Nevertheless, Kusaie is an important link in the chain from the Marshalls to the more western islands of the Carolines and it would be useful in American hands.

Kusaie has a maximum width of six miles and a total land area of about 42 square miles. Volcanic mountains form a semicircle on one side of the little port, which is the main island of Kusaie; on the other side, the harbor is completed by another semicircle made up of the small island of Lele. The island of Lele is flat and suitable for an airfield but the main island is too mountainous for use in this manner.

The mountains of Kusaie are steep and rugged with sharp peaks, the highest of which is about 1600 feet. The southern coast is surrounded by mangrove-covered islands.

Kusaie was discovered by Americans in 1806 and was originally named by them "Strong Island" after a governor of Massachusetts. It was a great whaling center in the 19th century, and later became a base for American missionary work. About one-fourth of the natives have American blood and most of them speak some English. They are Christians, mostly Protestants, since the Congregational mission has been located there for about 100 years. The natives are gentle but are said to dislike the Japanese



Japanese camp and air strips on Maloelap.

because they have destroyed their natural sources of food and forced them to work for rice. The population in 1935 was about 1200, of whom only 30 were Japanese and other foreigners. Since that time, no doubt, the Japs have increased, both by strengthening the military garrison and by bringing in civilians to supervise the native labor.

As in the Marshalls, the natives are ruled by their own king, who succeeds to power through a matriarchal line. Price tells of meeting the 60-year-old King John who, despite his age, could swim, spear, and paddle with the best. The king clung to the old ways with one exception: when Price was leaving the king took out a calling card from his pocket and handed it to him. On it was printed, "K. J. Sigrah." Sigrah was his family name. "What does the K. J. stand for?" Price asked. "King John," was the reply. Price concludes: "And when the first Yank lands on Kusaie, I can wish him no better luck than to be handed a card bearing the noble name, 'K. J. Sigrah.'"


Kusaie is a defensive outpost rather than an offensive one and may well be by-passed and suffered to fall through attrition rather than directly attacked.

#### PONAPE

**P**ONAPE is the largest of the islands of Micronesia, covering about 146 square miles. It is surrounded by a lagoon rimmed by a reef. Some 50 small islands make up the land area.

In addition to the lagoon itself, which forms a good basin for ships, there are six excellent harbors cut deeply into the island and so easily protected by shore defenses. The chief harbor is guarded by Mt. Chokach, a fortified island 900 feet high.

A severe rain is almost a daily event in Ponape, which is one of the best watered islands in the entire Pacific. Anything will grow, including the telephone poles, which sprout branches almost as soon as they are installed. Jungle undergrowth encroaches upon cleared areas at the rate of a foot or two a day and the island is of prodigious fertility. Sago-palms, bananas, mangoes, orange and lime trees grow wild; and extensive plantations of tapioca and rice,



Kusaie Island as it looked January 17, 1944.



as well as coconut groves and oil palms have been developed by the Japanese.

Ponape is 360 miles east of Truk. It is believed to be strongly fortified and may put up stiff opposition, although it has already suffered a considerable beating from repeated air attacks.

In 1935 there was a total population of 8,100; of these 5,601 were natives, 2,478 were Japanese and 21 were foreigners. Most of the natives were Kanakas, not unlike the natives of the Marshall Islands, but a few were Chamorros. These are a mixed native and Spanish race with many of the attributes of their European ancestors. The natives in Ponape have a relatively high standard of living and are among the most vigorous and independent of all those in Micronesia. They are virtually all Christians, being about equally divided between Protestants and Catholics. Under German rule before 1914 they resisted for nearly two years and had to be subdued by German warships, following an uprising in 1911. It is not likely that they have any greater love for their Japanese masters than they had for the Germans. Undoubtedly there has been a great influx of Japanese during the past few years.

Unlike most of the Micronesian islands, Ponape has a liberal water supply, both from the heavy rainfall and from mountain streams. There are few level areas, except on some of the coral islands surrounding the lagoon. The

islands are almost completely enclosed by a coral reef about 55 miles in circumference with few openings. Inside the lagoon are several anchorages for small ships and seaplanes, but few harbors suitable for larger ships.

Willard Price writes:

"It is possible that interior Ponape may be the scene of the stiffest land fighting in the Micronesian archipelago. No other island is so rugged, has such deep valleys, high peaks, abrupt precipices or dense jungle. The natives have a superstitious dread of the interior, but the Japanese have penetrated it to start plantations and, doubtless, install armaments. Because of the difficult terrain there are only forty miles of roads as contrasted with 171 on much smaller Saipan. Streams of any kind are almost unknown in Micronesia, but there are rivers on Ponape, tumbling down to the sea from upland lakes. American whalers used to come to Ponape for fresh water. Picturesque waterfalls are numerous. One we saw at Metalanim drops sheer three hundred feet.

"The thousands of cliffs are penetrated by caves. When the natives rebelled in 1901 they found safety in these caves against the shells of German cruisers. They will doubtless be used again by the Japanese. With a facing of concrete such a cave makes a strong pillbox or machine-gun nest or cache for ammunition."

Ponape would not be an easy place to capture but it is by no means invulnerable. Moreover, it may not be necessary to take it by outright assault if it can be neutralized and rendered useless to the enemy.

#### TRUK

**B**EST known of the central Pacific bases is Truk, popularly consider the Japanese "Pearl Harbor." It lies 385 miles west of Ponape and is the administrative and defensive center of the Carolines. It is the largest atoll of the Caroline group and best suited for use as an advanced fleet base. The entire large lagoon forms an unlimited anchorage for ships of any size and there are also ample natural facilities for airfields. The Japanese undoubtedly developed both the harbors and the airfields to a considerable extent but the formidable character of Truk as an enemy fleet base has been largely minimized by our constant air attacks and our naval raids. Today Truk has ceased to be a fleet base of the Japs and has become little more than a heavily fortified defensive outpost.


On the various islands of Truk there was in 1935 a population of about 12,300, of which 10,300 were natives and the rest Japanese, with a handful of foreigners. The natives were virtually all Kanakas, and were strong and well developed but generally lazy and poverty stricken. They have retained many of their primitive customs, such as cutting the lobes of their ears and hanging ornaments in them. The native children were required to attend the Japanese schools up to fifth or sixth grades but most of them returned to their native homes and took up their old customs after this elementary schooling.

The Truk islands consist of about 14 rather large basaltic islands and about 25 small coral islands within the lagoon, with some 50 islands in the surrounding reef. The larger islands vary from 10 to 15 miles in circumference. Many of them are covered with coconut palms. In



Ponape on February 20, 1944.


# Truk



*Upper left:* This is Dublon Town on Truk. The piers, boat basin, repair and supply facilities are shown in this picture, made on February 16, 1944.

*Center:* A towering pillar of smoke marks the grave of a Jap tanker—one of 23 Jap ships sunk in the raid on Truk on February 16 and 17, 1944.

*Lower right:* Japanese fishing craft and cargo ships give a picturesque quality to this rare prewar photograph of a harbor in the Truk group.





## Books On the Pacific Islands

**JAPAN'S ISLANDS OF MYSTERY.** By Willard Price. New York: John Day Co., 1944. \$3.00.

This book, from which liberal quotations have been made in the accompanying article, is unique. The author is a well-known American naturalist, with a genius for keeping his eyes open to other things besides flora and fauna. But it was on the basis of studying the plant and animal life of Micronesia that he and his wife gained permission from a suspicious Japanese government to visit their mandated islands some years ago. What he found there, and how he narrowly escaped the fate of other white men who failed to return from these mystery islands, is at once a fascinating story and an important survey of what Marines will find as they advance westward from the Marshalls or northward from New Britain. *For interesting and valuable reading.*

**ISLANDS OF THE PACIFIC.** By Hawthorne Daniel. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1943. \$2.50.

The author conscientiously discusses each of the island groups of the Pacific, from the Aleutians to the Philippines. A great deal of valuable information is included on their respective

locations, physical appearance, climate, topography, plant and animal life, peoples, languages, government and resources. *For reading and reference.*

**THE SOUTH SEAS IN THE MODERN WORLD.** By Felix M. Keesing. New York: The John Day Co., 1941. \$4.00.

The author, professor of anthropology at the University of Hawaii, gives an authoritative roundup of the scientific facts about the islands. *For advanced study and reference.*

**PACIFIC OCEAN HANDBOOK.** By Eliot G. Mears. Stanford University: James Ladd Delkin, publisher, 1944. \$1.00.

A valuable handbook of information about the Pacific area, particularly its weather, tides and currents, and other natural features, with tables and illustrations valuable for sea or air navigation. Pocket size. *For ready reference.*

Any of these books may be obtained, at the prices indicated, postpaid, from the Marine Corps Association, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C.

all there are some 245 islands in the Truk group. The surrounding reef is 140 miles long and the lagoon within it is some 40 miles in diameter.

Even when Willard Price visited the islands in 1935 Dublon was a hive of Japanese activity. Price saw little of artificial fortifications but was strongly impressed with the natural strength of Truk. Landing boats would, he observed, be confronted by a cliff of knife-like coral under pounding swells. If a landing was made on the reef the invaders would be faced by a lagoon with the nearest important island about four miles away. They would, moreover, be covered by batteries on the island peaks, while ships endeavoring to enter the lagoon would be at the mercy of the "coral mine fields" which are quite unpre-

dictable and changing because live coral does not stay in one place. It is constantly being built up in new places, added to which the Japanese have dredged coral from certain areas and deposited it elsewhere.

Price nearly met a fate on Truk similar to that of Colonel Ellis in Palau. A native chieftain with whom he was staying was hired by the Japs to take him on a fishing expedition and throw him to the sharks. However, the native revealed the plan to Price and together they staged a wreck in the spot where Price could swim to shore. Later, when the war broke out, this particular native escaped from Micronesia to the Solomons where he fell, fighting side by side with American Marines against the Japs, whom he knew too well.



Navy planes destroy a Jap cargo plane in the February Truk raid.



Squadrons of SBD's and F4F's fly low overhead in salute to the El Toro Air Station at their dedication ceremony on March 17, 1943.



# El Toro

By Major Arthur Menken  
USMCR

**T**HE soaring bull is a fitting symbol for the flying spirit of the Marine Corps Air Station at El Toro, California.

At the present time the station is commanded by Colonel William J. Fox, USMCR, and the executive officer is Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Adams, USMCR. Designed at first to accommodate one group, it has been forced to expand its facilities into a two-group station, and further large additions are contemplated. The phenomenal development has come about through the expenditure of vast amounts of labor, many millions of dollars, and the type of "can-do" spirit which makes a Marine the most versatile fighting man in the world. And at present the men of El Toro go directly out to the farthest reaches of the Pacific the moment their training is completed, to blaze the trail to Tokyo.

El Toro can't be found on many maps made before July, 1942. Until the Marines picked a site nearby for an airfield, the community was practically unknown except to natives of Orange County. Today, El Toro Marine Corps Air Station has grown from a bean field to one of the largest tactical operating airdromes on the Pacific Coast. In this relatively short time 2400 acres of Southern California farm land was converted from agricultural use to production of Marine


combat pilots, who, in the truest sense of the word, have demonstrated to the Japanese that war is hell.

Cut from the heart of the Irvine Ranch, one of the largest in the United States, El Toro Marine Corps Air Station lies 15 miles north of historic San Juan Capistrano Mission and 10 miles southeast of Santa Ana. It is flanked on the west by the Laguna Hills and on the east by the Lomas de Santiago hills, foothills of the Santa Ana mountains. Mt. Santiago, ("Old Saddleback"), 5,680 feet high, forms a backdrop for the base.

Rich in historical background, the land on which the station is located has been under four flags—Spanish, Mexican, California, and United States.

In the 1860's James Irvine, Sr., San Francisco merchant and landholder, purchased the property from its Spanish owners, thus acquiring a 107,000 acre ranch, previously used only for grazing cattle and horses. Various grain crops were grown until 1906, when an experimental field of lima beans were planted. So successful was this experiment that the ranch then began large scale planting of lima and black-eye beans until more than 20,000 acres were used for growing beans. In addition, there are now several thousand acres of walnut, orange, lemon and grapefruit trees, and the re-





## The Tower

mainder of the land is used for truck farming and cattle grazing. Seven dams and storage reservoirs provide billions of gallons of irrigation water for the ranch.

Navy authorities became interested in locating a Marine air station on the ranch in July, 1942, and surveyors marked out the site of the base. Construction started on August 3, while the crops still were being harvested.

**COLONEL THEODORE B. MILLARD**, first commanding officer of the station, reported for duty on September 23, 1942, to supervise the project. The first detachment of 30 enlisted men was quartered in a bunkhouse of the Irvine Ranch. This group, which formed the nucleus of Base Headquarters Squadron, was formally organized November 4, and on December 30 they moved on the station.

Meanwhile, construction of the base proceeded rapidly and runways and taxiways were completed by December 1. Warmup platforms were ready on December 28 and squadron hangars were finished January 15, 1943. All barracks, including bachelor officers' quarters, were ready for occupancy by January 20.

Weather conditions for flying in Orange County are considered by pilots to be "as good as possible" for Southern California. With the exception of some winter periods when severe storms occasionally lash the coastline, the days are clear and warm and the nights cool. Fogs frequently hamper flying, but only rarely does the California dew get up over the running boards on nearby highways.

Records of regular operational flights to and from El Toro start in January, 1943, when squadrons were being formed for combat duty in the South Pacific. Outstanding Marine flyers who already had seen action against the Japs passed their knowledge on to the new pilots.

On March 17, 1943, with Colonel Millard as commanding officer, the base was formally commissioned with Southland civic and military dignitaries present. On June 7, 1943, Colonel William J. Fox, Guadalcanal veteran, and formerly commanding officer of Henderson Field there,

succeeded Colonel Millard, who had been detached for duty overseas.

**T**HE multifarious activities under his command are typical of the work necessary to provide facilities to train pilots for combat duty overseas. Nothing must detract from this primary purpose. There are in every way the guests of the station and must not be distracted from piling up the number of flying hours that are required to make them ready to knock Zeros out of the sky and send Tojo's ships to the Nipponese version of some slant-eyed Davy Jones.

First of all, officers and men have to be quartered and fed. So rapidly were men poured into El Toro that an emergency tent city had to be put up almost overnight. So many officers were sleeping three in a room that a hotel in nearby Laguna Beach was taken over. Mess facilities expanded unbelievably, but the food has remained satisfactory in quantity and quality. The air station must furnish the facilities for all aircraft operating therefrom, and so it provides all personnel for the Operations Department, handling air traffic control and aerology, while a very well equipped Communications Department has charge of radio aids, a large telephone exchange, a post office, and a message center.

Base Ordnance has to handle huge quantities of bombs and ammunition. This department also conducts an ordnance school, as well as rifle, pistol and skeet ranges for the future poachers on Tojo's preserves.

One of the largest and most important units is the Assembly and Repair Department, which is essential to keeping planes in the air. Equipped with every modern facility, its busiest sections are those in charge of aircraft and engines. A metal section, a carpenter shop, and accessories section, as well as a parachute loft, paint shop and radio section do not include all the work of the A. & R. Officer, because he also is charged with running the flight section that handles not only the planes attached to Base Headquarters but all visiting ships as well. His is a full-time job.

Another unit with a real job to perform is Transportation. From the largest types of trucks and cranes down to jeeps, scooters and bicycles, some 400 pieces of rolling stock on the station are under this unit. With regular trips to San Diego, Los Angeles, Santa Ana and Laguna Beach, the equipment is constantly on the move. There are repair shops, fuel facilities, bus routes, crash trucks and a thousand and one details to handle. No garage exists in which to store a single machine, which adds to the necessarily heavy maintenance problem.

The steadily mounting personnel has placed extremely heavy demands on a post exchange that has expanded to its



## SBD's on Apron



**Repair**



**Inspection**



**Planning**

present million dollar a year business. This gives ample profits for the recreation funds, theater, Leatherneck's Club, and other activities. The quantities of soft drinks sold would warrant a pipe-line to the nearest distributor, and the same could be said about beer. The PX has a barber shop from which one can emerge in a relatively recognizable condition, and a tailor shop that keeps the local liberty-hounds in shape for dazzling the damsels of Hollywood.

Another busy citizen of the El Toro community is the security officer. He not only runs the guard detachment and a large detail of civilian police, but a civilian-manned fire department as well. The latter has a big job in the dry summer season when crashed planes set grass fires in the neighboring countryside. There is also a lot of work involved in inspecting records of civilian employees, gasoline and food rationing, and checking private vehicles on the base. Not the least of the security officer's tasks is the administration of an overcrowded brig which is so inadequate to the demands placed on it that nobody is at all anxious to move in there. And, once inside, all are most eager to get out. But the bread is excellent and so is the water.

**T**HE work of the quartermaster has kept increasing with the expansion of the base. Somehow he manages to keep a steady flow of food and equipment pouring into his warehouses from the trains that come chugging up the station's spur line from the Santa Fe, but perhaps his biggest headache has been in getting equipment and civilian personnel to run the laundry, whose mountainous piles of clothes and linen are always rising higher. All the food is kept moving at an equally appalling rate through a thoroughly modern and spotless cold storage plant.

In addition to all the departments mentioned, there are Plans and Training, Buildings and Grounds, Welfare and Recreation, Photography, and Public Relations. All the synthetic training on the station is a base activity, and a big one. At first, one officer was often in charge of several departments, but as the establishment increased in size and scope, a division of functions became imperative, and now

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
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**The C.O.**



**Link Trainer**

there have been sufficient additional officers assigned so that each department is under an individual, plus assistants in many cases where required, with a resulting rise in efficiency.

The most interesting recent addition to the base was the large contingent of Women Reserves. These have been assigned to all duties where they could replace men, and their work, under Captain Julia Rockefeller, has won the respect and admiration of all hands. Their eventual increase is expected to go as high as 2500 on this post, which will release just that many men for duty in the field. Their versatile and many diversified tasks are worth a story by itself.

Just as the Navy has never been able to get along without Marines, El Toro has had to lean heavily on the Navy for numerous functions that are reserved to it alone. The Supply Department consists of several naval officers with a large civilian staff of accountants versed in the mysteries of its labyrinthine procedures.

A Public Works Department, run by naval officers, and in charge of every structure in the area, somehow succeeds in keeping the base in repair while handling all the contracts with private firms for the progressive expansion of the station. Just when all seems in order, one of the local Santa Ana winds comes along and smashes a hundred windows. Then another group arrives and needs double the gasoline storage. Then the emergency field lighting blows out, and while the electricians are fixing it the carpenters and metalsmiths have to rebuild the water tank that was hit by a plane.

The Navy, too, furnishes intelligence officers, and also chaplains who look after the large library as well as the spiritual welfare of the men. The Navy Medical Corps handles the dispensary, which had to expand its already large facilities to take care of the Women Reserves. All medical and dental officers of the attached groups work under the supervision of the station's chief medical officer. The proximity of the Corona Naval Hospital with its superb equipment has made it possible to relieve the heavily taxed dispensary of handling serious or complicated cases which require prolonged hospitalization, but the fine staff



**Drill**



**Marksmanship**




**Peeling Off**

and equipment of the station's dispensary have proved adequate to every need.

No description of this kind would be complete without giving mention and credit to the many hundreds of civilians active in nearly every department. From the women in various offices, to the firemen, guards, carpenters, and expert technicians of many specialties, they have won respect by their devotion to duty. So have the Red Cross officials whose contact with the men is so intimate and valuable.

A recent appropriation of several million dollars will develop the El Toro base into one with every possible facility, from great repair shops to additional barracks and provision for a major supply department. All runways will be doubled, allowing for increased traffic. As every field has its traffic saturation point, depending on the number of runways, that point was reached some time ago at El Toro, and it became necessary to dispatch squadrons to satellite fields, some of which had existing buildings, while tent camps had to be erected elsewhere. Intensification of the Pacific cam-



**Homeward Bound**

paign will doubtless bring further developments of a similar nature, with each major air station reaching out, with its personnel and facilities, to take in the added bases needed to give more planes more place, not in the sun, but on surfaced runways. It is certainly a far cry from the days of 1930 when there were only 119 active Marine pilots on the rolls.

All the activities mentioned give one some idea of the variety of diversified functions that are necessary behind the lines, in a tranquil zone, to enable squadrons to train against our many enemies. The units, large or small, which get their final training at Mojave, El Centro, Santa Barbara, and El Toro, before going out to blast the Jap out of the Pacific skies, must fly every possible hour, by day and by night, out of these fields. The personnel attached to the air stations have as their primary function, regardless of what their individual assignment may be, the most perfect rendering of service to those whom they will, before long, be joining across the seas.



**Hope Springs Eternal**



**Sick Bay**



# Where Do We Go From Here?

## Marine Aviation Seeks New Targets

By Captain Garrett Graham, USMCR

ON the sultry afternoon of February 9, 1943, two parties of white men met at the mouth of a river where the thick tropical jungle crept down to the edge of the sea. The wild country through which they had been clawing their way for weeks was originally inhabited only by coal black natives. Yet there is no record to show that anyone exclaimed: "Dr. Livingstone, I presume?"

One year and 20 days later a similar group of white men splashed ashore upon an island beach a thousand miles to the north and west. They rapidly and efficiently took forcible charge of the place. There is nothing to show that any of them asked: "Where do we go from here?"

Yet that question now is uppermost in the minds of all who are attempting to follow the strategy of the war in the South and Southwest Pacific.

The first meeting at the mouth of the Tenamba River marked the victorious end of the conquest of Guadalcanal. A group of battle-hardened Marines had been transported by sea around the tip of Cape Esperance and had fought their way savagely down the coast to meet army units coming up from the southeast. Both had mowed down whatever weakening Japanese resistance they encountered. It was the completion of America's first successful land offensive in this war.

The amphibious landing a little more than a year later was on Los Negros Island in the Admiralty group of the Bismarck Archipelago. It sealed the doom of Rabaul and Kavieng, two heavily fortified Japanese bases in this region which long had been thought "impregnable"; and it condemned to death by disease or slow starvation some 72,000 Japanese troops now completely cut off from any possible chance of escape, or of receiving either supplies or reinforcements.

That epochal year and 20 days had encompassed a complete turn in the tides of war. The period had seen air battles of steadily increasing scope, with both sides paying bitterly but with the Americans holding substantially to the one-sided ratio established by the Marine pilots in the early days of Guadalcanal.

Starting at Guadalcanal, Marines and Army troops had doggedly fought their way up the ladder of islands in the Solomons and the Bismarcks toward their eventual destination, Tokyo.

At Guadalcanal that February afternoon a year ago, they finally ran out of Japs.

Now, in the Admiralty group, they have virtually run out of islands. The ones the Japanese still hold behind them they're welcome to. Cut off by sea and air, the sons of the Son of Heaven are as powerless as if each of the little supermen were trussed up in an individual straitjacket. There's no point to wasting good American lives in hunting them down and smoking them out of their burrows. They can safely be left to stew in their own juice.

The only value these individual islands had was for airbases. But with their planes shot out of the skies or blown to small bits on the ground and with the Americans firmly astride their supply lines, the Japs can't get new planes or more groceries. It's too far to wade home. They can figure out their fate for themselves.

NATURALLY our own high command knows where we are going next and just as naturally this information is not being shared with the enemy. Hence, even too much speculation would be out of place.

But surely it will give no aid or comfort to Hirohito to review the cumulative fury of the air fighting in which his power in this area has been completely destroyed and two of his most important and strongly fortified bases outside Japan itself have been blasted into uselessness.

As soon as the last Japs were cleaned out of Guadalcanal in February, 1943, the Americans redoubled their efforts to strengthen the place as an airbase and a springboard for their leap to the next objective—the air strip at Munda. After some five months of intensive preparation, during which the Japanese had evacuated the Russells and we had moved into them unopposed and built an airfield, Army and Marine forces pounced upon the New Georgia group of islands. The first landing was on Rendova Island, June 30, 1943. On July 5, landings were made at Zanana and Enogai Inlet on opposite sides of the Munda airdrome. Vella LaVella Island was invaded on August 5, and the next day it was announced that the Munda air strip was completely in our hands. With our planes operating from this spot, the offensive was continued until the conquest of the entire New Georgia Islands was completed on September 25.

October 6 the Japanese withdrew from Kolombangara and Vella LaVella, and we took over the Vila airfield on the former island. The Treasury Islands were next seized on October 27. By this time, Marine and Army planes were able to operate from Guadalcanal, the Russells, Tobriand and Woodlark Islands, the Segi strip on the south tip of New Georgia, Munda, and Vila.

These were all more or less preparatory moves. General Vandegrift was now ready to launch his last campaign before returning to Washington to become Commandant of the Marine Corps. With the stage all set, he turned over the job in the field to Major General Roy S. Geiger, who had been Commanding General of all air activity in the taking of Guadalcanal a year before.

The principal objective was the Empress Augusta Bay region on Bougainville, a bold maneuver that would bypass the Shortland Islands, the Faisi and Ballale airfields, and the Buin and Kahili airdromes.

The thrust at Bougainville on November 1 was entirely successful. By December 12, the Japanese had been

pushed back far enough in all directions so that the new Torokina air strip was ready to accommodate our planes. This not only left the by-passed Japanese airbases out on a limb and completely untenable, but constituted the first serious menace to Rabaul itself.

From here on, operations followed with great rapidity. On December 15, forces from General MacArthur's command in New Guinea landed at Arawe on New Britain, and by December 19 they had captured the Japanese auxiliary airfield there. Then before the enemy could pull himself together from this blow, the First Marine Division of early Guadalcanal fame, now led by Major General William H. Rupertus, hit him again with a landing at Cape Gloucester on the other side of the island. By the 30th, two Japanese air strips had been taken over by the Marines. One of these was an important auxiliary landing field.

The basing of planes at these two spots gave complete control of the straits between New Guinea and New Britain and merged the South and Southwest Pacific theaters of operation. If there had been any doubt before about the fate of the Japanese in this whole vast area, it was completely dispelled now.

By January 7, 1944, the New Piva airfield on New Georgia, capable of operating both fighters and medium bombers, was in working order, making worse than useless the enemy's former strong air installations at Kahili, Buin, Ballale, Faisi, Kara, and Kieta. The Jap airfields at these places had been pounded into impotence, and the strong ground forces there were completely cut off from reinforcements, supplies, or any means of escape. On February 14, we took over the Green Islands, skipping Buka and isolating the Buka and Bonis airfields.

Meanwhile, Rabaul and Kavieng had been taking a pummeling of ever increasing ferocity. Also, during the months of these closely integrated operations, there had been several naval engagements of heavy cost to the Japanese.

ALL this had been accompanied by some of the fiercest air fighting to take place anywhere during this entire global war. A few figures gleaned from communiqués and press dispatches, and thus not official nor wholly accurate, give some idea of the magnitude of this aerial warfare. In July, 1943, 436 Jap planes were destroyed; in August, 531; in September, 550. In October 995 enemy planes were destroyed or damaged. Of these, 367 were destroyed at Rabaul's five airdromes alone. Between October 12 and November 12, 784 Jap planes were reported destroyed at Rabaul. From December 23 to 31, 113 more were shot to pieces.

Although we had to pay for these lop-sided air victories, this rapid attrition was something the enemy could not afford indefinitely. The Nipponese had, and are reported still to have, formidable ground forces here to repel land assaults. But our terrific hitting power in the air completely neutralized the harbors and airfields at both Rabaul and Kavieng. Recent broadcasts from Tokyo have admitted that it has long been impossible for them to send in sizable

supply ships. They have been forced to rely upon the uncertain and insufficient use of barges, hiding out in island coves by day and trying to get through with food and munitions at night.

The landing, February 29, 1944, on Los Negros Island of the Admiralty group, its rapid conquest and the taking over and repair of the Momote airfield by MacArthur's troops, completely extinguished the last glimmer of hope the Japanese could possibly have in this entire region. Since, the Marines have cut in behind the enemy farther up the coast of New Britain and seized areas where air strips may be built to continue pounding Rabaul at closer range. This field in the Admiralty Islands is reported to be adequate for all types of planes, including the largest bombers and transports; and the lagoon is said to provide an excellent anchorage for strong fleet units.

Meanwhile the forces in New Guinea under General MacArthur have bracketed Wewak by a series of amphibious hops along the northern coast of that island, culminating in the invasion of former Dutch territory at Hollandia. A communiqué issued April 23, announcing this landing, added that this completely isolated the Japanese 18th Army, estimated as having 60,000 men.

The communiqué said further that the total remaining strength of the Japanese armies—those originally destined for the invasion of Australia—in the Solomons, Bismarck archipelago and New Guinea, was estimated at 140,000. In addition to the 60,000 in New Guinea, there are 50,000 on New Britain, 10,000 on New Ireland and 22,000 on Bougainville.

The original Japanese strength in the Southwest Pacific was a quarter of a million men, the communiqué said, of which 110,00—or 44 per cent—has been lost.

The Japanese on Tarawa were reported to have been told that it would take a million men to capture that atoll. Judging from this, they must have thought that Rabaul could stand off the assault of Uncle Sam's entire armed forces. Kavieng was undoubtedly deemed similarly impregnable.


As far as the United States is now concerned, these places can go right on being impregnable until the last invader has withered and died on the vine. The estimated 140,000 enemy troops reported trapped in this area have no possible means of escape and they cannot live off the country. From our advanced base in the Admiralty Islands, patrol planes can search vast sea areas in all directions and destroy any relief expeditions while they are still hundreds of miles away.

As soon as the mopping-up is completed, the Marine air squadrons which have so distinguished themselves in the twenty gruelling months since the first flying Leathernecks set their planes down on bomb-scarred Henderson Field, will have to find some place else to fight. The only thing left for them in the South and Southwest Pacific combat zone is to join MacArthur's forces in chasing the enemy up the northwest coast of New Guinea.

It is only natural, then, for the Marine flyers to wonder: Where do we go from here?



# Marine Corps Shoulder Insignia



1st MARINE AMPHIBIOUS CORPS



1st MARINE DIVISION



3rd MARINE DIVISION



5th MARINE DIVISION

THE number of battle blazes worn by Marines is steadily growing as more organizations follow the lead of the First Marine Division, which started the trend toward shoulder blazes in the Corps.

The first patch to be approved in this war was the well-known blue diamond with red numeral 1, white-lettered GUADALCANAL, and white stars of the Southern Cross, worn by the First Division. (The narrow red strip with CAPE GLOUCESTER lettered on it, tentatively proposed, is not authorized.) Other authorized insignia are the following:

SECOND DIVISION; scarlet background, white stars, and scarlet number 2 on a gold torch.

THIRD DIVISION; scarlet shield, gold line, and gold and black three-pointed star in center.

FOURTH DIVISION; gold number 4 superimposed on a scarlet diamond.

FIFTH DIVISION; maroon shield bordered in gold, and blue spearhead superimposed on a gold V.

FIRST MARINE AMPHIBIOUS CORPS; blue shield with white stars of the Southern Cross grouped around a red diamond.

Component parts of the First Marine Amphibious Corps use the basic patch with their own insignia inserted on the red diamond. These include:

*Aviation Engineers*; with winged engineer insignia.

*Service of supply*; a white star.

*Raider Battalion*; white skull.

*Defense Battalions*; white antiaircraft gun.

*Balloon Barrage Battalion*; white balloon.

*Antitank and 155mm. Howitzer Battalions*; both use basic patch of First Marine Amphibious Corps.

FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS CORPS; scarlet shield, golden alligator head, three white stars.

THIRTEENTH DEFENSE BATTALION; shield divided into three diagonal sections of red, white and blue, green sea-horse, in center with FMF in white.

EIGHTEENTH DEFENSE BATTALION; red shield, gold wings, white sword upright between wings, black 18.

THE FIFTY-FIRST DEFENSE BATTALION; scarlet disk with blue gun and mount in center, white numerals.

THIRD MARINE AIRCRAFT WING; scarlet diamond, air wings and Marine emblem in gold, Roman numeral III in black.

MARINE DETACHMENT ABOARD SHIPS; red diamond, gold seahorse on a blue anchor.




5th AMPHIBIOUS CORPS



2nd MARINE DIVISION



4th MARINE DIVISION



13th DEFENSE BATTALION



18th DEFENSE BATTALION



51st DEFENSE BATTALION



SHIP DETACHMENT





1944

been appointed Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, San Diego Area, as of 20 April 1944.

Major General John Marston is detached as commanding General, Department of the Pacific, and ordered to duty as commanding General, Camp Lejeune, N. C.

Major General Emile P. Moses, formerly commanding General, Marine Barracks, Parris Island, S. C., is retired.

Major General Henry L. Larsen has been detached from Camp Lejeune, N. C., where he was Commanding General and has been ordered to duty beyond the seas.

Major General Francis P. Mulcahy has been detached from the Second Marine Air Wing, Fleet Marine Force, and has been ordered to duty with Marine Fleet Air, West Coast.

Brigadier General Alphonse De Carre is detached from Camp Pendleton, Oceanside, California, and ordered to duty as President, Marine Corps Equipment Board, Quantico, Virginia.

Brigadier General Pedro del Valle is detached from the Marine Corps Equipment Board, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia, and ordered to duty beyond the seas.

Brigadier General Thomas E. Bourke is detached from his present assignment and ordered to duty beyond the seas.

Brigadier General Leo D. Hermle is detached from his present assignment and ordered to duty with Fleet Marine Force, San Diego Area.

The following executive nominations were received by the Senate on April 13, 1944:

Brigadier General James L. Underhill to be a major general in the Marine Corps, for temporary service, from the 28th day of September 1942.

Brigadier General Thomas E. Watson to be a major general in the Marine Corps, for temporary service, from the 20th day of January 1944.

Colonel Samuel C. Cumming to be a brigadier general in the Marine Corps, for temporary service, from the 19th day of September 1942.

Colonel Oliver P. Smith to be a brigadier general in the Marine Corps, for temporary service, from the 1st day of October 1942.

### All Roads Lead to Tokyo

WE congratulate Major Richard Ira Bong of the Army Air Forces, who recently shot down his twenty-seventh enemy plane. By thus beating the 26-plane record of Majors Joe Foss and Gregory Boyington of the Marines, and Eddie Rickenbacker's World War I record of 26 aircraft (including balloons), Major Bong becomes Ameri-

ca's leading ace in the history of aerial warfare—at least insofar as this method of reckoning leadership applies.

The Marine Corps has been proud to have two of its fighter pilots hold the record of enemy planes shot down, and it will naturally hope that Foss or some other Marine pilot may top Bong's notable record. But, as Eddie Rickenbacker well observed, the important thing is the destruction of the enemy's planes, whether in the air or on the ground, by shooting down, by strafing, or by bombing. And while the Marine flyers and their Army counterparts may indulge in a bit of friendly rivalry with each other, and among themselves, each recognizes the fine job being done by the others, and by the pilots and crews of other types of aircraft that cannot so easily measure their effectiveness in terms of box scores.

Never has there been so high a degree of coöperation, not only between Marine and Army Air Force flyers, but among all the air, sea, and ground forces of the Army, the Navy, the Coast Guard, and the Marine Corps, as there is in the Pacific combat areas today. There may be many branches of the service, each with its own traditions and *esprit de corps*—but just as there is but one enemy, so there is essentially but one United Nations striking force. In the Pacific, all roads lead to Tokyo, and it does not much matter who gets there first, so long as the objective be reached as promptly and efficiently as is possible with the united efforts of all.

### War Bonds

THE San Diego Marine Base led all Marine Corps activities in the purchase of War bonds in March, and the Corps as a whole substantially aided in shattering Navy War bond records during the month.

Cumulative Navy war bond sales pushed through the half-billion-dollar mark with the total for the month reaching \$46,036,481, and the grand total, \$512,700,115. Sales in March, 1943 were \$17,759,915.

San Diego Marine Base civilian personnel participated 100 per cent during March. Following San Diego were Parris Island, S. C.; Depot of Supplies, Philadelphia; Camp Elliott, Calif.; Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va.; Camp Lejeune, N. C. and Cherry Point, N. C., in that order.

Civilian personnel of all Marine Activities averaged 81.7 per cent participation and eight per cent gross payroll deduction.

March set a new high in War bond allotments registered by uniform personnel of the entire Naval establishment, with 134,000 allotments reported, lifting the grand total to 1,472,382.

*The author of "A Jungle Aid" (page 23) writes: "I'd like to know how other troop leaders solved their problems. The GAZETTE would be the ideal place for exchange of such information." We agree. What can you contribute to the pool of experience?*

# Civil Affairs

By Captain H. C. Prud'homme, USMCR

A YEAR and a half ago a civilian, more or less sound of body and mind, went into a procurement office and asked the sergeant at the desk whom he should talk to about military government. "Military what?" said the sergeant. "I understood," said the civilian, "that there was something about handling civilians in occupied areas." "No civilian jobs in this outfit," said the sergeant, "strictly combat—do you want combat, or don't you?"

Last month an officer friend of mine returned from Empress Augusta Bay. "It's this way," says my friend, "the man who hasn't been in an operation doesn't know how busy the commander of a combat unit is just getting his outfit ready to land and take the damn place, without bothering about what will happen after we occupy it. I take a dim view of this civil affairs business and—no offense—I don't get the idea of messing around with it."

There is a recent letter from a civil affairs officer who participated in an operation in the Central Pacific. "You see," writes my friend, "field officers are just finding out that civil affairs is just another staff job. When a draft for the Corps order was submitted there was surprise that the theater commander and not a civil affairs officer was to be the Military Governor. We are explaining the functions of civil affairs and by the time the next war comes along the civil affairs officers will find a place all set for them."

It is the writer's belief that the answer need not be postponed until it is hammered out by the trials and errors of this war. The unfamiliarity of the subject, and the sometimes irritating quality of the title (at least to military men), often are the cause of arguments which a good definition would cure. The Army civil affairs officers who have been through it in Italy could explain it without difficulty. But for the Navy and Marine Corps the story is still to be written, except for the Marshalls which are not too big a problem.

## DEFINITION

CIVIL AFFAIRS or "Military Government" are phrases used more or less interchangeably to mean the control of the affairs of civilian populations which are overrun in the course of military operations.\* Where the population is small the job is correspondingly reduced, as in the less developed islands in the Pacific. (Naval and Marine civil affairs officers accompanied the forces taking the Marshalls.) It is in anticipation of a complicated situation in more densely populated areas, which have been occupied, as in Italy, or which it is intended to occupy, that the services have assigned numbers of officers to civil affairs duty and have put them through a long period of special training.

The job is best explained by the Army-Navy Manual on Military Government and Civil Affairs: "Military necessity may require an armed force to establish military government to assist in the accomplishment of its military objective. . . . It is an obligation under international law

for the occupying force to exercise the functions of civil government in the restoration and maintenance of public order. . . . Assistance (to military operations) is rendered by . . . promoting security of the occupying forces, reducing sabotage, relieving combat troops of civil administration, mobilizing local resources. . . . The exercise of civil affairs control is a command responsibility. In occupied territory the Commander, by virtue of his position, has supreme legislative, executive and judicial authority, limited only by the laws and customs of war and by directives from higher authority."

The authority and responsibility of an occupying power enforcing military government are not new, though they are unfamiliar. The historian can go back through Napoleonic wars, to George Washington and Gustavus Adolphus, and to ancient Roman law and practice for developments, the outcome of which is embodied in the Hague Regulations.

The Hague Regulations include well-known provisions on the conduct of hostilities, prisoners of war, rights of neutrals, etc. On occupation of enemy territory they cover restoration of law and order, censorship, control of transportation, regulations as to taxes, respect for "family honor and rights, the lives of persons . . . as well as religious convictions and practice," labor, destruction and seizure of enemy property, compensation for private property, requisitions, and so forth. The United States will observe these regulations.

## FUNCTION OF CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS

SO, during an occupation, while the civil affairs officer may be actually engaged in stopping looting, seizing deposits of money and valuable records, burying civilian and enemy dead, apprehending hostile ringleaders among the civilian population, organizing the local government, getting distribution of food in operation, cleaning up of the debris of battle, setting up special military courts for the trial of civilians, changing local currency, dealing with black markets, enforcing air-raid precautions, and establishing sanitary measures, he is supposed to be a kind of mentor to his commanding officer on the rules of belligerent occupation.

In the November, 1943, *Naval Institute Proceedings*, Lieut. W. H. Hessler, USNR, says: "A theater commander has plenty to do without the worries involved in dealing with the civil population of an occupied island or mainland area. And the operations officers subordinate to his command usually have their hands full, without the tribulations of conducting a local government in their spare time. That is why the United States Navy is training selected groups of officers in military government and administration. It will be their function to take over the non-operational problems involved in military occupation, in which civilians are concerned, and relieve operations officers of those headaches. As large and complex areas come under naval control there will be many advantages derived from the availability of trained civil affairs personnel, familiar

\*See also the article "Military Government" in THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE for May-June, 1943.





#### NATIVES LIBERATED BY MARINES

In all of the islands taken from Japan, natives like these, who have suffered many privations under Japanese rule, look to their American liberators for relief and rehabilitation. Relations with them are a primary responsibility of civil affairs officers.

with the languages, customs, law, economy, and general cultural problems of the territories concerned."

The civil affairs officer is a new piece of equipment designed to cope with an anticipated situation. In areas of Navy responsibility in the Pacific the military government will be a Naval military government, as it is now in the Marshalls. The Navy has trained and is training, a substantial number of CAO's. The Marine Corps has a few. The decision to plan and train in advance of the job, instead of meeting it when it comes (as the Marine Corps has on numerous occasions done successfully in the past), was no doubt stimulated by the report on the Rhineland occupation in the last war.

In that report there are several comments on absence of preparation. It says: "Despite the precedents of military governments in Mexico, California, the Southern States, Cuba, Porto Rico, Panama, China, the Philippines and elsewhere, the lesson has seemingly not been learned. . . . The majority of the regular officers were ill-equipped to perform tasks differing so widely from their accustomed duties. . . . The magnitude of the responsibilities assumed, appear to have been greatly underestimated. There can be no doubt that the belief, felt in many quarters, that the armies could occupy enemy soil and yet divest themselves of the responsibilities of government, was both prevalent and powerful. . . . The military situation, serious enough when we consider that G. H. Q. was at this time faced with the problem of moving 300,000 men to the Rhine, and the uncertainty in regard to the nature of the occupation, were no doubt responsible for the American failure to prepare

for the task at hand. The failure, however, laid a heavy burden on the shoulders of the Third Army Commander and his subordinate officers, charged with the security of their several commands. In all this force, with the exception of perhaps a half-dozen men, there was probably no one who had the faintest conception of the German governmental system, of its functions, limitations or channels of communication. . . .

"By far the larger number of injustices committed by the American army can be traced to the ignorance of inexperienced officers in charge of civil affairs and provost court officers, who suddenly found themselves in responsible and unaccustomed positions. . . . The view is often expressed and seriously argued, that we are dealing with a defeated enemy and that we need not over-trouble ourselves as to the treatment accorded. A mature reflection, however, must convince even the most radical that the question involved is really not what is due the inhabitants of the defeated country, but what is owed to the victorious country by the army which represents it. An occupying army in a defeated country is making history which is bound to be written. As that army conducts itself, so is the world largely to regard the country which it represents."

This time the Navy is putting officers through a long, tough course of occupational "scholastics" at the Naval School of Military Government and Administration at Columbia University. The Army is doing likewise at its schools. The Marine Corps has trained CAO's both at the Army and the Navy Schools.

How the assignment of Marine and Naval CAO's will be handled is a question on which an indication can be obtained by considering civil affairs operations in the field. There are two or three stages corresponding to succeeding tactical phases. Whether CAO's are taken in at all during the combat phase, as they were in Italy, depends on the nature of the tactical operation and how the civilian population is disposed in the area. Based on some of the Sicilian experience, the CAO's performed a function corresponding to that of reconnaissance, ascertaining the whereabouts and conditions of the civilians, and, after establishing the necessary contact, for example, keeping them from crowding bridges and fords which were in the line of communications.

#### THE OPERATIONAL PHASE

**D**URING the operational phase, the CAO who goes ashore is attached to his tactical unit and is under the sole command of the officer in command of the tactical unit. After the situation becomes more stable, a more comprehensive civil affairs organization may be established, on a regional basis, included in which are likely to be various specialist officers on police, legal, medical, supply, financial, and other functions.

The following are stories from Italy. A CAO may land on D day loaded down like a pack burro with, in addition to his weapons, the tools of his trade—plans, handbooks, papers and proclamations. He marches (probably with one enlisted man) on his "objective," the nearest town, yelling at the top of his voice—"We are Americans." The beach being under fire and the town between the naval guns afloat and the German guns ashore, he concludes that civil

affairs are reasonably active. He raises the ensign on the city hall. He may find a Cardinal, an officer of the local Carabinieri, and nine scrubwomen to help him in the capacity of a temporary staff. The officer of the Carabinieri may finally round up some of his police, and rearmed with abandoned weapons, effectively stop the civilian looting which breaks loose whenever there is a pause in the shelling.

An Italian colonel comes in from another town and in a flowery speech about its beauties invites the United States CAO to come at once to visit the place "and bring some flour to the starving population." The CAO engages a local undertaker to bury the civilian dead. As the next few days follow he surveys the grain stores available, issues some relief rations to the local hospital and an orphanage, organizes a system of priorities and prices on wheat, flour, bread and petroleum products, watches the growing consciousness of the people that supplies are short, sees the mob psychology develop so fast that a black market is in full swing in a matter of hours, and has not much success trying to stop it for lack of occupational police. He locates some coal and authorizes its requisitioning for mills and bakeries. Establishes an employment office. Issues relief to Italian soldiers still trying to surrender to him and he refusing. Stops youngsters throwing hand grenades and exploding ammunition from an abandoned enemy dump. Finds money running short so gathers in a number of enemy mules abandoned by the enemy and auctions them off for enough to keep going a while. Confers with officials of neighboring towns and appoints five mayors. Puts down a budding revolt against one of his newly appointed mayors. And so on.

These observations are given because they are interesting and true. Needless to say, the experience bears no relation to what has been seen so far in the Pacific, but it illustrates the possibilities and describes the early phase of a military government, when the conditions of supply and communication are still in the first or second phase tactically.

#### THE ORGANIZED OR "REGIONAL" PHASE

WHETHER a more elaborate form of military government succeeds the so-called tactical organization depends on how complicated the problems in the area are. Occupied cities of several hundred thousand population will be very different problems from south sea island atolls. In the densely populated places it is not feasible for lack of manpower to "take over" or "run" the whole local administration. The problem is to make use of the existing system and only to supervise and control it—the government, the courts, police and prisons, trade and industries, health and sanitation, money and banking, public utilities, transportation and communications, fire departments, air raid systems, taxation, labor, and the host of lesser functions which comprise the organization of cities in the orient as elsewhere.

The greatest uncertainty can be expected to prevail as to what local officeholders, business men and technicians will be ordered or permitted—for security reasons among others,

to remain at their posts. The problem of controlling the police organization in cities in hostile countries, whose language is incomprehensible to us, will stimulate the interest of old timers in the Marine Corps, as will also the possibility of training native police in some of the island areas.

It is solely a matter for the commander who is the Military Governor, to decide if and when and to what extent he will establish the regional military government organization.

There will be available for this organization officers who have spent weeks if not months studying the area from all points of view concerning civil affairs. The regional organization will probably be ready to function along highly specialized lines, with administrators, lawyers, supply men, doctors, engineers, and intelligence men. To many people this will sound like a postwar set-up. It may be, but it is not designed to be so. Its purpose is to establish order in the rear of the combat area, to assist the military operation, and to relieve the commander from detaching combat officers to accomplish the same object.

It goes without saying that the Theater Commander will in the first instance order the disposition of all CAO's under his command. Looking at the question from the standpoint of planning as to what kind of CAO's may prove most useful to Marine units, it is possible to consider them in two categories. There are CAO's who are given a general administrative training, who act in the capacity of aides to their commanding officers, in the planning at the staff level and performing administrative functions. And there are specialists whose performance in an integrated civil affairs group moving into a particular area is more likely to cover a specific function, such as public safety, engineering, law, or intelligence.

A job that is likely to fall to Marine units is that of keeping order in areas occupied by Marines. Wherever there is a large civilian population the function of public safety goes beyond that of military police. The occupation police eventually get themselves mixed up in everything that goes on, but in particular technical experience is necessary in handling criminal investigation, narcotic control, prisons, and police courts. Many men who are good at investigation and patrols, as individuals, do not necessarily make good supervisors.

In areas that have been Japanese for a long time, previous knowledge of the Japanese police system, their courts, municipal organization, language, and social customs would make a real difference in handling the population and probably in the number of our personnel that should be assigned to the job. Experience thus far in Europe is that men with police experience in civilian life are more successful in the police work of military government than men with the usual background of civil affairs officers.

Such are the general functions of civil affairs officers. It seems apparent that as we advance along the road to Tokyo there will be increasing demands for their services.

If Moses had been a committee, the Israelites would still be in Egypt.—J. B. HUGHES, *American City*.



# THIS WAS TARAWA



*By Colonel Clyde H. Metcalf, USMC*

AS the tide of battle sweeps westward across the Pacific, and colossal naval forces pound Japanese positions on coral islands into dust, neutralizing the efforts of our enemies to resist, the landing and seizing of these islands is made relatively easy so long as the fleet, with its superior air power, can exercise control of the air and sea, and deliver thousand of tons of explosives at a dozen or more critical points.

Let us not forget, however, that this has not been the order of the day for very long and it may not continue to be the pattern of war. The more normal pattern seems to be that of the Guadalcanal, the Bougainville, and the Cape Gloucester campaigns with an occasional Tarawa thrown in as the supreme test.

During this more normal type of fighting, close support of artillery and bombing planes can hardly be counted upon; tanks and mortars may more often be available; co-ordination by platoon and company commanders will usually be the order of the day. There will be times when the fighting will be so close and resistance will be with such determination that only the small groups led by determined leaders who rise to the occasion on the spot will be able to function as tactical units. Such fighting usually takes the form of one or two men delivering accurate fire at a critical point, such as the slit of a pillbox, while other members of the determined group close in with grenades or bayonets, and, by their heroic acts, eliminate an enemy group which may be holding up the advance of large numbers of our

forces. The number of such determined points of resistance may be legion and held by foes determined to make a stand to the last. Under such a situation, if our forces are to carry the fight on to an ultimate victory, they must be endowed with a determination and fighting spirit that has been attained only by men of a strong individualistic race, by men belonging to an élite corps having a long record of determined fighters, thoroughly trained in the best technique for such fighting, and endowed by their leaders with a will to live up to the best traditions of that corps.

Such conditions have arisen repeatedly during the 169 years of the history of the Marine Corps. We could cite many such examples but let us, for this purpose, skip all but brief mention of one, and a fuller development of this manifestation in a recent battle.

At Belleau Wood, during the most critical stage of World War I, determined groups of Marines fought their way, foot by foot, through a rugged thickly wooded terrain which had been highly developed for defense and filled with obstacles and held by the best units of the German Army. By methods devised only by small groups, the Marines drove back superior numbers of Germans and, after days of fighting, completely cleared the enemy from the wooded area. Many of them were immediately recognized as outstanding heroes of the Marine Corps; they became known as the élite fighters of their organization for other Marines to pattern after.

World War II has produced another such battle but in

an entirely different setting—on a small coral island in the Central Pacific, the island of Betio of Tarawa Atoll. Our readers are generally familiar with the over-all picture of the attack on Tarawa, how after many bombings and bombardments, battalions of the Second Marine Division began making landings on the lagoon shore of Betio Island. They have read of the heavy losses that the units suffered in making their way in to the beach and getting a foothold along the north shore of the island. This, of course, also took the highest order of courage, facing the losses which they sustained and still keeping on and affecting the landing in the face of murderous fire.

**B**UT we are concerned here more particularly with the kind of fighting that took place on the landing beach and in driving the enemy from his strongholds as exemplified by a few gallant Marines, most of whom, in addition to many others, will in due time be given recognition in official citations. The individuals mentioned are only typical but were picked out by their commanders; many others who performed similar deeds, known only by their intimate comrades or themselves, played equally important parts in the winning of this decisive victory which helped to open the way for a deeper thrust into the Japanese controlled areas of the Western Pacific.

While the heroic individuals mentioned below were performing outstanding deeds of heroism and helping to gradually overcome the resistance of the enemy, they were given every possible support by naval gunfire, occasional bombing missions, and above all, as constant a flow of reinforcements, as much ammunitions and supplies as could be gotten to them under the difficult situation of bringing it across the reef and reaching a beach swept by enemy fire. The ultimate success of their fighting was made possible by this support given them by their higher command and supporting forces.

Let us first notice the action led by First Sergeant Wilbur McC. Burgess, who when his company landed on the beach, located two pillboxes firing on our troops as they attempted to land. On his initiative, he set forth to knock out these positions. Taking along a rifle grenadier, he personally directed grenade fire against the emplacement and temporarily knocked it out of action. He then crawled to the position and destroyed it with TNT. Crawling to within five yards of a second emplacement, he threw TNT and offensive grenades into the opening, forcing out two of the enemy, who were immediately killed. After all the officers of his company had been killed or wounded, Burgess took command and continued the attack. He was one of the first to cross the landing field to the south coast and although he had only a few men left, he continued the attack and rendered valuable assistance in stopping a counterattack.

For courage and effective leadership, the actions of Sergeant James R. Atkins have scarcely ever been excelled. While a member of the Second Tank Battalion reconnaissance party which laid a lane of channel markers over a shell- and bomb-pocked coral reef for a distance of 1200 yards, Atkins, when the channel markers were swept away, made himself a human channel marker, during which time he was under heavy enemy fire. After the tanks were

safely guided to the beach, he volunteered to lead tanks inland through our own infantry lines. He led the tanks well within the enemy lines daringly and courageously working his way forward under extremely heavy enemy fire and pointed out targets to the tanks.

The extraordinary effective action of Sergeant Roy W. Johnson ranks equally high in our rôle of heroes. When the advance of his squad and the entire right flank of his company was held up by an enemy tank, which was in a shell hole and firing continuously from its movable turret, Johnson, without regard for his own safety, fearlessly crawled through fire to the tank, climbed to the turret and then with great coolness opened the escape hatch and dropped a grenade into the tank. With keen presence of mind he slammed the hatch and sat on it until the grenade exploded, completely knocking the tank out of action. By this daring act, at the risk of his life, he not only enabled the advance to continue, but became an inspiration to all who were in the area. Sergeant Johnson was killed later in the action while fearlessly leading his men.

For leadership, initiative, coolness under fire, and utter disregard for his own safety, the actions of Corporal Phillip R. Burke warrant serious consideration for inscription in the Corps' Hall of Fame. Although wounded while landing on the beach, Burke organized a group of men and, under heavy machine-gun and rifle fire, attacked enemy positions with TNT charges until his supplies ran out. Wounded again the next morning, he disregarded his own safety by throwing himself on a hand grenade thrown by the enemy, saving the lives of members of his section; from this action he received serious wounds in his right arm.

For the inspiring leadership of a command above his rank and conduct for sustaining the morale of his men, the actions of Sergeant Edward R. Godwin will find an outstanding place in the annals of the Marine Corps. His platoon landed within the boundaries of an enemy strongpoint which dominated the entire bay area. When the platoon leader was seriously wounded, Godwin assumed command. In spite of severe enemy fire and a complete absence of communication with friendly troops, he led the platoon and established an isolated position in a crater among enemy emplacements. Through his cool-headed organization, the platoon was enabled to repel repeated bayonet attacks made by the enemy from three directions. For two days Godwin refused to withdraw within friendly lines. Although suffering an injury to his shoulder, he administered first aid to the wounded in the absence of a corpsman.

For notable initiative, skill, and devotion to duty, the conduct of Private First Class Joseph D. Doherty is particularly worthy of admiration. Unable to locate his own unit which had landed under heavy machine-gun and mortar fire, Doherty on his own initiative made his way to the front lines and took up a position. The following morning he found himself and two other Marines in advance of the front lines and under attack by enemy forces which were trying to wipe them out. After repulsing the attack by accurate rifle fire and grenades, he decided that the position was too advanced and covered the withdrawal of his companions. Later that day he saw a group of the enemy at-



## Presidential Unit Citation for Second Marine Division

**T**HE Presidential Unit Citation has been presented to the Second Marine Division (Reinforced) for the attack and victory over the Japanese defenders of Tarawa.

The citation reads:

"For outstanding performance in combat during the seizure and occupation of the Japanese-held Atoll of Tarawa, Gilbert Islands, November 20 to 24, 1943. Forced by treacherous coral reefs to disembark from their landing craft hundreds of yards off the beach, the Second Marine Division (Reinforced) became a highly vulnerable target for a devastating Japanese fire. Dauntlessly advancing in spite of rapidly mounting losses, the Marines fought a gallant battle against crushing odds, clearing the limited beach-heads of snipers and machine guns, reducing powerfully fortified enemy positions and completely annihilating the fanatically determined and strongly entrenched Japanese forces. By the successful occupation of Tarawa, the Second Marine Division (Reinforced) has provided our forces with highly strategic and important air and land bases from which to continue future operations against the enemy; by the valiant fighting spirit of these men, their heroic fortitude under punishing fire and their relentless perseverance in waging this epic battle in the Central Pacific, they have upheld the finest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

tempting to set up a machine gun under a wharf behind our lines and by extremely accurate rifle fire prevented any considerable casualties from being inflicted on our troops. The following day, with utter disregard for his own safety, he exposed himself to draw sniper fire and with remarkable skill killed four enemy snipers.

For executing a hazardous task, Sergeant Eugene L. Hill made a substantial contribution to the success of the operation in a most unusual manner. When his unit was attacking a strong enemy position in the emplacement of a disabled five-inch gun, the tripod of his machine gun was damaged beyond further use. Knowing that the fire power of his weapon was vitally needed at this stage of the attack, he cradled the weapon in his arms and with complete disregard for his own safety, exposed himself to heavy enemy machine-gun fire in order to fire his gun effectively from a kneeling position. Tracers from his weapon ignited a powder magazine in the enemy position which was thus destroyed.

But as a two-man army, Sergeant Clarence E. Petrie

and his platoon leader are in a class to themselves. The Japanese were in possession of many strong pillboxes and dugouts on the beach: these were causing heavy casualties among Marines attempting to gain the beach by wading through the shallow waters. Petrie, accompanied only by the officer, voluntarily assisted in attacking and destroying four of the strong enemy positions. He helped put a 75mm. pack-howitzer in position to fire on the first pillbox and helped to load the howitzer in the face of heavy machine-gun fire. He then with the lieutenant rushed the position and entered it to ascertain if all the Japanese were dead. Without hesitation they attacked four large pillboxes connected together by trenches. They attacked the first position in the face of heavy machine-gun fire, and under the cover of the accurate and steady fire of Petrie, the pillbox was gained and a number of hand grenades and TNT tossed in, after which both men entered to finish off the enemy. By way of the connecting trenches, they made an assault on the second position and killed its occupants. They then attacked the third position, and after throwing

grenades and TNT inside, they entered to mop up. Two Japanese were discovered and killed by grenades before the lieutenant was seriously wounded by a Japanese grenade. Without hesitation, and at great risk of his own life, Petrie dragged the officer outside to safety and carried him back to the aid station.

ONE of the most decisive actions of a small group of men in the battle was carried out by Corporal Robert E. Voorhees and four other marines. Enemy fire coming from a large bomb-proofed shelter on the flank of the battalion had caused numerous casualties and had been holding up the advance for two days. Demolition crews beginning the assault under the cover of friendly fire were soon pinned down by heavy machine-gun fire from the structure. The success of the demolition group depended on quick action because mortar shells were bursting close by and the shallow trenches in which Voorhees' assault crew had taken cover offered little or no protection. Realizing that enemy fire must be lifted from the demolition team so that they could advance and place their charges, Voorhees exposed himself and the four other marines to heavy machine-gun fire in order to move to a position from which they could bring fire to bear on the shelter. Their initial fire was answered immediately. During the violent action which followed, the demolition group advanced and planted their charges. The explosion partially demolished the shelter and killed about one hundred of the enemy within. The remainder, approximately two hundred, emerging from the main entrance firing rifles and light machine guns in an effort to withdraw and to establish a new defense, were met by the fire of Voorhees and his comrades, who were closing in. The engagement that followed was violent and at close quarters and resulted in the death of many more of the enemy. The reduction of the bomb-proofed shelter, the key point of the enemy defense in this area, made possible the advance of the battalion and the securing of the northeast section of the island.

For gallantry beyond the call of duty, the actions of Corporal Orville E. W. Broeker are worthy of recounting

in this brief narrative of outstanding heroic acts. His squad was in the assault. After advancing several hundred yards, the assault was held up by heavy enemy flanking fire coming from a concrete machine-gun emplacement. Showing bold initiative and quickness of thought, Broeker withdrew his men to a covered position. In the face of heavy enemy machine-gun fire, he began to work his way to the emplacement. Midway to his objective, he was hit in the face by fragments of an enemy grenade. Wounded and partially blinded, he continued to advance and finally, gaining the top of the emplacement, he dropped a thermite grenade through an air vent and completely destroyed the enemy resistance, allowing the front lines to continue the advance.

But not all of the heroes were engaged in trying to kill the enemy. During the cleaning up of the smaller islands of the Tarawa Atoll, after the advance guard (to which Private John "A" Bolthouse, Jr., was attached as a member of an artillery observation party) was heavily attacked by a superior enemy force at close range, Bolthouse joined a group of other marines engaged in an effort to evacuate casualties from the front lines under heavy enemy fire. He succeeded in getting several of the wounded to the rear area and continued his action until he was killed while attempting to reach a wounded Marine who was in the rear of the enemy. By his great personal valor he saved the lives of men who would otherwise have perished.

These hasty accounts of the deed of valor of the Marines of the Second Division are necessarily fragmentary and incompletely told, but they show the battle courage of America's fighting men at a new height. Perhaps it will not be necessary for Marines to gain a victorious decision under such difficult conditions as that of Tarawa during the continuance of this war, but if we all get on with the war with the determination to maintain the highest traditions of the Corps, our fighting units will stand ready to engage the enemy under the most difficult circumstances with confidence in ultimate victory. Come what will, Marines will not fail to live to the highest order of gallantry that was reached at Tarawa.



## Camp Elliott Transferred to Navy

CAMP ELLIOTT, Calif., chief training center of FMF units on the West Coast until the establishment of Camp Pendleton, will be turned over to the Navy as a personnel distribution center, the Navy Department has announced. Marine activities at Camp Elliott, now used principally as a replacement and casual center and as a specialized school area for mortars and machine guns, field artillery and officer candidate instruction, will be moved to Camp Pendleton. Transfer of the camp will be completed by June 30, 1944.

The transfer will not at present include the Marine Base depot, and the tank training area known as Jacques Farm and Green Farm. Those areas of Camp Elliott will be

turned over to the Navy later, it was announced recently.

Situated just north of the San Diego city limits on Kearny Mesa, Camp Elliott comprises about 29,000 acres. It came into being on 21 December 1934 when the Marine Corps rented 19,000 acres. It was not until the stress of national emergency, however, that the camp mushroomed to its present proportions. It became the home of the Second Marine Division in June 1941, when that unit was in the process of being formed.

The camp was known as Camp Holcomb until 20 June 1940, when it was redesignated at Camp Elliott, in honor of Major General George F. Elliott, who was Major General Commandant 1903-1910.

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# After the Tank, What?

## The Armored Vehicle May Have Reached Its Limit of Development

By Colonel H. W. Miller, Army Ord.-Res.

RECENT Russian reports say that in the first two weeks of the German offensive which began on June 26, 1943, some 3,000 of Germany's finest tanks including their latest and largest tank of 62 tons, were destroyed. As a result, the German offensive was stopped and a Russian offensive was possible on July 12th. Three thousand tanks destroyed, one offensive broken, and a formidable counteroffensive begun in two weeks. So what about the tank?

In June 1941 the German Army pounced upon Russia. The Russian Army was sliced into bits, just as the Polish and the French and British Armies had been. The advance was terrifying, both in speed and in extent. The actual loss of the Russian armies in men and material and the loss to Russia of manufacturing centers and cities is probably beyond our comprehension. We may have to wait a long time for an accurate report. It was probably the superb morale of the Russian fighting for his home that retarded the advance of the German armies, however ably assisted by their tanks and planes, so that by Christmas 1941 the Germans had not been able to take Leningrad, Moscow or Odessa.

During all this bitter summer and autumn, the Russians, fighting hand to hand, were learning how to destroy German tanks. They were learning that such close hand-to-hand fighting was effective. Bottles of gasoline thrown at the tanks, exploding when they struck, were very effective devices. The tank has almost no protection against fire, because vast quantities of air must be sucked into it for the crew and the engines; hence fire is a deadly weapon. The Russians were learning, likewise, that no tank can be fully protected on the front, sides, top and rear. If adequately protected everywhere against artillery fire, the tank would be so heavy that it would be a useless device in order that it may run interference for the infantry.

Only somewhat over a year ago, we saw the German Army lure some 300 British tanks into a trap at Tobruk and destroy them with 88mm. antiaircraft guns planted on the two sides of the trap. The Germans themselves were demonstrating that the war engine they had used with such devastating effect could be destroyed rather easily once within artillery range. Any army which has several hundred old antiaircraft guns of from three inches up, preferably mounted on self-propelled vehicles so that they may maneuver quickly, can probably destroy all the tanks that can be brought against them. We Americans hastily devised an antitank device by combining the M3 tank chassis and the 105mm. howitzer with a certain

amount of armor protection. Here was a self-propelled artillery piece similar to those we had designed almost twenty years ago. It has proved very effective.

With this and the Mark 4 (General Sherman) tank, with a longer 3-inch gun in a turret with the 360-degree traverse, General Montgomery was admirably fitted to meet all the tanks Marshal Rommel could send against him. Had it not been for the desert, which is an almost unconquerable thing, Montgomery probably would have rounded up all Rommel's forces long before he got back to Bengasi, and there would not have been any Tunisian campaign. It must not be thought that it was the fault of the antitank guns nor of the Mark 4 tanks that Montgomery did not completely destroy Rommel's army before it reached Tunisia. Rains and the desert probably made the German withdrawal possible.

It should be clear that we were witnessing alarming signs that the tank, which started as a puny weapon in the first World War and became such a powerfully destructive engine in the second, was beginning to show unmistakable signs of limits of development. There are many features of a tank which, if not capable of expansion, definitely limit the possibilities of that device. The capacity of the earth, particularly soft earth, to sustain weight per square foot of area, imposes very severe limitations on the total weight that any piece of equipment may be required to give the flotation necessary for mobility.

The power that must be placed in a tank to produce the necessary speed cannot be expanded indefinitely. The armor that must be put on it to protect it adequately for its absolutely essential use has a limit. The firepower of its cannon and heavy machine guns is definitely limited. If and when the tank begins to reach its limit in these four categories—bearing pressure on the earth, power to drive it, armor to protect it, and firepower for destruction—one must then of necessity begin to think of other means of accomplishing the purpose for which this particular mechanism was designed. And the end or purpose of this contact artillery is to run interference for the infantry and, in high-speed warfare, to spread out after a break-through, cut lines of communication, and take the enemy in the rear so quickly as to produce disconcertion and confusion in large units, as we saw repeatedly in the campaigns in Poland, Belgium, and France, as well as in the Balkans and in Russia.

We shall know eventually just how many tanks the Germans assembled in the region of Orel and Kursk for an attempted break-through in the direction of Moscow in June, 1943. It is certain that they depended upon these

tanks as in the previous two years' campaign to breach the Russian lines, cut their communications, and permit the armored cars and the infantry to get through. Neither they nor anyone else has yet invented another method of accomplishing all this. A part of the assault may be accomplished by a devastating bombardment of the defenses to pulverize all means of resistance on a certain sector, but the break-through must then be accomplished by power vehicles carrying troops, firepower, and defense.

Inasmuch as initial surprise is the prime element in such an offensive, the forward movement of the great mass of tanks was not preceded by the formidable artillery bombardment that was the rule in the first World War. But the Russian intelligence service was of such character as to obtain a fairly good picture of the German intention both as to the time and the exact place of the offensive. As a consequence, the Russians had taken every precaution possible to meet this tank assault. They had available bottles of gasoline with detonators, the newly developed American rocket gun, 37mm. high-velocity antitank guns, and their own artillery of various calibers. The largest caliber used for antitank service was probably no greater than 105mm. Practically all antitank work must be by direct fire, because the tank is a moving target. The only thing that can be accomplished with longer-range indirect-fire cannon is to tear up the roads and so slow up a tank assault that the smaller artillery can get at its targets more easily as the tanks move more slowly through the fields or over soft ground.

It must be appreciated in considering the fate of the tank, that the Russians have chosen to use methods so heroic that many may question if those methods will be used by others. Under desperate circumstances, however, it must always be assumed that any group of men, particularly German troops against which we may find our own troops battling in France and in Germany itself before long, will employ the most heroic methods. By these we refer to the practice of lying in the fields or beside the roads as though dead and permitting tanks to come abreast, jumping to the feet and throwing bottles of gasoline against the sides of the tanks from distances no greater than thirty or forty feet. Likewise, in the recent German tank assault on the Russian lines, a Russian antitank-gun officer commanding 37mm. gun batteries said that a very close study had been made of

the largest German tank, the 62-ton "Tiger" to find its vulnerable points and that four had been found. One of them was near the fuel supply. He said he had placed his guns on the sides of the roads no farther than 200 feet from the road itself. At this distance, of course, 37mm. projectiles can pierce a considerable thickness of armor, and if there are known vulnerable places in the tank, as there will always be, no tank could be expected to withstand this fire. He mentioned that he had destroyed fifteen tanks in one day with these 37mm. guns at such close ranges and that seven of them had been the supertanks with which the Germans had hoped to pierce the Russian lines.

We may conclude then that the 3,000 German tanks destroyed by the Russians in a period of two weeks, thereby breaking the German offensive, were destroyed through the use of gasoline, rocket projectiles, close-range fire of 37mm. guns, longer-range fire of their 50 and 75mm. guns and 105mm. howitzers. Probably the ranges were no greater than a few thousand yards at most and may have averaged less than a thousand yards. This emphasizes the close-combat character of the tank. If it cannot come to grips with the enemy infantry, it is a relatively useless device. And if the enemy is willing to use the heroic methods employed by the Russians, then the same slaughter may be expected on any battle front.

This brings us to the question with which we started. We have practically reached the limit in the weight and speed of tanks, in the driving power we can put into them, in the fire-power we can give them, and the armor we can put on them. Yet we have seen this device destroyed in appalling fashion in a period of only two weeks in the 1943 German offensive against Russia. It must be admitted also that as a consequence of this slaughter of tanks, the German offensive was broken.

The question then is, "What follows the tank?" The Russians, the Germans, the British, and we know how to destroy tanks in great numbers and quickly enough to break a great offensive. We come thereby to the realization of the point already made, that probably never will human ingenuity be capable of devising anything that further human ingenuity cannot defeat. Having defeated the tank, how shall we compensate for a very vulnerable human body that cannot be armored against the machine gun, hand grenades, shrapnel balls, or shell fragments?



## Looking to the Future

WHATEVER types of island defense we encounter in future amphibious operations, we look to those operations with resolute, but cautious, confidence. Our victories in the Gilberts, the Marshalls, and the Admiralties, following those in the Solomons, New Guinea, and on New Britain, have demonstrated that two of the factors working strongly for us will weigh ever more heavily in our favor as we progress. They are battle experience, and physical power.—LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALEXANDER A. VANDEGRIFT.

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# Interlude on Guadalcanal

By W. S. Marchant

*The author was Resident Commissioner of the Solomon Islands British Protectorate. He had lived there for three and a half years and his job was to maintain the law and keep order and administer the territory.*

AS soon as the Japanese started their eastward drive it was obvious that the Solomons would be very much in the war zone, so it was decided to retain a skeleton staff for intelligence work and to keep contact with the native people.

Put shortly, the plan of action was for the District Officers to remain at their stations as long as possible and report enemy movements, but if threatened, to retire to the bush and continue to report and keep in touch with the natives. Each officer had been equipped with a portable radio with which to communicate with headquarters, which were established in the bush on the Island of Malaita. Dumps of food and supplies were made at suitable spots to which the officers could retire if necessary. Similarly the natives were advised to move back from the coast and to establish themselves in the hills.

The "hills" are mountains, which go up to four thousand feet mostly, though the highest of all in Guadalcanal is eight thousand. The islands run steeply down to the sea and they are densely wooded. The climate is hot, humid and with rain up to ten feet a year, so you can imagine the country affords plenty of cover. In fact the bush is so thick in most parts that you have to hack your way through with knives. As one man said: "You can almost see the damned stuff grow up as you cut it."

In addition to the large island of Guadalcanal, there are half a dozen other good-sized islands, and many smaller ones and atolls. I was on Florida Island, which is where the harbor of Tulagi is.

The Japanese occupied the group as far east as Tulagi at the beginning of May, 1942. We then resigned ourselves to a period of watching and waiting.

For the next couple of months, the Japanese were in undisputed occupation, and during this period they occupied strategic points, set up defenses, and began the now famous Henderson airfield on Guadalcanal. It was impossible for us to move about between the islands as the whole area was under constant air reconnaissance by the enemy, and his sea patrols visited the various islands, plundering native villages and taking anything they fancied from the European houses. So we settled down in native huts in the heart of the islands. We were well hidden from aerial view by the dense foliage, but all the time we kept a sharp look-out for enemy movements, and the native scouts always managed to bring advance information of enemy patrols so that we could get away before he came. Sometimes the notice was not very long. In fact, one officer was having lunch when a Japanese patrol vessel steamed into the little harbor where he was stationed—so he "upsticks and away," taking his radio with him. When the Japanese landed, all they found

were empty buildings and the remains of a half-eaten lunch.

In the past the Solomon Islanders were famous head-hunters, but it is now thirty years since they organized a raid. Most of them are Christians and the old customs are dying out; today they live in their villages, sailing, fishing and cultivating their gardens and attending church like many an English village community.

At the time I am speaking of they acted as scouts and were our chief source of information about the movements of the enemy. There was no lack of volunteers for this duty and they took considerable risks to get the information we wanted. They would set off in small canoes and paddle the thirty odd miles across the water in all weathers—and the waters around the Solomon Islands are often very far from calm—then the scouts would hide their canoes in the mangroves and set off on foot to the Japanese positions. They often had very narrow escapes, but I am glad to say that all through this stage not a single scout was lost.

These scouts would get inside the Japanese positions, and were often very ingenious in describing what they had seen, although unfamiliar with the technical terms for modern equipment. Once, for instance, we were particularly anxious to know the number and caliber of the Japanese antiaircraft guns and one scout described them as: "All same small beer bottle"—which of course was exactly what we wanted to know.

We listened to these stories which they brought in, sifted out the essential facts, got in reports from all the other island, decoded them, collated them with our own, and sent them off to the intelligence center outside the territory. We had a very busy time, for in addition to all that, we had to organize the patrols and, of course, make sure of getting our own supplies. Indeed that was one of our chief problems. The climate makes it impossible to hold large reserves. We couldn't get new stocks from outside because our sea communications with the outside world had been cut. Flour, sugar, tinned foods, soon ran out and we came to rely on native foodstuffs: panna, yam and occasionally a bit of fruit.

Another thing the Solomon Islanders did for us was to engage themselves to work for the Japanese on the construction of the airfield on Guadalcanal, and then after three or four days run away and tell us all about it. They found out where the ammunition was stored and the food and the fuel dumps. They reported where the aircraft were based and the positions of the antiaircraft guns and they generally studied the habits of the enemy. All of this was invaluable in planning the recapture of the islands. In fact, if it hadn't been for these scouts and our radios, our intelligence couldn't have known of the existence of the Henderson airfield, much less the exact details of its defenses.

When the American Marines landed on Guadalcanal on

August 7, 1942, the Henderson airfield was just on the point of completion. The attack was a complete surprise to the Japanese and the Americans captured the airfield the first day. It was the key to the whole island, and when we knew it had fallen we all felt that our months of hard work and discomfort in the bush had been well worth it.

The Islanders did not take part in the fighting—officially—but they were most helpful to us as scouts and laborers. They were splendid, for example, in carrying up supplies once the troops had landed. That was a difficult job. Everything had to be man-handled, unloaded direct on the beaches, and carried for miles in precipitous mountain country.

The villagers saved the lives of many of our airmen too.

If any of our people had to bail out, the natives would set off in their canoes, pick them up, and bring them back to their village. They fed them, attended to their injuries, and then sent word on to the nearest allied post. Often these villages were behind the Jap lines, and then villagers would smuggle the airmen down the coast by canoe at night, and back to allied territory.

Sometimes, too, the Islanders had a crack at the Japs themselves. There are plenty of examples of outstanding bravery on their part, one Melanesian sergeant being awarded both the George Medal and the American Silver Star. Indeed if it had not been for the loyalty of the Solomon Islanders, many of us might now have been in a Japanese prison camp.

## Escape from Rabaul

THE story of Marine Second Lieutenant Jack G. Morris' landing within rifle shot distance of two Rabaul airfields and escaping eight days later was disclosed to his squadron members in an official report of the flyer's rescue. Lieutenant Morris was serving his first tour of duty as a fighter pilot, when shot down during a bomber-escort mission over Rabaul, February 10. Motor trouble made him easy prey for five Zeros. He was rescued after a six-day trip down mountain and jungle streams to the coast and a day and a half in his rubber boat. Blinded by an explosive shell from the first Zero, and with his plane out of control, Lieutenant Morris jumped. A blurred, misty view of trees below, followed again by complete blindness and an almost immediate landing in a dry creek bed, convinced him that he could not have been more than 500 feet above the ground when he jumped.

Regaining consciousness after the crash, the lieutenant found he had suffered a sprained right wrist, a split nose, and a few bruises in the blind landing. His left eye was completely closed; he had partial vision from the other.

"I dove for the jungle as soon as I regained consciousness," he related, "because I was certain the Japs would send out patrols to find my burning plane. Well hidden, I rested and listened to the .50-caliber bullets from my crashed plane exploding. I took a chance and crawled back to the creek bed to get my emergency jungle kit and rubber boat from my parachute."

After bandaging his wounds, the officer tried to hide his parachute; but he hadn't the strength. He passed the first night in the jungle only a few hundred yards from his completely burned plane.

"My equipment was in pretty good shape," he related. "My wrist watch and compass both were working. I had plenty of jungle rations, and the mountain streams offered plenty of fresh water. I had just two thoughts. One, I wanted to get away from the Jap concentrations around the airfields. Two, I wanted to get back to the coast and out into the ocean where our search planes might spot me."

The first three days of his travel, the pilot was in mountainous country. He worked his way down the mountain streams slowly.

"I was nervous, even jittery," he said. "I had no depth

perception in my one eye and imagined Japs and unfriendly natives all over the place. In fact, the first day I hid out all afternoon and started moving again after dark. The third day I had to backtrack. The mountain stream I was following suddenly became a waterfall going hundreds of feet down. I walked back up the stream, climbed up the steep banks, and worked overland to the jungle below. I came out not far from the base of the waterfall and found that my mountain stream had become a sluggish jungle river."

The 14th and 15th Lieutenant Morris slowly waded down the river. There were many fish, some big ones, but he still depended on his jungle rations as he kept working toward the coast.

"It's a good thing I had those rations, too," he said. "I saw no wild foods at all on the mountain side or in the jungle. I didn't even see a coconut until I was a short distance from the coast."

That was on the afternoon of the 16th, his sixth day in the jungle. The river suddenly widened, and he could hear breakers in the distance. At sundown, he inflated his rubber boat, loaded it with coconuts, floated to the mouth of the river, and was blown to sea by an off-shore wind.

"At dawn," he reported, "I spotted a ship moving through the mist in the direction of Rabaul. It went by silently not far away—a Jap submarine."

"Around noon I saw nearly a hundred of our planes high overhead on their way to Rabaul. Later a lone PV (Vega Ventura) flew over quite a bit lower. I caught the pilot's attention with my mirror. He circled, dropped some more rations within 25 feet of my rubber boat, circled me for an hour and a half, and then disappeared for help."

"Later that afternoon, another Ventura circled overhead and dropped a dye-marker. But because of the rough water, he didn't spot me. That evening, a Jap fighter plane flew overhead without seeing me. Later, I saw another submarine—again Jap."

Lieutenant Morris was rescued the next noon. Another Ventura appeared, spotted the lifeboat, and circled. An hour later, a Consolidated Catalina flying boat landed, picked him up, and flew him to a rear area hospital.



# Boyington Receives Medal of Honor

ON March 17, 1944, the President announced the presentation of the Congressional Medal of Honor to Major Gregory Boyington for service as set forth in the following citation:

"For extraordinary heroism above and beyond the call of duty as Commanding Officer of Marine Fighting Squadron Two Fourteen in action against enemy Japanese forces in the Central Solomons Area from September 12, 1943, to January 3, 1944. Consistently outnumbered throughout successive hazardous flights over heavily defended hostile territory, Major Boyington struck at the enemy with daring and courageous persistence, leading his squadron into combat with devastating results to Japanese shipping, shore installations and aerial forces. Resolute in his efforts to inflict crippling damage on the enemy, Major Boyington led a formation of twenty-four fighters over Kahili on October 17 and, persistently circling the airdrome where sixty hostile aircraft were grounded, boldly challenged the Japanese to send up planes. Under his brilliant command, our fighters shot down twenty enemy craft in the ensuing action without the loss of a single ship. A superb airman and determined fighter against overwhelming odds, Major Boyington personally destroyed twenty of the numerous Japanese planes shot down by his squadron and by his forceful leadership developed the combat readiness in his command which was a distinctive factor in the Allied aerial achievements in this vitally strategic area."

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

## A Tribute from His Ground Crew

*The following spontaneous tribute to Major Gregory Boyington, Marine fighter pilot who was reported missing in action over Rabaul, January 3, was written by Captain Arthur W. Little, Jr., as spokesman for all the officers and enlisted men of the squadron which Boyington commanded:*

SO much will have been written—and justly so—concerning the brilliant exploits of our recent "Skipper," Major Gregory Boyington, of Okanogan, Washington, reported missing in action since the day he shot down his 26th enemy plane and thus equalled the records of Captain Rickenbacker of the last war and Marine Major Joe Foss, that we want to get in our comparatively unimportant tribute showing what his ground crew thought of Major Boyington, and tell how he endeared himself in the brief time he was with us. Incidentally, though it really isn't incidental, we refer to him in the present tense. Along with his fellow-pilots, we have a strong feeling that, like Captain Rickenbacker, he'll show up again someday—and perhaps with a seagull rather than a halo on his head, too.

As a matter of fact, "Greg" Boyington wouldn't look natural with a halo 'round his head. The first time we heard of him out this way, one of our boys had observed him on leave in New Zealand where he was recuperating from a broken leg that had kept him out of action for seven months. The Skipper with a crutch and one leg



in a cast, was having a wonderful time in a popular cafe.

Our men liked that. The first time the writer saw Major Boyington, he came roaring into our camp area in a jeep, slammed on the brakes and hit the deck like a cowboy swinging off his bronc.

"You in charge here?" he demanded with a grin when the dust had settled.

And before I could admit as much, he added, almost apologetically, "Well, I'm afraid I've got to take over; they've just given me this squadron—I've heard about you fellows, had about seven months up in the combat zone, didn't you—am proud to be one of you. . . ."

We'd heard about Greg Boyington, too. We'd heard about his "Flying Tiger" days in China when he knocked down six Jap planes. It was all right with us. We were proud to serve under him! We're glad now that we told him so.

Short, stocky, unimpressive looking, after a few moments talk with Boyington you'd probably say, "there isn't so much of him, except for those tremendous shoulders, but every bit counts."

HE seems more alive—even now—than most people. While you are with him he makes you feel that way too. Perhaps that is the secret of what he does to his men and fellow-officers—but I don't believe the Japs feel that way about him, since none who have met him face to face have lived long enough to boast about it. To us who are fortunate enough to know him, though, his color comes from the undeniable strength within him, a gift of leadership which not only stamps him as a fighter when the going is tough, but happily is perfectly obvious to all who work with him.

At the time Boyington joined our squadron most of our

original pilots had completed their tour of combat duty and returned to the States. Our new Skipper was given a brand new Flight Echelon composed of youngsters whom few, except Boyington, appeared too enthusiastic about because of their lack of experience. Boyington called them his "Black Sheep" and taught them all he had learned in China skies.

It's already an old story about how, during their initial six weeks in action, his Black Sheep shot down 58 planes, strafed 20 more on the ground, and were credited with 22 probables at Bougainville alone, to say nothing of shooting up troop-laden barges. No bombers escorted by them were ever lost. An additional six weeks under Boyington's leadership over Rabaul increased the total enemy destruction to 94 planes.

Boyington's first meeting with the enlisted men of our squadron occurred one afternoon when, at my suggestion, he addressed the 275 assembled personnel—and gave 'em hell—and they liked it. He made a hit with them from the start, not only because of the genuine sincerity which fairly oozed out of him as he spoke, but also because of the drenching downpour in which he stood out under the cocoanut palms, bareheaded and in "GI" shorts and shirt-sleeves, in front of his men who were protected by ponchos and helmets.

As I recall, the discussion had considerable to do with the fact that many of our boys had been overseas 18 to 20 months and were becoming annoyingly consistent about believing the "scuttlebutt" flying around to the effect that we were to be relieved and go home for a well-deserved rest. The rumor, while plausible, if not controlled might upset the morale of our workers. Boyington "gave them the word" in no uncertain manner and warned them there is a limit to such speculation.

**S**HORTLY before the scheduled muster, the tropical downpour burst with all the fury of a Somerset Maugham drama. The men were still in their tents but the Major's hut and storm-clothes were some distance away. "How's about postponing this?" I thoughtlessly asked Boyington while there was still time. He looked at me as if he just didn't understand for an instant, then fired an hilarious "Hell, No!"

The following day, through the thin partition of the outer office, I overheard Sergeant Major "Smokey" La Brose, of Chicago, remark: "That's all, brother! The way the men took to our new CO was sure something! The thing that got 'em was the calm way he stood out there and took a physical beating while giving them a verbal one. I've seen everything now! They'd follow that guy anywhere!"

A few nights later, at a big squadron barbecue and beer party which the officers gave to the men, we introduced Major Boyington formally to his command. He climbed up on an oil drum, waved a great chunk of roasted wild boar at them and addressed them extemporaneously as "You time-worn men!" If he hadn't already won all of them over, he had them wholeheartedly from there on in.

There is quite a bit of homespun humor of the Will Rogers variety in Greg Boyington's make-up. Essentially a fighting man rather than a military demon-for-detail, his

natural enthusiasm occasionally finds him in petty trouble.

One day he was supposed to write a letter of recommendation for a Sergeant who had applied for OCS. After thinking a while, he scratched his head, shoved the paper away from him impatiently, and turned to me.

"Hell," he declared, "this is your job—my job is fighting—you write it!"

Then he suggested as an afterthought: "Just say something like I've got a boy of ten and if he should ever have to go to war I hope he can be led into battle by such an officer as this Sergeant. . . ."

We thought there was something fine about that. That's the way his letter was sent into Headquarters at Washington.

As we bade him and his pilots Godspeed at 2 a.m. just before they started northward to meet the enemy on his last flight, he turned to me and complained: "You know, I only wish I'd had more time with the men—I'd like to have taken them out on the Range, and got to know them a hell of a lot better. . . ."

The day Major Boyington was reported missing, I received a letter from him. It enclosed a letter from a doctor concerning the mother of one of our corporals. Apparently she had been bedridden for a long time and now spent all her time crying for her boy. The doctor advised that it was of the utmost importance that the son get a furlough.

"I think this is important, too—please do something about it, pronto!" the Skipper had written across the top of the doctor's letter. The last thing he said that morning was: "Don't forget to have a 'cold one' on tap for me when we return!"

It's on tap. . . . But it was typical, too, of the Major to delay coming in to collect it from the squadron reefer, since seven of his Black Sheep are also missing and he never asked anyone to do anything he wouldn't do. "I wouldn't think much of a commander if he ordered his men to go places he wouldn't go," he told us once.

"Come up and fight!" Boyington would shout at the Japs when they sometimes cut in on our radio frequency. Like an athlete with natural timing and game sense, he instinctively moved quickly to the right places with little wasted effort: As an Indian mountain guide who seems to "smell" elk over yonder ridge, Boyington flew straight as an arrow to where he could smoke out the Japs. When they failed to accept his battle cry, he'd turn over to his Wingman his division leadership on the way home, climb to heights above the clouds, circle around and await his chance to pounce on unsuspecting enemy stragglers passing beneath him.

But the saga of Greg Boyington's aerial lore belongs elsewhere, preferably among the thrilling pages written for history from the fond memory books of his co-pilots. About all else I know, from the back row seat of a humble ground officer, is that for our money he is probably now sitting on an island somewhere shouting "Come down and fight!"

Yes, the Skipper has left us for awhile. But somehow we doubt if he ever gets very far away. For, after all, in aviation the only real distances in these modern times are those we carry deep in our hearts . . . and there has never been any distance between Greg Boyington and his men that won't always be bridged.



# Intra-Battalion Communications After Landing

By Lieutenant Thomas M. Kerr, Jr., USMC

CONFUSION is the classic characteristic of military engagements and no military activity better begets confusion than an amphibious operation. SNAFU is SOP on any enemy held beach that is simultaneously assaulted along its length by thousands of troops. Boated units are separated from physical contact with their commanders and from their companions on the right and left. The beach itself is a place of farther separation. During those first minutes, the situation is *really* normal.

Communications is the instrument which must bring control and organization out of that initial lash-up.

The problem of location, communication and control between division, regiment, and battalion is not difficult. These larger units land on specified beaches with more elaborate equipment and are easily contacted. It is the smaller units that experience the greatest loss of contact with each other and with their higher headquarters in the coral, salt and blood *mélee* on the beach. Assault companies, moving forward from the beach to seize the initiative, lose platoons and become lost from battalion. The most difficult communication job lies in finding them again for the battalion and finding the battalion for them.

However successful their communications may be, division, regiment, and battalion headquarters still cannot command or control unless each Battalion Landing Team commander can report the situation of his individual and, unfortunately, elusive rifle companies. Higher echelon cannot call down artillery fires on a road when they are not sure that Charlie Company has not already reached and crossed that road. Knowledge of and intelligent development of the entire situation thus depends first on the intra-battalion communication system—from Landing Team to those fast-moving, fighting companies.

A solution of this important problem, and one somewhat at odds with past and current "school" solutions, was employed with considerable success during the attack on Namur on 1 and 2 February, 1944.

In order to accomplish immediate wire and radio contact with the rifle companies, men and equipment from the battalion communication platoon were divided and assigned to boats so that three wire men and two radiomen landed with each rifle company. This company signal team was commanded by a corporal and its responsibility was to establish and maintain communications from company to battalion CP.

One of the three wire men with each team was instructed to remain on the beach on landing while his two fellows moved inland laying light assault wire (w-130) from hand reels (RL-39). The man who stayed near the

beach extended his end of the wire to the initial battalion switchboard which arrived ashore about 15 minutes after the first wave. In the event the switchboard was landed later or not at all, the three beach wire men were to splice their respective company lines together and place a telephone on this party line in the CP. In this manner, wire communication was immediately established to all rifle companies.

The light wire held up well and there was little line trouble experienced during the action.

The company lines, thus initially installed, were extended as their units moved forward by the two wire men who remained with them.

The two radio men assigned to each company carried and operated TBY radio equipment. These ultra-high frequency sets worked successfully between boats before landing as well as ashore on the atoll. On terrain of this nature there are no long distances or high land masks to frustrate their operation.

Still, no matter how successful these small and sometimes troublesome radios may prove, they are not so adequate or satisfactory a means of sending the word as the telephone. The Bard of Avon himself, with all his skill in language, could not have put into a written message the vivid inflection of a personal conversation that best conveys the true situation.

Wire was the primary means used for this reason with the radios ready to substitute should the lines go out.

Although these efforts brought successful and unbroken communications with the company CP's there was still one difficulty encountered. The companies themselves, especially during the attack, moved ahead of their command posts leaving their wire and radio facilities at that location. That wire line and that radio are the means available for getting the constantly developing situation back to all higher echelons.—They must move with the action. Company commanders who leave them behind at a CP are creating a delay time between future contacts with the enemy and reports of that contact to battalion. Present day wire and radio equipment will go anywhere a light machine gun will go—and should be taken there. Also, wire and radio equipment are the means for placing artillery fire, naval gunfire and air support accurately in front of the advancing company. It is poor strategy to leave those battleships behind and out of your fight.

The fast-moving situation of modern battle requires immediate and constant contact with lower echelons after landing. These remarks offer one suggested way for establishing and maintaining that vital contact.

# Decorations and Commendations

## NAVY CROSS

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL VICTOR H. KRULAK, USMC:** While Commanding Officer of a battalion of a Marine Parachute Regiment in the Solomons from October 28 to November 3, 1943, Colonel Krulak landed and daringly directed the attack at Choiseul of his battalion against the Japanese, destroying hundreds of tons of supplies and burning camps and landing barges. Although wounded on October 30, he refused to relinquish his command and continued to lead his battalion against the numerically superior Japanese forces.

**MAJOR GORDON WARNER, USMC:** Major Warner, who was with the first Marine units to invade Bougainville, outsmarted enemy troops, skillfully camouflaged in entrenchments, with taunts in Japanese, causing them to fire on him and thus reveal their positions. On another occasion, when his company had overcome positions which could be attacked unassisted, he procured a tank and, preceding it on foot, guided it in assaulting six machine-gun emplacements too strong to be reduced by infantry.

**CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER FRANCIS J. MURPHY, USMC:** Warrant Officer Murphy aided greatly in actions against the Japanese in the Bougainville campaign.

**PRIVATE JOHN J. WANTUCK, USMC:** With the entire American occupation force endangered by approaching hostile troops intent on recapturing the beachhead at Zanana Beach, New Georgia Island, on July 17, 1943, Private Wantuck and a comrade unhesitatingly volunteered to man two light machine guns in a desperate effort to de-

fend the position. He coolly waited through the night for the enemy to approach within easy range and then opened fire.

## DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

**SERGEANT WAUSS R. TEAGUE, USMC:** Sergeant Teague was credited with killing at least four enemy snipers and the destruction of three machine-gun nests while at Vuru Village, Vangunu, Solomon Islands, where his conduct was at all times characterized by an intense interest in the safety of his comrades and in the utter defeat of the enemy.

**CORPORAL WESLIE L. PHILLIPS, USMC:** While occupying a key position in the center of his company's lines at Bairoko Harbor, New Georgia, Solomon Islands, on 20 July 1943, Corporal Phillips pressed forward alone with a machine gun after all the other men in his squad had become casualties. Gathering ammunition from the dead and wounded, he held off the enemy while the wounded were being evacuated under the cover of his fire.

**PRIVATE FIRST CLASS JOHN NOVINA, USMCR:** Acting promptly and calmly in an emergency during an attack, when all the other men in his squad were either killed or wounded, Private Novina operated a machine gun alone while being subjected to the exceptionally heavy fire from enemy rifles, machine guns and mortars, while at Bairoko Harbor, New Georgia, Solomon Islands, on 20 July 1943.

## LEGION OF MERIT

**BRIGADIER GENERAL GERALD C. THOMAS, USMC:** While serving as Chief of Staff of a Marine amphibious

## General Holcomb Decorated

**T**HE President of the United States pursuant to an Act of Congress, approved 22 February 1944, takes pleasure in presenting the **DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL** to

**GENERAL THOMAS HOLCOMB, U. S. MARINE CORPS,**

for service as set forth in the following citation:

"For exceptionally meritorious and distinguished service to the Government of the United States in a duty of great responsibility as Commandant of the United States Marine Corps from December 1, 1936, to January 1, 1944. Thoroughly experienced in combat and assigned a task of exacting proportions during the national emergency and after December 7, 1941, General Holcomb was responsible for the development of an organization equal to extensive and pressing demands incident to the aggressive prosecution of the war. He has achieved brilliant success in the numerous phases of rapid expansion of the Corps to many times its normal size, at the same time, holding Marine Corps personnel to the traditional high level of combat readiness during a tremendously critical period. General Holcomb's forceful and inspiring leadership, his distinctive ability as an administrator and executive, and his tireless and unwavering devotion to duty have been major factors in the success of our offensive drive against the Japanese strongholds in the Pacific War Area and have contributed essentially to the high morale of the officers and men carrying the fight to the enemy. His consistently valuable service in a position of vital importance is in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The award was presented in the Secretary of the Navy's office at noon, April 12, 1944.



corps from August 7 to September 15 and October 10 to November 8, 1943, General Thomas contributed materially to the success of the operations, which resulted in the occupation of the Treasury Islands, the execution of a successful diversionary landing on Choiseul, and the establishment of a beachhead at Empress Augusta Bay on the enemy stronghold of Bougainville.

**COLONEL JAMES M. SMITH, USMC:** Colonel Smith, despite the fact that he had recently recovered from wounds, volunteered to secure vital information on the terrain and the enemy strength and disposition while leader of an advance reconnaissance patrol on an enemy-occupied island in the Solomon Islands group from October 27 to November 1, 1943.

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL NATHANIEL S. CLIFFORD, USMC:** Lieutenant Colonel Clifford, possessed with a marked ability to impart his knowledge gained by constant and diligent study of enemy aerial tactics, achieved distinctive success in training Marine Fighter pilots and ground crews under his command in the Solomon Islands Area from September 11, 1942, to August 5, 1943, and inspired them to the same high state of courage that enabled him to land an amphibious plane in rough seas and rescue a pilot, injured by enemy action.

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM K. POTTINGER, USMC:** Piloting aircraft in day and night missions against heavily defended Japanese shore installations and shipping on Guadalcanal, Lieutenant Colonel Pottinger inflicted severe damage on the enemy and obtained much valuable information for the planning and execution of subsequent attacks.

**MAJOR CHARLES L. BANKS, USMC:** As executive officer of a raider battalion at Bairoko and Enogai, New Georgia, Solomon Islands, Major Banks discharged his duties with fidelity and efficiency. On one occasion, after his battalion had engaged the enemy for seven hours, he volunteered to make a difficult trip over a strange jungle trail to arrange for delivery of essential supplies and evacuation of the wounded.

### SILVER STAR

**COLONEL HAROLD E. ROSECRANS, USMC:** During the assault on Tulagi Island, Solomon Islands, Colonel Rosecrans skillfully and fearlessly placed units of his command into combat in support of the forward elements of that battalion and thereby contributed materially to the annihilation of the entire hostile garrison.

**COLONEL JAMES M. SMITH, USMC:** On New Georgia, Colonel Smith voluntarily accompanied a platoon of Marine tanks committed to knocking out several hostile pillboxes which were impeding the advance of an infantry regiment.

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL KENNETH F. McLEOD, USMC:** As a battalion commander against enemy Japanese forces on Tarawa, Colonel McLeod led his battalion with great skill against strongly defended positions to the end that all Japanese on Betio Island were destroyed and the island secured in the shortest possible time.

**LIEUTENANT COMMANDER WARREN E. PAGE, MC, USNR, CAPTAIN CONRAD M. FOWLER, USMC, FIRST LIEUTENANT ROBERT W. DORRELL, USMC, and FIRST LIEUTENANT HOWELL T. HEFLIN, USMC:** These officers, with great skill and courage, participated in action against the Japs in the Bougainville campaign.

**CAPTAIN WILLIAM L. FLAKE, USMC:** Captain Flake personally located three hostile machine-gun emplacements and aggressively led his men forward under fire to destroy them at the cost of a serious wound to himself on Vangunu, Solomon Islands.

**CAPTAIN ERNEST A. POWELL, USMCR:** As a pilot attached to a fighting squadron in the Rendova Island area, Captain Powell boldly engaged four Japanese planes when his division contacted a large number of Japanese twin-engined bombers and sent them crashing down.

**CAPTAIN WALTER S. McILHENNY, USMCR:** Captain McIlhenny led a patrol of twenty men to secure information but on the way back, they were spotted. When almost all of his men were wounded, McIlhenny, despite his own injury, determined to carry the message himself and succeeded in reaching our lines.

**FIRST LIEUTENANT JOHN R. KENDALL, USMCR: (Army)** On New Georgia, Solomon Islands, Lieutenant Kendall aggressively led many reconnaissance patrols at great personal risk, accurately located enemy positions at Bairoko Harbor and successfully led a food-carrying party through Japanese-controlled territory.

**FIRST LIEUTENANT JOSEPH S. NOLAN, USMC:** Lieutenant Nolan, after being wounded, ordered an attack which destroyed a strong Japanese position near the Koromokina River, Bougainville.

**FIRST LIEUTENANT WILLIAM A. RENO, USMC:** As commander of a machine-gun platoon, Lieutenant Reno's gunners beat off repeated Japanese attacks on Cape Gloucester. After one night of attack, enemy dead were piled so high, he had to order some of his men to change their gun emplacements.

**FIRST LIEUTENANT BUD TINKER, USMCR:** On New Georgia, Solomon Islands, Lieutenant Tinker put the company's mortars into action thus enabling the continued advance of friendly troops, then moved to the front and supervised the replacement of wounded machine gunners, the replenishment of ammunitions and administered first aid and evacuated wounded personnel.

**SECOND LIEUTENANT PHILIP A. OLDHAM, USMCR:** Rather than call for volunteers to attack three machine guns that were blocking an advance on an enemy position with vicious cross-fire, Lieutenant Oldham crawled forward alone and wiped out one of the guns and its crew.

**MASTER GUNNERY SERGEANT ANTHONY J. PALONIS, JR., USMC:** When his platoon leader was killed, Sergeant Palonis aggressively assumed command with such skill that several strong Japanese positions were destroyed, during which he attempted the rescue of two wounded marines at the cost of a serious wound to himself, on New Georgia.

**GUNNERY SERGEANT CLIFTON CARTER, USMC:** Sergeant Carter, when, with a number of men from his platoon,

he was surrounded by the enemy, set an ambush which resulted in the death of 30 Japanese soldiers on Bougainville.

MASTER TECHNICAL SERGEANTS JOHN J. MURPHY, USMC, and JOHN F. WHEELER, USMC: While serving with a Marine Aircraft Group during the bombing of Henderson Field, Guadalcanal, a direct bomb hit and demolished a dugout in which six men had taken shelter. Sergeant Wheeler answered a call for assistance and Sergeant Murphy freed himself and then assisted getting his comrades out from under the debris.

TECHNICAL SERGEANT RAYBON M. CHAMBERS, USMC: Braving enemy fire so intense that every man in his party was killed or wounded, Sergeant Chambers continued to lay telephone wire single-handed until communications were established throughout his battalion.

GUNNERY SERGEANT ROBERT T. NICHOLS, USMC: Sergeant Nichols conducted a one-man reconnaissance behind enemy lines under constant machine-gun and mortar fire after landing on Bougainville.

PLATOON SERGEANT HURSHALL W. HOOKER, USMC: Sergeant Hooker is credited with killing nine Japanese while in action on Florida Island and on Guadalcanal.

PLATOON SERGEANT HENRY P. SZEWCZAK, USMC: When the advance of his platoon was halted, Sergeant Szewczak aggressively reconnoitered the hostile position well to the front with such skill as to effect its subsequent destruction.

SERGEANTS WALDO D. HUMPHREY, USMC, THOMAS J. BELT, JR., USMC, RUDOLPH ROTT, USMC, RONALD B. WILLIAMS, USMC, LUTHER L. THORNTON, USMC, PLATOON SERGEANT LEROY C. CLEARY, USMC, CORPORAL HENRY J. DOANE, USMC, and PRIVATE FIRST CLASS NIEL OVERTON, USMC: These men participated in a patrol in action on Bougainville.

SERGEANT GEORGE J. VAL, USMC: Sergeant Val, a member of a rifle company on Bougainville, took command of his platoon and led it in aggressive attack which resulted in the capture of the enemy's position.

SERGEANT EDGAR J. HERSCHLER, USMC, and CORPORAL ORVAL L. FISHER, USMC: Both men, in action on Bougainville, braved the fire of Japanese machine guns to remove and rescue wounded marine comrades, and while doing so, were themselves wounded.

CORPORAL ROBERT L. MULFORD, USMC: When his platoon was pinned down by enemy fire, Corporal Mulford retrieved a Browning Automatic rifle from a casualty and led his squad forward, personally destroying an enemy light machine gun and its entire crew.

CORPORAL FRANK L. WILDER, USMC: Corporal Wilder and a comrade carried ashore their radio equipment on Bougainville, established a radio station under enemy observation on the beach, rendering invaluable service to the sector commander by maintaining communications.

CORPORAL OTTO L. YEATER, USMC: While he was serving with a Marine Aircraft Group during the bombing of Henderson Field, Guadalcanal, a bomb hit and demolished a dugout in which six men had taken shelter.

After he was assisted from the debris, Corporal Yeater worked tirelessly with a companion to uncover those still buried in the ruins.

CORPORAL BERT E. ZUMBERGE, USMC: When Zumberge landed on Abemama Island of the Gilbert group, his company was immediately subjected to withering machine gun and rifle fire and in the first burst, his buddy was badly wounded. He braved the concentrated fire and sheltering the wounded man with his own body, gave first aid.

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS EUGENE P. AMURRI, USMC, CHARLES L. BARNES, USMC, JAMES W. CALLAHAN, USMC, ROBERT E. DOW, USMC, JACK J. MCGOVERN, USMC, MELVIN P. SARTAIN, USMC, JAMES L. STONAKER, USMC, and PRIVATES HARRY N. FORCINIO, JR., USMC, WARREN M. LAMBUTH, USMC, and CHARLES R. MITCHIE, USMC: While at New Georgia, Solomon Islands, these men courageously advanced under enemy fire to locate and destroy hostile machine-gun emplacements, rescued comrades who were seriously wounded in action, delivered important messages between friendly troops, and exposed themselves to heavy enemy fire to retrieve medical supplies from a parachute in a tree.

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS SAMUEL J. COLLINS, USMC, WILLIAM R. MAC PHERSON, USMC, ROBERT A. NASH, USMC, and PRIVATE ROBERT J. MURPHY, USMC: These men were together during the battle of Piva Forks on Bougainville and "never flinched when those Japs were coming at us." They stuck by their guns and helped their comrades to advance.

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS NORMAN COHEN, USMC, and JAMES F. McNABB, USMC: With hand grenades and a machine gun, these two boys knocked out several enemy machine-gun crews and killed more than a score of Japanese who were counterattacking Marine positions on Cape Gloucester.

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS JOHN P. PERELLA, USMC: Private Perella swam 1,000 yards through rough sea, in full view of the enemy and subjected to heavy Japanese fire, to summon aid for his Marine platoon, trapped behind enemy lines.

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS JAMES O. WALKER, USMC: While a member of a five-man patrol which was halted by enemy fire, Private Walker aggressively went forward and killed an entire enemy machine-gun crew, in action at Vanunu, Solomon Islands.

PRIVATE EVERETT BRYANT, USMC: With no concern for his own safety, Private Bryant was persistent in the operation of his machine gun, bringing exceptionally effective fire to bear on strong Japanese positions.

PRIVATE DALLAS E. JOHNSON, USMC: With utter disregard for his own safety, Private Johnson, while serving with a Marine Aircraft Group on Henderson Field, Guadalcanal, voluntarily left his shelter and made two hazardous trips to the field hospital with wounded personnel.

#### DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS

MAJORS WILLIAM E. GISE, USMC, and GREGORY J. WEISSENBERGER, USMC: While Commanding Officers of



Marine Fighting Squadrons in the Solomon Islands Area, these two Marine officers gallantly led their squadrons on numerous combat missions and together account for the destruction of a great number of enemy planes.

MAJOR JOSEPH H. REINBURG, USMCR, CAPTAINS KENNETH M. FORD, USMCR, JAMES E. SWETT, USMCR, FIRST LIEUTENANTS ARTHUR R. BOAG, USMCR, VERNON L. GLASCOCK, USMCR, MILTON N. VEDDER, USMCR, SECOND LIEUTENANT PAUL FUSS, USMC, and MARINE GUNNER GORDON V. HODDE, USMC: While fighter pilots attached to Marine Fighting Squadrons in combat against Japanese forces in the Solomon Islands Area, these men, with cool courage and grim determination, gallantly led their flights and launched daring attacks against superior hostile forces, thus destroying many enemy aircraft in that vicinity.

#### NAVY AND MARINE CORPS MEDAL

SECOND LIEUTENANT CHARLES L. HOBART, USMC: When an airplane crashed at Brannan Field, Florida, Lieutenant Hobart and another marine officer succeeded in removing the pilot and placing him in an ambulance, in spite of the imminent danger of gasoline explosions.

SERGEANT ROY W. WADDELL, USMC: While assisting two members of an Army B-24 Liberator crew, whose ship had crashed into the sea, Sergeant Waddell observed an injured officer tossing about in the rough sea. Advancing to the extreme edge of the rocky promontory, he managed to pull the semi-conscious survivor out of the water and bring him safely to shore over an area honey-combed with deep crevices and lashed by heavy surf.

#### BRONZE STAR MEDAL

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT E. FEJT, USMC: As commander of an engineering regiment during a season of torrential rain on Bougainville, Colonel Fejt supervised construction of roads and trails through dense jungle in the advance areas.

CAPTAIN PATRICK O'SHEEL, USMC: Captain O'Sheel, although he himself was wounded when a 500-pound bomb demolished press headquarters at Cape Torokina, Bougainville, assisted and took command of rescue operations.

#### SOLDIERS' MEDAL (Army)

CAPTAIN JOHN P. LONG, USMCR.

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS LAWRENCE J. CHOATE, USMC.

#### GOLD STAR IN LIEU OF SECOND AIR MEDAL

FIRST LIEUTENANT CHARLTON A. MAIN, USMCR.

#### AIR MEDAL

MAJOR HERMAN HANSEN, JR., USMC.

MAJOR WILLIAM H. PACE, USMC.

CAPTAIN HOWARD E. COOK, USMCR.

CAPTAIN ROBERT T. EWING, USMCR.

CAPTAIN LEWIS GORDON, USMCR.

CAPTAIN CARROLL E. McCULLAH, USMCR.

CAPTAIN ROY A. THORSON, USMCR.

FIRST LIEUTENANT DONALD L. BALCH, USMCR.  
 FIRST LIEUTENANT FRANK B. BALDWIN, USMCR.  
 FIRST LIEUTENANT JOHN F. BEGERT, USMCR.  
 FIRST LIEUTENANT HENRY M. BOURGEOIS, USMCR.  
 FIRST LIEUTENANT CALVERT S. BOWIE, USMCR.  
 FIRST LIEUTENANT THERON H. BROWN, III, USMCR.  
 FIRST LIEUTENANT BENJAMIN E. DALE, JR., USMCR.  
 FIRST LIEUTENANT FOY R. GARISON, USMCR.  
 FIRST LIEUTENANT WILLIAM B. HARLAN, USMCR.  
 FIRST LIEUTENANT THOMAS H. HUGHES, JR., USMCR.  
 FIRST LIEUTENANT WILLIAM McDOW JOHNSTON, JR., USMC.  
 FIRST LIEUTENANT ROBERT M. JONES, USMCR.  
 FIRST LIEUTENANT LEONARD W. MC CLEARY, USMCR.  
 FIRST LIEUTENANT AUBREY E. MORSE, USMCR.  
 FIRST LIEUTENANT PAUL A. MULLEN, USMCR.  
 FIRST LIEUTENANT ADDISON R. RABER, USMCR.  
 FIRST LIEUTENANT SAMUEL RICHARDS, JR., USMCR.  
 FIRST LIEUTENANT WILLIAM E. SAGE, USMCR.  
 FIRST LIEUTENANT EDWIN E. SHIFFLETT, USMCR.  
 SECOND LIEUTENANT JAMES ENGLISH, USMCR.  
 SECOND LIEUTENANT FRANK J. HUBKA, USMC.  
 SECOND LIEUTENANT HARTWELL V. SCARBOROUGH, JR., USMCR.  
 SECOND LIEUTENANT JOHN M. SODD, USMCR.  
 STAFF SERGEANT JACK PITTMAN, JR., USMC.  
 PRIVATE FIRST CLASS DONALD S. BATCHELOR, USMCR.  
 PRIVATE FIRST CLASS FREDERICK J. BECK, USMC.  
 PRIVATE FIRST CLASS DONALD A. BLACK, USMC.  
 PRIVATE FIRST CLASS CLARENCE N. GOODWIN, USMCR.  
 PRIVATE FIRST CLASS WILLIAM C. STRUBBE, USMCR.

#### PERUVIAN AVIATION CROSS, FIRST CLASS

COLONEL BOEKER C. BATTERTON, USMC, for services with the U. S. Naval Aviation Mission at Lima, Peru.

#### PERUVIAN AVIATION CROSS, SECOND CLASS

WARRANT OFFICER WALDO HARRIS, USMC.

#### COLOMBIAN DECORATIONS

*Cruz de Boyaca (Caballero):*

SECOND LIEUTENANT JOHN DONATO, USMC.

*Cruz de Boyaca (Comendador):*

COLONEL BYRON F. JOHNSON, USMC.

*Cruz de Boyaca (Oficial):*

MAJOR ROGER WILLOCK, USMCR.

#### Wearing of Presidential Unit Citation

TO clarify existing regulations regarding the wearing of a presidential unit citation, the Secretary of the Navy on 30 March 1944 in ALNAV No. 72 stated as follows:

Personnel of the unit who were actually present and participated in the action (or one of the actions, if more than one is mentioned) shall wear the ribbon with star permanently.

Personnel attached to the cited unit but not present or participating in the basic action, and personnel who subsequently joined the unit, shall wear the citation ribbon without star and then only when attached to that unit.

# BOOK REVIEWS

Any books reviewed may be obtained at publishers' prices from The Marine Corps Association, Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C.

**PACIFIC PARTNER.** By George H. Johnston. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce. 227 pps. \$2.50.

**PACIFIC PARTNER** is written by an Australian to give Americans a clearer picture of the rôle of this great South Pacific ally in the general pattern of World War II. It is written to tell Americans something of the impact which America has made on the world's youngest national democracy; to tell something of the struggle of Australian men and women toward a total war effort and an austere way of life; to tell the little-understood background of politics and people; to penetrate into the psychology of the Australian fighting man; and to examine his relations, in action and out of it, with the American dough-boy. It is of particular interest to the many thousands of members of the Marine Corps and other armed forces of the United States who have served in Australia.

Therefore this book, although written by an Australian, is written as impartially as possible. It is written, too, with pride, for the war effort of Australia must stand comparison with that of any nation in the world. It is the story of a nation of 7,000,000 English-speaking people holding a continent almost the size of the United States, surrounded by neighbors numbering roughly 1,100,000,000—more than half the population of the world. It is the story of the real Australia—the spirit and psychology of its fighting men and women, the workers in its factories, its political leaders and its war leaders; its achievements and its shortcomings, its battle honors which extend from Atlantic to Pacific, from the Arctic to the Antarctic; the way of life for which, at one stage of the war, it had given more lives, proportionate to population, than any other nation fighting under the banners of the United Nations.

One interesting observation of the author is that the Australian government asked for General MacArthur to be sent to Australia as Allied Commander some time before the fall of Bataan, well knowing that the American people would not let down one of their own commanders and thus, by asking for MacArthur, they paved the way for speedy American reinforcements to Australia.

Very little reference is made to the continent of Australia, the main emphasis being on the war effort of the people. A greater part of that war effort is concentrated within the country. Since Australia has been so close to her enemies, defense units of all kinds have been provided to protect her shores and airfields. Many of the units of the Australian Army are for such duty only and are not available for overseas service. This should be borne in mind in calculating the potential of Australia as a partner in prosecuting the war with Japan to the bitter end.

The observations of the author in a chapter entitled "Kill Or Be Killed" are of particular interest to our fighting forces. He had observed new and untried units receive their first baptism of fire and had seen them flinch under combat but later become stern and determined fighters.

His conclusion as to our relations in the postwar world are particularly important. He believes that Australia should and will be drawn closer to the United States in economic and political hook-ups and that, together with our other Allies, we will establish a new order in the Pacific which will make for a lasting peace.

C. H. METCALF.

**HOW TO ABANDON SHIP.** By Phil Richards and John J. Banigan. Fighting Forces Series, Washington: Infantry Journal, 1943. 196 pp. \$.25.

**HOW TO ABANDON SHIP** is a grim little booklet which has distilled competent and detailed advice from the years of the war. The specific instructions are underlined by the evidence of men who have been torpedoed and shipwrecked, men who have survived long trips on lifeboats and on rafts. The authors give a complete and very practical account of how to provide against disaster when aboard ship in the war zone, how to get off the ship when it is sinking, how to sail a lifeboat, and how to survive in it. There is an effective chapter on morale, one on simple navigation with pilot charts, and clear directions for medical aid. In the inexpensive and handy format of the Fighting Forces Series, it is a volume that should go to sea with all seamen, and on transports with all soldiers and Marines as a very literal handbook.

P. D. C.

**GOD, MAMMON AND THE JAPANESE.** By Fred Harvey Harrington. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press. 362 pp. \$3.75.

**THIS** book is an account of the activities of Dr. Horace N. Allen in connection with Korean-American foreign relations from 1884 to 1905. Allen was at first a Protestant missionary, but through his connection with the royal family he soon became very influential and assumed an official diplomatic status. The story is taken from Allen's letters to the State Department as well as to friends and collections of manuscripts in the New York Public Library. Allen witnessed the whole drama of the Orient. As it unfolded step by step he saw the clash of Japanese and Russian interests and the desperate efforts of the Chinese to hold back the advance of the Empire of the Rising Sun. Meanwhile, he was playing every possible game to further the interests of the United States, often overstepping his instructions from the State Department.

Korea during this time was nominally independent but extremely weak and lacking in the political consciousness. The stories of the many intrigues that went on in Seoul is interestingly told. Both the Japanese and the Russians were seeking to get control over Korea but Russia was more concerned in controlling Manchuria and for that reason finally gave way to the Japanese who were then able to maneuver the country into a subordinate position and finally as a Japanese possession. They stopped at nothing; they even murdered the queen, who was the only strong person in the royal family and of Chinese leanings. The weak king leaned on Allen very heavily for advice and Allen even at times took care of him as practically a refugee. The book is of timely interest since the Allies have declared their intention of taking Korea from Japan. This will probably mean that some kind of Allied mandate will have to be established in Korea because of its extreme political weakness and the fact that the people have been almost completely enslaved by the Japanese, who control practically all the wealth of the country.

C. H. M.



**JAPAN: ITS RESOURCES AND INDUSTRIES.** By Clayton D. Carus and Charles L. McNichols. New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers. 252 pps. \$3.50.

THIS book presents a very comprehensive and interesting survey of the Japanese people and the resources of the country in all of their amplifications. It is of great importance at this time as it presents numerous factors which must be taken into consideration as to how we are going to crush Japan and what we are going to do with her in the postwar period. It leaves no doubt that Japan has a very high and efficient production capacity, not only for war materials but for competitive trade in the postwar world even if she is completely defeated.

Japan's geographic position is her first great resource. With the tremendous increase of trade between Asia and North America during the nineteenth century, it was channelized past Japan as that country lies along the shortest trade routes between the two continents. Our crushing of Japan must include some measures for neutralizing the strong geographic position of that country with reference to Eastern Asia. The authors believe that they are: "(1) conquest; (2) Allied administration; (3) readjustment to permit peacetime economy; (4) a change in social values; (5) abolition of subsidies to un-economic industries and liquidation of tax burdens."

They outline the reasons for Japan's great progress during the last ninety years as follows: "(1) A population that was exceedingly homogeneous, racially and psychologically. (2) The deep-rooted and fanatical reverence of the Japanese for national unity, as manifested in Mikado worship. (3) The ancient and persisting military tradition which was strengthened by the fact that they defeated a race of larger, stronger men. (4) The long experience of the Japanese in copying, adapting, and finally naturalizing an alien civilization. (5) The long period of isolation in which racial traits, good and bad, were intensified and crystallized in a set pattern, and during which a strong autocratic government, the rule of spies and censors, was established and tacitly accepted by the people as a whole as an inevitable corollary to essential unity. (6) Persistence, purposefulness, and ruthlessness, which are the outstanding qualities developed during Japan's unique history."

While there is considerable variance of opinions as to whether or not Japan should be occupied and internal reforms affected by the Allied powers, there should be no difference in opinions as to the desirability to crush the Japanese competitive system of exploiting her human resources in a ruthless manner and in subsidizing industries engaged in competitive foreign trade.

The book leaves no doubt in the mind of the reader but that Japan will have a high degree of competition potential and will come back as Germany did after World War I if strong measures are not taken to prevent it. The book is exceedingly well illustrated with groups of pictures which tell the story of different phases of Japanese industry. C. H. METCALF.

**TURKEY, KEY TO THE EAST.** By Chester M. Tobin. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 170 pp. \$2.00.

TURKEY is much in the public eye today because of the continued Russian advance in the Near East. This country is rapidly approaching the time when it must choose definitely between the Allies and the Axis. In this book the author gives the story of the development of modern Turkey, indicating its strength and weakness and shows its improvement from a military and political standpoint today.

**THE BOOK OF THE NAVY.** Selected, with notes by W. Adolphe Roberts and Lowell Brentano. Introduction by Captain Dudley W. Knox, USN (Retired). New York: Doubleday Doran and Co., Inc. 302 pp. \$3.00.

THIS anthology of naval prose and verse is arranged in chronological order and covers the entire history of the Navy—from the Revolution up to the current war against the Axis. Interesting it is to realize that some of the official reports prepared by naval commanders rank as fine prose. For an example, see John Paul Jones' "The Qualifications of a Naval Officer" or "O. H. Perry at Lake Erie" by Perry himself.

Nor are the Navy's achievements in time of peace neglected. There are "Discovery of the North Pole" by Rear Admiral Robert E. Peary and "First Flight Across the Atlantic" by Josephus Daniels, as two examples.

There is variety in the selections in this book, which appears excellent for browsing—or reading a part at a time. No naval officer will fail to be the better for the reading of it. Because it is so difficult for the average navy man or officer to track down naval lore (there are few books on the subject, and there are many ships and stations where what books there are are hard to get), it is believed that *The Book of the Navy* will be especially valuable. It would be even more valuable, however, with a complete index, and it is hoped that an index will be prepared for later printings.

GARDNER B. SOULE.

**BATAAN: THE JUDGMENT SEAT.** By Lieutenant Colonel Allison Ind. New York: The Macmillan Company. 395 pp. \$3.50.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ALLISON IND gives his own personal account of the tragedy of Bataan in *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*. However, the tragedy did not begin on December 7, 1941. It began years before when the United States was blind to the fact that some day we should have to defend the Philippines against the Japanese, and in this blindness refused to strengthen ourselves sufficiently to meet the inevitable onslaught.

Colonel Ind had been a writer and college professor before being commissioned as a reserve officer in the Army Air Forces. He went to Manila in May 1941 with General H. B. Clagett, and Lieutenant Colonel (later General) Harold H. George. He was among those who took the initial beating in Manila and who retreated step by step down Bataan peninsula. He got away twenty-four hours after General MacArthur's party.

The highlight of his story concerns a question that seems to have been strangely overlooked by the American public. That is: why, with eight hours' warning after the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, were virtually all of the American planes in the Philippines destroyed on the ground? Here is what Colonel Ind has to say on the subject:

"There had been some dispersion, unquestionably—but a photograph which fell into my possession for a few moments (a photograph made by one of our own pilots in flight over the stricken field) showed through a frame of sweeping smoke four B-17's lined up neatly. Other photographs, taken on the ground, all told a nauseating story of half-measures. The dispersion conceivably might have been adequate for high-level bombing, but offered only some inconvenience to determined low-level strafers. This entire set of photographs was removed from my desk a few nights later. No one seemed to know what happened to them."

GARRETT GRAHAM.

# MILITARY DIGEST

## The Jap Army Had Its Day\*

JAPAN'S war with the United States did not actually begin on December 7, 1941, but rather, ten years before when the Nipponese moved into Manchuria. The war with China beginning in 1937 was a continuation of the war of 1931. By the time the China War had gained momentum the Japanese, making no secret of their aims, announced that their real enemies in the east were not yellow, but white. The direct—and *foreseeable*—sequel to the attack on the Marco Polo Bridge in North China was the attack on Pearl Harbor.

At Shanghai in August, 1937, the battle between two Oriental forces was fought basically on Western principles. The Chinese force was a wall of flesh concentrated along the river banks. The Japanese force, more complex, included landing boats, armored vehicles, aircraft, and heavy guns. The wall of flesh held for three months but the shattered Chinese eventually fell back in confusion. In North China the initial enemy's success was swift. Before long, however, the Japanese were in the position of men who think they see the summit of the mountain every time they climb over a foothill. The Japanese advance had slowed; the Chinese retreated, trading space for time. After the fall of Hankow in October, 1938, the war became a stalemate.

The basic facts of this stalemate were that the Japanese could not advance with their heavy armament and the Chinese could not advance without it. In part the situation involved Japanese failure to follow through; in part it involved Chinese patience and determination. In part it hinged upon Chinese tactics. What the Chinese lacked in machines they attempted to make up for in wits. They produced a vast and varied pack of tricks, each of which they used with endless variation and with telling effect. A Chinese army can move quickly in battle. And lack of supplies, serious as it is, is compensated for by battlefield mobility. A Chinese army, supplies and all, can go up one side of a mountain and down the other. A modern army, unless it operates on a desert or a dry, flat plain, must find roads for its heavy equipment and for its supply trucks. A Chinese army is loosely organized; there are comparatively few rules of procedure, but a modern army must have tight organization and fixed rules and detailed time tables. The Japanese, of course, could use Chinese tactics, but only by giving up their relatively heavy equipment; and they had to maintain their superiority in equipment for the Chinese had a superiority in manpower.

But the very factors that had led to stalemate in China appeared to assure success against the Americans, the British, and the Dutch. In relation to China's Oriental Army, Japan's Army appeared Western; but in relation to the armies of the great Western powers, it was Oriental itself. The limitations of her economy forced her to choose between a few heavy weapons and many light ones. In the main, she chose light ones—easy-to-carry machine guns and

mortars, comparatively small fieldpieces, fragile but maneuverable fighter planes, and low-caliber rifles. She even chose a lightweight sneaker instead of a heavy boot. Light weapons raised fewer problems of organization. It is much easier to route light mortars to the front and arrange their supply than it is to route and supply heavy howitzers. Under these circumstances, the Japanese could hope to play tag with relatively immobile Western soldiers. She already had mobile detachments, infiltrating columns that could sweep around a jungle swamp as easily as around a China rice field. Experience in surf landings on hostile shores was provided by a series of raids on the China coast during 1940 and 1941, and maneuvers in Formosa and Hainan gave the troops familiarity with jungles. Tactically, Japan was ready.

Japan's opportunity came in the fall of 1941. She had to strike when she did. Otherwise the pace of British and U. S. rearmament might have made even initial victory impossible.

It was not the sort of Western blow she had delivered at Shanghai. It depended on spreading confusion in every direction and then striking toward Singapore. It paid heavy dividends. Everywhere the Japanese found an almost perfect military vacuum. There were battles, but not a war; skirmishes, but not a campaign. The Japanese had as an ally our own miscalculations and our own mistakes and our own weakness. The U. S. had too little strength in the Philippines; the Dutch had too little in the Indies; the British had too little in Malaya and Burma. By the time Singapore fell, Japan was able to take whatever she laid her hands on—Southeast Asia and most of the islands of the Pacific.

The satisfaction of the Japanese was complete. Everything they had counted on had come through. Even the U. S. and Australian soldiers had fallen back under the brilliance and force of the Japanese attack, and the Tokyo newspapers, in mock sympathy, commiserated with the Allies for their weak, spineless soldiering. But at the moment the Japanese seemed invincible, the Allies began to outfight them. On Guadalcanal, American soldiers absorbed all the Japanese tricks and added some of their own. Groups of raiders were able to run loose over the entire island, tricking, confusing, and cutting off Japanese detachments, and at the same time upsetting supply lines and destroying food, fuel, and munition dumps. Japanese tactics no longer bewildered the troops, and before long, stalemate began throughout the Southwest Pacific. That stalemate was brief. Shortly after the Japanese advance ended, the Allied advance began.

By this time it was clear, to the Japanese as well as to the Allies, that the Western soldiers could outsmart the Japanese, and at the same time do what the Japanese had failed to do—shift a heavily equipped army as quickly as a lightly equipped one.

Before the end of the second year of the Pacific war, the Japanese had ceased to regard enemy soldiers as confused weaklings and had begun to feel stirrings of respect for

\*From *Fortune*, April, 1944.



Western strategy, Western arms, and even Western bulldozers.

The Japanese have shown a very real awareness of their military problems. There is no longer the optimism of the early days; many Japanese, certainly, expect their Army to retreat. But there is not yet evidence of deep popular depression. Japan has never experienced defeat in war, and it is pleasanter to look back on the sixty-nine days of the Malaya campaign, pleasanter to remember victory celebrations, pleasanter to know that there has been a period of national glory, pride, and honor, than it is to look forward to the end of a long war.

### Japan's Power of Resistance

FOSTER BAIN, recently Advisor on Mines to the Philippine Government, was interned by the Japanese in Manila and has only lately been returned to this country. In the April issue of *Foreign Affairs* he writes with the authority of his professional background and from his personal observation on "Japan's Power of Resistance."

In measuring Japan's capacity to sustain war, we should remember that war power and industrial power, while closely related, are not identical. It may happen that a nation poorly endowed with resources but possessed of an ironbound will may accumulate enough materials in advance to enable it to prevail in war, at least for a time, over a nation richer in materials but suffering at the start from a weaker will or a less united purpose. It will be sufficient to say here that the war would not have begun, at least when it did, if the Japanese had not been misled by appearances into believing that we had neither the interest in the Far East nor the unity of purpose necessary to sustain a long and bitter war there. Our implacable determination to crush Japanese militarism is now clear. It will have a strong psychological effect on the Japanese, but whether people or leaders will crack short of military defeat cannot yet even be guessed.

Undoubtedly the Japanese seriously depleted their accumulated stores of materials in their great opening moves. The more extensive campaigns which began in December 1941 have, of course, made even heavier drafts on the Japanese stockpiles. The territories overrun by the Japanese armies contain in abundance many of the key materials which Japan lacks. But these require exploitation, and it is extremely doubtful whether up till now the Japanese have derived much benefit from them.

Capture of the oil fields in the Netherland East Indies was a major objective of the Japanese, and one of their early accomplishments. However, the employees of the owning companies carried through a thorough campaign of destruction before they withdrew. The extent of the destruction had been checked by a neutral observer. It was so complete that the owners themselves estimated that it would require a year to restore production under peacetime conditions and with free access to normal machinery markets. It is unlikely that the Japanese have either the machinery or the tankers to transport crude oil to Japan for processing. One may conclude, then, that the Japanese have not as yet profited much from their capture of the

main East Indian oil fields. It is known that gasoline is scarce within the Japanese lines and that Japan is still depending largely on her prewar stocks. Though gasoline rationing has proved very effective, any stored supply in the end must run out.

Japan's conquest of the Malayan States and the Netherland East Indies has provided her with a surplus of tin and rubber. Nor should the Japanese experience any shortage of chromite, manganese, or bauxite that can be shipped north from Malaya and the Philippines without making too serious a call on shipping. Abundant supplies of coal are available to Japan from Manchuria and Korea, and it is probable that she has been able to increase her steel supply materially since the war began by limiting the use of scrap and erecting additional blast furnaces. Though she is deficient in iron ore, there are supplies available to her in Malaya, the Philippines, and in Manchuria. A shortage of shipping and the uncertainties of railway transportation will in time, however, undoubtedly affect her production. In copper Japan faced a critical shortage, but she has been making strenuous efforts to speed mining in the Philippines and has succeeded in opening new and rich mines. Here again, shipping is her main problem.

More important, however, than any shortage of individual materials is the over-all shortage of manpower. The Japanese have not to any considerable extent won their way into the confidence and liking of the peoples they have conquered, and since they had assumed the position of friends coming to rescue the various peoples from exploitation, they are precluded from using overforceful methods to make them work when disinclined. Certainly in the Philippines at any rate, the people submit only and to the extent that they must.

The failure of the Japanese propaganda is what prevents Japan from quickly organizing industry in the conquered territories and precludes her from replacing promptly the supplies which she is currently expending. However high their courage and determination, the Japanese cannot win without sufficient guns, ammunition, and ships. They are not able to keep up the supply alone. For us, then, time is the essence of victory.

### Landing Ship, Medium

THE Navy recently admitted that it had a brand-new type of ship, which has been added to fill out its invasion repertory. The LSM—Landing Ship, Medium—is expected to fill the last gap in the range of vessels needed for amphibious jobs. Details on the LSM's use and operation were carefully withheld, its construction only sketchily described. It is over 200 ft. long, somewhere between big and small tank-landing vessels (LST and LCT). From the Navy's landing-vessel program has come a motley lot of odd, ugly but effective craft for beach assault. The LSM is the last of eleven designs (15 types). . . . With officers and men waiting, the Navy is now concentrating on production of these vessels with a high-powered incentive program of talks, movies, demonstrations in factories and shipyards. The \$5-billion landing-vessel budget calls for a vast armada of more than 80,000 by year's end.—*Time*.

### Surprise Weapons of War\*

**D**ON'T get the idea that all the surprise weapons are German, as Axis propaganda would have you believe. New weapons that are effective, particularly Allied weapons, are usually introduced in combat and not over the radio.

An example of this was the recent precision bombing of Berlin on a cloudy night. It's anybody's guess how the RAF Lancasters did it, but it would have been possible with an electric automatic pilot that could direct a plane within 40 to 60 feet of a predetermined bombing point hundreds of miles away. Such a pilot might be the answer. Whatever the means, the result was one of the biggest surprise attacks of the war.

World War II has produced more surprise weapons of the air, land and sea than any conflict in history. Some of the surprise weapons were more of a surprise to the civilians than to the military brains of the belligerents.

Allied experts, such as Oliver Stewart, the British aviation authority, put radar at the top of the list of secret weapons having the greatest effect on over-all strategy. Following in close order are power-operated gun turrets, anti-tank weapons, rocket weapons, energized rings on bombers to combat German magnetic mines, and engine developments such as the two-stage supercharger that carry aerial warfare to dizzy heights.

Some of the most effective surprise weapons—the million-candlepower searchlights used on Allied bombers to hunt subs at night—the combat formation used by Liberators and Flying Fortresses to concentrate their fire—are the least sensational. On the other hand, rocket bombs, a development in the realm of Buck Rogers, have still to prove their worth in aerial warfare.

Lack of recoil, target penetration, and range are prime factors which for years have spurred on inventors in their efforts to harness rockets. With rocket bombs, the Germans claim they are the first to develop an effective rocket weapon. It is a matter of record that rockets were first launched in this war from tubes under the wings of Russian Stormovik planes. The Germans learned about these rocket projectiles the hard way, for the targets were Nazi tanks. The principal difference between the Russian rockets fired at ground targets and the Nazi anti-bomber rockets is that the former are fired by contact fuses and the latter by time fuses. When a shell bursts 20 or 30 yards from a plane, it may destroy it, depending on where the fragments strike.

The Germans boast that they sank the Italian battleship *Roma* with a "flying bomb" carried on the wings of a rocket-assisted glider directed by remote control. The glider is said to be guided by the bombardier in a "parent plane." This winged torpedo, first described by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, may burn powder in its rocket motors or one of the fuels with which German rocket engineers have been experimenting for years. Range, operational detail, and effectiveness are matters of speculation, but experts agree such a weapon exists.

The Nazis have also allowed to "leak" out through neutral sources the existence of giant rocket guns set up along the coast of France to shell London. This "Goebbels' De-

light" is said to have a barrel 100 feet long and a range of 125 miles. The projectile, fitted with small wings, steering gear and propulsion apparatus would travel through the stratosphere. Londoners, who believe guns of this type actually have been set up, are not alarmed, for experiments have shown that the barrel would stand no more than 30 shots. Also, the flash of detonation would light up an entire countryside and be quickly spotted by reconnaissance planes.

Other rocket weapons are the German six-barreled "nebelwerfer," or fog thrower (British soldiers call it the "screaming meemie"), and the famous American bazooka. The latter, which launches a rocket projectile from a hollow tube, has proved its worth as a tank buster. The first Nazis to encounter the bazooka in Africa mistook its fire for a 155mm. gun.

While the Russians and Germans appear to lead in the development of rocket weapons, it can be told that American and British engineers have devoted exhaustive research in this field. Most rocket weapons, however, are better adapted to defensive strategy, and Allied ingenuity has been bent on offensive weapons such as the M-7 tank destroyer, the super Flying Fortress known as the B-29, torpedo planes, incendiary bullets that explode self-sealing gasoline tanks on aircraft, rifled mortars, rifle grenade thrower which hurls a grenade a distance between those covered by the hand grenade and mortar shell, parachute bombs that can be safely dropped by a low-flying plane, machine guns with increased fire power, ricochet and time shells, bombsights, and such highly technical developments as the Sperry automatic gun sight.

The Sperry gun sight, which takes the guesswork out of aerial marksmanship, is credited with helping knock down 541 Nazi fighters in a single month. It calculates the amount of "lead" on a target, the effect of gravity and the wind, points the guns and tells the gunner the precise moment to open fire. So far as is known, the Axis has nothing that even approaches this gun sight.

The Army recently announced another effective gun director. This one is used with antiaircraft guns, and it not only directs the angle of fire, but sets fuses so the shells will explode in the path of an enemy plane.

Since the beginning of the war, the enemy has shown considerable ingenuity in developing deadly torpedoes. The Russians recently reported the Nazis are using a land torpedo operated by remote control. It resembles a small tank, is about the size of a motorcycle sidecar, and has a reel of cable at the rear leading back to an operator. The operator directs the torpedo and explodes it electrically. The Russians have found the best defense is to cut the cable.

For some time, the Germans have been intent on producing a surprise weapon that would destroy Allied naval supremacy. When the submarine, holdover threat from World War I, proved ineffective in stopping convoys, the Nazis tried magnetic torpedoes and mines. The British nullified the mines with the "Wedding Ring Wimpy," an energized ring fastened to the wings of Wellington bombers. The ring causes the mines to explode harmlessly.

The two-man Jap submarine which carried two 18-inch torpedoes and a charge of high explosive under the stern

\*By Wayne Whittaker, in *Popular Mechanics*, March, 1944.



May 1944

was an innovation early in the war. This baby sub, with limited cruising range of 200 miles at low speed, has not been much of a success, according to reports. The British, however, in the pattern of alert nations at war, are believed to have taken a cue from the Japs in the development of a midget submarine that recently made a sensational debut. These tiny subs were used to penetrate a mine field along the coast of Norway and cripple the 35,000-ton German battleship *Tirpitz*. When the Italian fleet surrendered, among the craft turned over to the Allies were new models of a midget sub.

There is some basis for the statement that Yankee ingenuity is leading the world in the creation of surprise weapons. The Office of Scientific Research and Development in Washington, whose business it is to pioneer in army and navy secret weapons, has produced no less than 200 unpublicized weapons and improvements to military equipment since we entered the war.

The importance with which Congress regards this agency is evidenced by the size of its 1944 budget—\$135,982,500. This budget survived congressional hearings without one penny being deducted from the amount requested. About \$46,000,000 will be spent for electronics research and "radio co-ordination," \$20,000,000 will be devoted to the science of submarine destruction, and some \$11,000,000 are earmarked for "special projectiles."

Since this agency began to function, the armed services have let contracts for \$2,000,000,000 worth of the products it has been instrumental in developing. A single discovery saved \$1,000,000,000 in plant construction by simplifying the manufacture of an explosive.

It's a safe bet that when more deadly secret weapons make their appearance they will bear the mark: "Made in the U.S.A."

### Kwajalein Becomes a Mighty Base\*

THESE islands of Roi and Namur had been hard to take. And so had Kwajalein and the others. They belong to us now by every right and rule. We need them for our present war and for our future defense.

It was the genius of command and the guts of our fighting men that did this job in the Marshalls. It was far from a pushover. It was an expensive and beautifully timed job. We paid plenty for these necklaces of coral atolls. They are ours. Japan manhandled them from the Germans in 1914—and hoodwinked the League of Nations out of permanent mandates for them after the war. The Germans had bought them, along with the Carolines and Marianas, from Spain for a trifling \$4,500,000 at the end of the Spanish-American War. Our title to them now is clear and needs no explanation. If we are to remain in the Pacific, they must form our first line of defense beyond Pearl. They are a part of the necessary steppingstones that lead to the Philippines and the Far East. They are not loot. They are only a part of our general insurance policy against some future treachery, some second infamy of Pearl.

On moonlit nights, here on the dunes on the seaward side of this strange little island, I have talked of such

things with men who have devoted their lives to the service of their country. Rugged, determined Rear Admiral Alva D. Bernhard, commander of this sprawling atoll and of the building of a great base here, minces no words about who should own the Marshalls.

"It would be unthinkable," he said bluntly, "ever to haul down the Stars and Stripes from over these islands. We have shed American blood here to insure future American security in the Pacific. We have freed the native population, who have been living in a state of slavery. Of course, we must keep these Marshalls and allow no one to interfere with us."

### School or Work

SCHOOL or work—which should the returning serviceman choose after the war? This poser was mooted by six prominent American civilians\* in the April issue of the *Leatherneck*. All agreed that education was essential to a successful life—whether that success be in business or the enjoyment of living. But there the concurrence stopped. Three of the four who were college graduates believed wholeheartedly in the worth of formal education. The fourth (Charles Kettering) holds that, "The important thing is the man and the way he uses his knowledge and opportunities, not his degree."

David Sarnoff, while pointing out the advantages of attending an institution, contends that, "The real problem is not whether education should be 'completed' but rather how best to continue it. No matter which choice is made the process will be one of self-education. Every man will learn ultimately that the greatest of all teachers is experience and the greatest of all universities is life itself. But it is easier if he can make good use of school and college."

Sidney Hillman, naturally, places more emphasis on technical education, and points out, "The postwar market, with its new needs, new inventions, new processes, undoubtedly will demand technical training of a high degree. The returned fighting man ought to get it where it is most quickly available, with government aid if necessary."

This discussion, of course, revolved around the man who left school to go immediately to war. It might well apply also to those men who were discontented with their lot in civilian life. They, too, can profit through educational programs while in the Marine Corps and afterwards, through the governmental aid now being planned for discharged fighting men.

\*Contributors were: Charles Kettering, head of General Motors research laboratory; graduate engineer; inventor of auto self-starter; Delco lighting. Donald Douglas, president, Douglas Aircraft Company; pioneer plane builder; onetime Annapolis student and engineer graduate of MIT. David Sarnoff, who rose from telegraph messenger boy in New York to become president of the Radio Corporation of America. Clarence A. Dykstra, president, University of Wisconsin; former city manager of Cincinnati and director, Selective Service System. Sidney Hillman, president, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America; co-chief of defense program at beginning of war. Ernest K. Lindley, Washington correspondent of *Newsweek*; syndicated news columnist and radio commentator; Rhodes scholar.

\*By Frazier Hunt in the *Saturday Evening Post*, March 25, 1944.

### Jungle Tactics\*

IN the April issue of *Military Review* an article appeared, which contains some observations on tactics which the editor believes to be worth repeating. It is pointed out that no jungle situations are identical but that the basic conditions are: (1) extremely limited visibility; (2) limited ranges of all flat-trajectory weapons; (3) scarcity of established routes and difficulty of road construction; and (4) physical limitations on cross-country movement. All of the foregoing are tactical factors of prime importance.

Artillery support in jungle warfare is handicapped in a number of ways but can be made quite effective if it is adopted to the special conditions. Survey sections, while working under serious handicaps, can be expected to conduct surveys adequate for the preparation of firing charts. Registration fire should be conducted on all available key points.

For the close support of infantry attacks adjustments must be started well over the lines and fire worked back by the sound and fragment method—that is, until fragments are actually received in the area occupied by friendly troops. This is imperative in order to bring effective fire on enemy positions, which will be only a few yards in front of our leading elements. Any attempt to make a temporary withdrawal during this supporting fire will only result in the Japs moving forward, and the ground will have to be won back with consequent losses. Troops in the jungle soon learn the value of closely adjusted artillery fire.

The actual destructive effect of artillery fire in the jungle

is of course reduced, but the shock effect on enemy personnel is sufficient to enable infantry units following closely behind artillery concentrations to advance against well-organized positions with minimum losses.

Delay fuzes are usually necessary to insure penetration of the shell to the jungle floor. Instantaneous fuzes result in bursts in the tree tops, which, however, is an effective way to clear out tree snipers.

Despite the obvious difficulties, tanks *can* operate in the jungle. The principal use of tanks in the jungle is in the reduction of definitely located centers of resistance holding up the infantry advance.

Tank action in the jungle moves at a snail's pace. Routes must be prepared for each tank's advance to the line of departure. Infantry units must be assigned to move forward with each tank. Tanks advance slowly, spraying the jungle with canister and machine-gun fire, cutting down foliage. When bunkers are located, a few rounds of armor-piercing ammunition open a hole, then high explosive is used to detonate inside. Foxholes are overrun.

Their infantry support must keep close to prevent the Japs from rushing in from blind spots to plant magnetic mines on the tanks. The tank is lost without close support by infantry and by other tanks. The resulting combat is a far cry from the dashing tactics once visualized for armor, but it gets results and saves lives when carefully planned teamwork is the rule.

\*From the *Military Review*, April, 1944. "Campaigning in the Jungle," by Lt. Col. B. L. Paige, USA.

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## Events of a Month

(Continued from inside front cover)

vance into India, as the Japanese announce the capture of Kohima.

April 9—British forces drive Japanese patrols out of Kohima.

The "softening up" of Truk continues. Ponape and New Guinea are also under attack.

### THE UNITED STATES

March 10—A new ruling agreed upon by the Army and Navy allows regular officers of the armed forces to accept such nominations for political office as come without solicitation by themselves.

March 11—Foreign Economic Administrator Leo T. Crowley reports that from March, 1941 to December 31, 1943, lend-lease aid totaled \$19,986,000,000. Mr. Crowley, Under Secretary of State Stettinius and members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee agree that lend-lease has paid the United States enormous dividends in lives saved and "security for our homes and soil."

It is learned that the Navy Department supports the Middle East oil development project which has been widely criticized in the United States.

March 12—Stating that "government must and will help" in the task of reabsorbing returning veterans, Governor Bricker, aspirant for the Republican Presidential nomination, continues, "but it is the duty of every American citizen who appreciates liberty and who has a sense of responsibility to support and promote decent employment in private industry."

March 13—A committee of 11 members with a fund of \$25,000 is established by the Senate to investigate the nations petroleum sources and the production and consumption of oil in relation to national security.

March 14—By a vote of 47 to 31, the Senate passes the "States' rights" compromise soldier vote bill restricting the use of the federal ballot.

Charles E. Wilson of the War Production Board claims that German air superiority has been outfought and outproduced.

March 15—The House of Representatives passes the "states' rights" soldier vote compromise bill by a vote of 273 to 111 and submits it to the President who immediately telegraphs to the Governors of all the states to indicate to him whether the federal ballot will be declared an acceptable supplement to the state ballots. The bill, now passed by the House and the Senate, provides first for the use of the state ballot and secondly for the use of the federal ballot only if the absentee service man outside the United States has failed to receive a state ballot by October 1, having applied for it before September 1, and if the governor of his state has certified by July 15 that the use of the federal ballot is legal under the laws of the state.

Major General Lewis B. Hershey, Selective Service Director, informs local draft officials that by July 1, 240,000 men deferred for occupational reasons will probably have to be drafted while 250,000 more pre-Pearl Harbor fathers will be taken to meet service requirements.

March 16—Donald M. Nelson, chairman of the War Production Board, tells the Steel Advisory Committee of the WPB that the great need for fighting men

has reconciled military leaders to declines in war production.

March 17—President Roosevelt again tells a press conference that there is a serious need of men under 26 years of age in the Army. He states the problem is to get the young men into service without disrupting vital war industry.

March 21—Secretary of State Hull issues a 17-point program of American foreign policy aimed at a postwar world of international cooperation.

It is learned that Eric A. Johnston, president of the United States Chamber of Commerce, will visit Soviet Russia upon the invitation of Premier Stalin, to investigate the Russian system.

Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, defends the Arabian oil project extending from Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean as a measure of sound economy and wise national insurance.

March 22—The White House discloses that 47 states have replied to President Roosevelt's telegram on the soldier-vote bill. Twenty-one Governors indicate that their states are likely to use the federal ballot under certain circumstances; 21 states appear unlikely to use the federal ballot under any circumstances; four are uncertain; one state has not replied conclusively while South Carolina has failed to answer at all.

March 23—The House Foreign Affairs Committee approves the extension of the Lend-Lease Act for another year with an amendment to give Congress a check on any postwar military or economic obligations to which the President may attempt to commit the country in writing off the lend-lease contracts as paid.

March 24—President Roosevelt states that by July 1, 5,000,000 men in the services will be overseas. The President also declares that less than two per cent of the available supply of American farm machinery has been exported to our Allies while members of the British Empire have been supplying large quantities of food to United States troops under reverse lend-lease.

The "G.I. Bill of Rights" providing for hospitalization; education and vocational training; loans for homes, farms and businesses; unemployment benefits and employment service for veterans of this war is passed by the Senate.

March 27—Donald M. Nelson of the War Production Board reports that aircraft production for the month of February rose four per cent while munitions output fell one per cent.

The Supreme Court has decided that men become soldiers in the Army when they receive the induction oath and not when accepted for duty following physical and mental examinations.

March 28—Paul V. McNutt, chairman of the War Manpower Commission, tells the House Military Affairs subcommittee holding hearings on the desirability of a national service law, that he is not in favor of such a measure for the present.

It is learned that the War Department's new regulations will cut the Army's quota of students scheduled to enter medical and dental schools next year by 50 per cent.

March 31—The "states' rights" soldier vote bill becomes a law without the President's signature. In a special message to Congress, President Roosevelt urges Congress to amend it in

order to provide for a wider and freer use of the federal ballot.

It is learned that Selective Service has taken measures to freeze men qualified for limited service in the armed forces in jobs contributing to the war effort. An attempt is being made to separate essential from non-essential 4-F's in proposed legislation to provide for drafting the latter.

The War Department orders that the college air crew training phase of the Army Air Forces program be ended on June 30.

April 3—The Supreme Court, by an eight-to-one decision, declares that Negroes cannot legally be barred from voting in the Texas Democratic primaries. Although the ruling applies only to Texas, Southern Congressmen fear that it may be extended to the primaries of other states.

The Aircraft Production Board reveals that plane production for the month of March reached 9,118 planes.

April 4—A Department of Justice report indicates that department action against spies and saboteurs was successful for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1943.

The Army, Navy and War Shipping Administration reveal that they are setting up machinery to put into effect the new soldier voting law as soon as possible.

The Civil Aeronautics Authority announces its intention to build 6,000 air fields and airports after the war.

April 5—Wendell L. Willkie announces his withdrawal as a candidate for the Republican Presidential nomination, following his defeat in the Wisconsin Republican primary. Mr. Willkie had chosen the state of Wisconsin for a test of that section's attitude toward international cooperation. He interprets his defeat as evidence that the mid-West advocates a policy of isolation.

April 6—The Office of War Information reveals that the Army has now attained its goal of 7,700,000 men but that drafting must continue around present levels until July 1, in order to supply necessary Army and Navy replacements. The Navy is 400,000 men short of its 3,600,000 goal.

Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York still declines to become an avowed candidate for the Republican Presidential nomination although Wendell Willkie has withdrawn from the race. Governor Bricker of Ohio, another Republican Presidential aspirant, states that he will intensify his own campaign.

Major General Lewis B. Hershey, Director of Selective Service, declares that mobilization and demobilization will reach equality in July and will continue at that level for as long as possible.

April 8—Major General Lewis B. Hershey of the Selective Service System, orders draft boards to suspend the induction calls of all men over 26 until the younger age group has been processed.

April 9—In a speech to the people of the nation, Secretary of State Cordell Hull defines United States foreign policy. The speech calls for the complete elimination of Nazism and Fascism in all countries, makes clearer American policy toward the French Committee of National Liberation and the Badoglio government, and warns neutral nations against continuing their aid to Axis nations and vows that neither Hull nor President Roosevelt has made or will make any secret agreements.

# *Books for Marines*

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By WILLARD PRICE

The 264 pages of this book offer the most comprehensive and interesting encyclopedia of Micronesia one is likely to find. And it undoubtedly contains the most recent authoritative information available to the general public about the islands of Micronesia (the Carolines, Marianas, and Marshalls). The author had spent many years in the Far East, writing for American and British publications; and, in 1935, he and his wife journeyed from Tokyo through Micronesia, ostensibly as research scientists. They recorded the habits of the natives, the geography of the islands, the flora and fauna—and the Japanese fortifications. \$3.00.

## **ISLANDS OF THE PACIFIC**

By HAWTHORNE DANIEL

The author conscientiously discusses each of the island groups of the Pacific, from the Aleutians to the Philippines. A great deal of valuable information is included on their respective locations, physical appearance, climate, topography, plant and animal life, peoples, languages, government and resources. \$2.50.

## **BANZAI NOEL**

By CAPTAIN GARRETT GRAHAM, USMCR

This book, which might well be sub-titled "Memoirs of a Metallic," gives the reader a sidelight on the war in the Pacific such as none other does. The author comments freely on a wide variety of subjects, from life under daily bombing on Guadalcanal to the manners, morals, and allure of South Sea maidens. The book is remarkable for its vigor, its high spirits, and its utter honesty. \$2.00.

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